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Chapter 1
Introduction
Population aging has become a major challenge to a growing number of countries
around the world. It describes a shift in a country’s age distribution towards the
elderly. Two main developments are responsible for this phenomenon: a decrease
in fertility rates and an increase in life expectancy. The demographic shift towards
aging societies has started in more developed countries and by now also affects
developing countries. It will remain an important challenge throughout the 21st
century in many countries, though the level, intensity and timing will differ. This
dissertation consists of a set of empirical papers that address this important topic
from different angles.
The shift in a country’s demographic age structure has profound and far-reaching
consequences on economic conditions within and between countries. Most obviously,
it strains the financial situation of social security systems, as a rising number of
pensioners has to be supported by a shrinking workforce. Compared to the effects
of population aging on social security systems, the effects on the economy as a whole
are less widely discussed: markets for goods and services as well as labor and capital
markets are also affected.
The demand for goods and services varies over the life cycle. A shift in the
age structure, therefore, results in changing patterns of demand and consumption
(Lu¨hrmann 2005). At the macroeconomic level these changes are likely to trigger
sector shifts in production and, thus, labor markets (Bo¨rsch-Supan 2003b). The size
and structure of the effects on domestic production and labor markets depend on a
country’s international trading activities and the sectoral mobility of employees.
Production and labor markets are also affected by demographic change through
labor productivity. In an aging economy the productivity of older workers gains
in importance: In Germany, for example, the share of workers older than 55 years
will double from 12 percent today to almost a quarter of the total workforce in
2035. However, the age profile of productivity at an aggregate level is not yet very
well understood (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Du¨zgu¨n and Weiss 2005). For projections of the
effects of population aging on macroeconomic measures such as economic growth
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this is a key issue. Chapter 2 underlines the importance of labor productivity and
human capital when simulating future economic growth depending on stagnating or
increasing fertility rates using an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model.
In an aging economy, the labor force not only becomes older but also smaller. As
a consequence, capital is abundant relative to labor. Cross-country differences in the
timing and level of the aging process induce international capital flows (Lu¨hrmann
2003), because younger countries have lower capital-labor ratios and higher asset re-
turns. A phenomenon that is widely discussed in this context and that has attracted
much attention in the popular and academic press is the so-called “asset-meltdown”.
Several voices have pushed forward the argument that high savings of the baby-boom
cohorts not only contributed to the rise in stock prices in the 1990s but might in the
future also be responsible for a large decline in asset values when selling financial
assets for their retirement consumption: an “asset-meltdown” (Siegel 1998). When
the baby-boomers reach retirement within thirty years from now, they will start to
withdraw their financial assets in order to finance consumption. This puts pressure
on asset prices as subsequent cohorts, the baby busters, are much smaller and their
demand of financial assets is correspondingly lower. The question of whether this
causes a substantial “asset-meltdown” has led to divergent answers in the academic
literature (Brooks (2002), Poterba (2001) and (2004)). Using an Overlapping Gen-
erations (OLG) model, Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2007) show that well
functioning capital markets channel capital from aging into younger countries such
that a decline in asset returns is dampened. The extent of capital mobility is a
decisive factor for the amount of such demographically induced capital flows. For a
better understanding it is, therefore, necessary to further empirically explore vari-
ous institutional factors that impede perfect capital mobility. In this dissertation, I
investigate the relevance of institutional capital market frictions for cross-border in-
vestments and the historical experiment of the formation of the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) as an example of increased financial market integration
and capital mobility (Chapters 3 and 4).
As mentioned above, the most obvious and most widely discussed effect of de-
mographic change is on the social security system. In many developed countries
pension systems are of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) type. PAYG systems are char-
acterized by contributors in the current labor force paying for the current retired
generations. In aging populations the number of contributors in the workforce sub-
stantially decreases relative to the number of pensioners. This already tense financial
situation is often aggravated by governments offering generous early retirement and
preretirement pathways (Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004a and 2004b).
These developments have prompted many countries to reform their pension sys-
tems in two main respects. First, a shift towards (partially) funded pension systems
is undertaken which allows for lower replacement rates, i.e., the average net pub-
lic pension income relative to average net labor income. As a consequence, people
have to substitute private and company pension plans for public old-age provisions.
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Second, the PAYG system itself is modified by reducing incentives to retire early
and by increasing the statutory retirement entry age. This dampens the decrease
in the number of contributors relative to beneficiaries depending on how responsive
people are towards new pension rules. Such reforms do not only have positive effects
on the financial situation of the pension system but, as discussed above, also have
important consequences for labor and capital markets by changing the relative size
of the workforce. Chapter 5 examines the long-term implications of various reform
options on retirement entry decisions and the actual retirement age of older workers
in Germany. In particular, the effects of an increased statutory retirement age and
of the introduction of adjustment costs for early retirement are examined.
The above mentioned issues are not exhaustive but present an overview of the
most important economic effects of population aging. The present dissertation con-
sists of empirical research papers that touch some of these issues. Selective questions
of the causes and consequences as well as potential policy responses to population
aging are analyzed. Each of the Chapters 2 to 4 is a self-contained paper with its
own introduction and appendix. Chapter 5 contains two papers that are closely
related to one another. However, each of them can be read independently. This
implies that a few of the arguments and little parts of the literature reviews are
repeated.
Chapter 2 is based on a paper by Berkel, Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter
(2004) and undertakes a thought experiment concerning the roots of population
aging, namely demographics itself. The paper poses the intuitive question of whether
an increase in a country’s fertility rate could dampen the consequences of population
aging. While the popular notion - “if we have too many elderly we need more
children in order to compensate for this” - seems plausible at first, the results of
economic theory are ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher fertility rate can have
the effect of reducing the tax and social security burden imposed by the aging
process. Additional positive effects arise if a higher fertility rate increases a society’s
human capital. On the other hand, children entail costs, in particular for their
education. It is impossible to quantify the complex interaction between birth rates
and economic growth ex-post empirically, because the aging process is historically
unique and there is no example of a complete aging process yet. Therefore, an OLG
model for Germany is employed that structurally maps the complex interactions
between the aging process and macroeconomic variables such as per capita economic
growth over a period of more than a generation. The results are differentiated:
Higher fertility rates only result in higher per capita gross national income if the
additional children born are also better educated and trained. Consequently, the
formation of human capital and not a higher fertility rate itself is decisive for long-
term growth. Moreover, it takes a very long transitional period until a higher fertility
rate results in a larger and better-educated labor force that contributes to social
security. Therefore, reforms of the social security system still have the highest
priority because this is the only way to solve the problems of an aging baby-boomer
3
generation in the short and medium term - meaning the time until the baby-boomers
retire.
While Chapter 2 maps the interactive consequences of population aging on rel-
evant macroeconomic measures in a general equilibrium simulation model, the re-
maining chapters are based on empirical methods. They elaborate in more detail
on single issues that are directly or indirectly related to population aging: On the
one hand, capital market frictions and the extent of capital mobility are explored.
On the other hand, effects of social security reforms on the distribution of actual
retirement entry age are investigated.
Chapter 3 is based on Berkel (2004) and examines which institutional capital
market frictions impede perfect capital mobility. Despite large potential gains, in-
ternational equity investment is less diversified across countries than predicted by
the international version of the traditional capital asset pricing model (ICAPM).
According to the ICAPM, individuals should hold equities from around the world in
accordance to the countries’ world market capitalizations. However, empirical facts
reveal that international portfolios are largely home biased. Using data on bilat-
eral equity portfolio holdings for 38 countries, the paper compares the theoretically
predicted share of foreign assets at the country level as predicted by the ICAPM
under perfect capital mobility to the actual shares observed in the data. The differ-
ence between these two values is then taken to investigate the relevance of different
capital market frictions: financial market development, information asymmetries
and direct barriers such as capital controls. Two important findings are reported:
First, besides a home bias in equities for most country pairs, a ‘friendship bias’ can
be observed for some country pairs, which are mostly located in the EU. This re-
sult already suggests that information and familiarity links between countries play
an important role. Second, indirect barriers such as the degree of financial mar-
ket development and especially information asymmetries have strong explanatory
power. In contrast, direct barriers such as capital flow restrictions have no signifi-
cant impact, which might be due to low data quality, though. Based on this work,
identified capital market frictions can be incorporated in OLG models in order to
simulate demographically induced capital flows. Corresponding approaches on how
to implement capital market frictions are also shortly sketched in this chapter.
Whereas Chapter 3 gives a broad overview on various capital market frictions,
Chapter 4 investigates the importance of a single event, namely the formation of
a currency union. The paper analyzes the effect of European financial integration,
especially of the EMU, on gross portfolio flows between Germany and 47 countries
from 1987 to 2002. A gravity model of bilateral asset trade is estimated. The
results reveal that there is substantially more portfolio trade between Germany and
countries also participating in the EMU. This effect evolves smoothly over time. In
particular in 2002, cross-border portfolio flows between Germany and EMU countries
are significantly larger compared to flows between Germany and Denmark, the UK,
and Sweden which are part of the EU-15 but not of the Euro area. Moreover,
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the paper investigates whether economic changes intertwined with the formation
of the EMU can explain part of its effect on portfolio investment. Changes in
exchange rate volatility, financial market development and increased real economic
integration among EMU countries have significant effects on German gross portfolio
flows, but they can not account for the positive effect on German gross portfolio
flows due to the formation of the EMU. Finally, heterogeneous country responses
to this event are revealed. The EMU effect on gross portfolio flows is larger for
countries with more developed banking and equity markets and for country pairs
with more correlated business cycles. The analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 show that
the assumption of perfect capital mobility is less problematic within EMU countries
compared to within and between other regions.
Chapter 5 is motivated by the question of how different pension reform options
affect retirement entry decisions of older workers. The first part of the chapter is
based on Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) and focuses on the changes in pension
legislation since 1992 and the reform options discussed by the German Social Secu-
rity Reform Commission installed in 2002 (“Ru¨rup Kommission”). Theses options
include shifts in the adjustment factors of early retirement and an increase in the
statutory retirement age from age 65 to 67. The aim of the paper is to provide an
econometric estimate of the long-term impact of these reform options on retirement
entry decisions in Germany. In a first step, a structural model is estimated which
relates the actual retirement decisions of older workers in the data to the relevant
pension rules. In a second step, pension reform rules are changed and future re-
tirement decisions are simulated based on the estimated coefficients of the model.
The simulations show that the early retirement adjustment factors introduced by the
1992 pension reform will raise the average effective retirement age for men by almost
two years. The two-year increase in all relevant age limits proposed by the “Ru¨rup
Kommission” would raise the retirement age of men by another eight months. The
results show that these reform options offer major potential for postponing the ef-
fective age of retirement and for regaining financial sustainability of the German
PAYG public pension system. The analysis employs survey-based data of the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and relies on the individual retirement entry
age as self-defined by the interview respondents.
The second part of Chapter 5 discusses the identification of preretirement and
its characteristics in administrative data of individuals’ retirement entries in 2003
published by the German Pension Insurance (“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”). Ad-
ministrative data is very valuable because large samples and detailed information on
pension claims and labor-market status before retirement are provided. In this data
- in contrast to the GSOEP data mentioned above - retirement entry age is defined
as the age when receiving old-age pension payments for the first time. This classifi-
cation does not cover preretirement, which refers to retirement entries before early
retirement, i.e., before age 60 or 63. Identifying and characterizing preretirement
is an important exercise in this context since preretirement cases are in the center
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of interest in recent German pension and labor-market reform initiatives. The data
underlines that preretirement is frequently used in Germany: 40 percent of all men
and women in the sample preretire. On average they stay 2.4 years in preretirement
before taking one of the regular retirement plans. Furthermore, differences between
individual determinants of the retirement age for those choosing preretirement pro-
grams as opposed to regular public pension plans are discussed. Once sufficiently
long time series data will be available in the future, deeper analyses of the effects
of pension and labor-market reforms on retirement entries, especially preretirement,
can be undertaken based on the insights gained in this paper.
To summarize, this dissertation elaborates on different topics relevant for a bet-
ter understanding of the economic consequences of population aging. It investigates
the impact of demographic change on economic growth, the determinants of interna-
tional investment - relevant inter alia for predicting future demographically induced
capital flows - and evaluates potential reforms of the German pension system.
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Chapter 2
Births, Economic Growth and
Population Aging
2.1 Introduction1
The gradually accelerating demographic change is one of the key factors shaping
the future development of our society. In an aging population a shrinking working
age population is accompanied by a rising number of pensioners. In the future this
means that the financial burden of supporting ever more pensioners will fall on ever
fewer shoulders and will exercise increasing pressure on social security systems and
on the economy as a whole.
To date discussion has focused primarily on the consequences of aging, and on
the financing and design of the public pension system. However, it would also make
sense to investigate the causes of the aging phenomenon, focusing in particular on
the continuing decrease of the fertility rate. The obvious question to ask is whether
the aging problem can be solved by raising the fertility rate?
Economic theory is unable to provide an unambiguous answer to this question.
Neo-classical growth theory postulates a negative long-term relationship between
the rate of growth of a homogeneous population and per capita production as the
per capita output of one additional worker falls when a country’s labor force grows
(Solow 1956). However, this comparative static model does not do justice to the
complex relationships pertaining between the population structure and overall eco-
nomic development. In the short and medium term - and particularly during a
period of demographic change - the connection between fertility rate and economic
growth is not clear cut at all. Whether changes in population growth hinder, pro-
mote, or have no impact at all on economic growth has long been debated between
1This is a joint paper with Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan, Alexander Ludwig and Joachim Winter. A
German version has been published in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik (2004), 5(1), pp. 71-90.
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economists and demographers without reaching any conclusive answer.2
The key aspects of economic theory which need to be included in any consider-
ation of this issue can be outlined very briefly. A higher fertility rate can have the
effect of reducing the tax and social security contribution burden imposed by the
aging process. A higher fertility rate may also increase a society’s human capital
which in turn has a positive impact on growth (Lucas (1988), Romer (1986)). On the
other hand, children also entail short-term costs (particularly for their education)
which must be paid for by society (Cutler et al. (1990), Weil (1999)). However, in
reality the detailed workings of these mechanisms are highly complex.
All in all, these opposing effects make it very difficult to arrive at a theory which
adequately explains the impact of higher birth rates on economic growth in an
aging society and a quantitative analysis is therefore required. It seems appropriate
to perform an empirical ex-post analysis in order to determine the influence of a
higher fertility rate on economic growth. However, for a number of reasons this
approach would not generate satisfactory results:
(1) The aging process is historically unique. The aging society is a late 20th cen-
tury phenomenon. History can provide no examples of any society or economy
which has completed an aging process of this nature.
(2) The observable time frame for the current aging process is not long enough to
be able to analyze past developments to demonstrate the impact of changed
fertility rates on economic growth in Germany. The aging process is the out-
come of the lower fertility rates prevalent since the beginning of the 1970s and
therefore only stretches back one generation. What is more, as children first
need to be raised, educated and trained before they can join the labor force
and contribute to gross national income (GNI), it takes 20 to 25 years before
the impact of changes in the fertility rate becomes apparent in terms of overall
economic output.
(3) The interactions between the fertility rate and economic growth are extremely
complex and for this reason it is unlikely that they will be adequately explained
by drawing on developments in the relatively recent past alone.
For these reasons the interaction of fertility rates and economic growth can be
more effectively studied using a macroeconomic simulation model. It is capable
of structurally mapping the complex interactions between the aging process and
macroeconomic variables such as per capita economic growth over a period of more
than one generation. The model can simulate various fertility rates and calculate
their impact on economic growth in the period 2000 to 2100. This long period of
time is necessary in order to encompass both short-term and extremely long-term
developments. In order to register the full impact of a change in the fertility rate it
2A review can be found in Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001).
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must be monitored for a period equivalent to at least the entire lifespan of a single
individual.3
The simulation model used in this study4 consists of three related components: a
demographic projection, a workforce projection and a macroeconomic model based
on these two forecasts. In order to analyze the overall economic impact of a change
in the fertility rate, the demographic projection entail three fertility scenarios. The
initial scenario is based on the assumption that the current fertility rate in Germany
of around 1.36 children per woman remains unchanged. This initial scenario is then
contrasted with an increase in the fertility rate to 1.8 children per woman. A fertil-
ity rate of this magnitude currently applies in France (1.8), in some Scandinavian
countries (Denmark 1.65, Norway 1.70) and the United States (1.93). Also a po-
tential further fall in the fertility rate to 1.1 children per woman is examined. This
is roughly the rate to be found in some Southern European countries (Spain 1.13
or Italy 1.20) and many Eastern European countries (e.g. Bulgaria 1.10, the Czech
Republic 1.16). The workforce projection is based on the demographic projection
and on assumptions regarding the future age and gender-specific composition of the
workforce. The demographic and workforce projections - which are presented in
Section 2.2 - provide the exogenous data for the macroeconomic simulation model.
The description of the macroeconomic simulation model - a multi-country model
with overlapping generations - is presented in Section 2.3 and provides the relevant
macroeconomic variables such as German GNI and growth rates. The results are
discussed in Section 2.4.
2.2 Demographic and Workforce Projections
The starting point of the simulations are demographic projections that differ with
respect to various forecast rates of birth that feed back into the workforce projections
and the macroeconomic model. The demographic model for Germany is the product
of an extrapolation differentiated according to age and sex. Although this study only
investigates variations in fertility rates, our model is actually capable of combining
various fertility, mortality and migration scenarios.
In the reference scenario the fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman,5 which has
remained more or less unchanged over the last two decades, is extrapolated to the
3Guest and McDonald (2002) also use a simulation model to study a similar issue and consider
the influence of a falling fertility rate on the standard of living in Australia.
4A comprehensive and detailed explanation of the method adopted can be found in the study
undertaken for the Heidelberg Office of Family Affairs and Social Security (“Heidelberger Bu¨ro fu¨r
Familienfragen und soziale Sicherheit”) (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Berkel, Ludwig and Winter 2002).
5The fertility rate refers to the total fertility rate (TFR). TFR is defined as the average number
of children that would be born to a woman by the time she ended childbearing if she were to pass
through all her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) of a given
year. Both TFR and ASFR are employed in our demographic projections.
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future for Western Germany (Table 2.1). It is also assumed that the fertility rate of
1.15 per woman in Eastern Germany will continue to adjust to the rate in Western
Germany until 2015. The scenario of a constant fertility rate is then compared
with the alternative scenarios in other European countries referred to briefly in the
introduction. On the one hand it is assumed that the fertility rate will increase from
1.4 to 1.8 children per woman by 2015. In the other scenario the fertility rate drops
roughly symmetrically to 1.1 children per woman. Both scenarios help to illustrate
the range of effects of variations in the fertility rate on economic growth.6
Table 2.1: Fertility rate projections
decreasing constant increasing
West East West East West East
1999 1.4 1.14 1.4 1.14 1.4 1.14
2015 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8
2100 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2001) for the year 1999.
The values for 2015 and 2100 are based upon our fertility
scenarios.
The assumptions regarding life expectancy and labor force projections in Ger-
many are based on the medium forecast scenario of Birg and Bo¨rsch-Supan (1999).
These variables initially differ in Western and Eastern Germany but subsequently
converge over time. The demographic projections diverge from the forecasts by Birg
and Bo¨rsch-Supan (1999) with regard to the migration figures. In the present paper
the ratio of immigrants to the overall German population established in 1999 is ex-
trapolated. Demographic changes can consequently be unambiguously assigned to
differences in fertility scenarios.
As international capital flows are allowed for in the macroeconomic simulation
model and therefore other countries are modeled as well, demographic and labor
force projections are also needed for those other countries, namely EU countries.
They are taken from the United Nations projections (UN 2000) and the OECD
Labor Force Statistics (OECD 1999).
At a constant fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman Germany’s current popu-
lation of around 82 million would be almost halved in 100 years (Figure 2.1 a). A
30 per cent higher fertility rate of 1.8 children per woman would significantly slow
down the contraction of the population but would not be enough to stabilize it as
6In addition to these scenarios of rapidly increasing or falling fertility rates in the period up
to 2015, also more gradual changes in the period up to 2030 have been studied. The differences
between these two alternatives and the variants presented here are negligible in the medium term;
cf. Bo¨rsch-Supan, Berkel, Ludwig and Winter (2002).
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this value is still below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. Projections
of the number of children - here defined as all those under 20 years of age - reflect
overall demographic projections (Figure 2.1 b).
Figure 2.1: Projections of population and number of children
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During the first 10 year period the number of children does not differ significantly
from one scenario to the next as the fertility rate must first settle at the new level.
In the long term, all the scenarios predict a decline in the total German population
and number of children. Both the population and number of children will decrease
considerably faster if the fertility rate drops than if it were to increase.
The additional children who would be born if the fertility rate were to increase
will (on average) join the labor force at the age of 20. Only then will they enlarge
the supply of labor. As a result, a change in the fertility rate between 2002 and 2015
will therefore only affect the size of the working age population from 2035 onwards
(Figure 2.2 a). Likewise the number of pensioners will only change around 60 years
later (Figure 2.2 b).
These figures clearly illustrate the problem of an aging Germany: The number of
pensioners will rise up to the year 2035 both absolutely and relative to the workforce
as the old-age dependency ratio (Figure 2.3) clearly shows.7 This dramatic increase
will take place when the 1960s baby-boomers reach retirement age from 2020 on-
wards. If the birth rate were to increase, the old-age dependency ratio would fall
again from 2035 onwards; at a constant fertility rate, the ratio would remain un-
changed. If the fertility rate were to drop even further, the old-age dependency ratio
would continue to increase even after 2040.
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 have important things to tell: Even if the fertility rate was to
rapidly increase, the aging problem would still be inescapable in the period up to
2035. In fact such an increase would exacerbate the overall dependency ratio even
7The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of employed persons to pensioners.
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Figure 2.2: Working age population and number of pensioners
a. working age population
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Figure 2.3: Old-age dependency ratio
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further in the short term as the increased number of children would also have to be
supported by the working age population. This means that in the long term positive
effects on the economy as a whole can only be expected after an initial aging summit
is reached around 2035.
2.3 A Model of the German Economy
Within the focus of this study the effects of demographic change on the economy as a
whole are of outstanding importance. Therefore the demographic scenarios outlined
in Section 2.2 are embedded in a model of the German economy. The workforce
projections of the previous section provide the labor supply of the future. In the
model this variable is a central determinant of the object of our study: per capita
GNI and its growth.
An Overlapping Generations (OLG) model is employed which is particularly
suitable for examining demographic changes. The concept of an OLG model was
originally devised by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). The variant presented
in the following expands the model proposed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)8
to include several countries and thus accounts for the impact of international cap-
ital markets and goods on national economies (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter
(2003b); Ludwig (2002)).9
It is assumed that perfect capital markets exist between the countries considered
and that capital can flow freely over national borders. As the following observations
examine the economic development of Germany in the context of its interactions
with economic developments in other EU countries, the assumption of perfect capital
mobility approximates to reality fairly well, especially since the introduction of the
euro has finally eliminated exchange rate risks in the eurozone.10 The more regions
which are considered, the less realistic is the assumption of perfect capital markets,
however.11
8Cf. Chapter 3 in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
9Models of overlapping generations are a favorite method of studying the impact of population
aging on the economy; refer to Kotlikoff, Smetters andWalliser (1999, 2001), De Nardi, Imrohoroglu
and Sargent (1999) and Altig et al. (2001) for the USA; Miles and Iben (2000) for the United
Kingdom and Fehr (2000) and Hirte (2002) for Germany.
10Chapter 3 indicates that the degree of international diversification in the eurozone and within
the EU-15 countries is relatively advanced compared to other regions. As Chapter 4 shows, the de-
gree of capital flows with Germany has increased in light of the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU).
11In contrast to the flows of capital and goods that are determined endogenously in the model,
migration is determined exogenously by the demographic model.
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2.3.1 The Model Structure
In the model the economy has three sectors: the household sector, the production
sector and the (rudimentary) state sector. The most interesting aspect of the state
sector is in the context of the present paper the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) retirement
insurance system.
In the household sector, households maximize their consumption and have per-
fect foresight regarding the utility they derive from their consumption over their
lifetime. The key notion in this model is consumption smoothing: Households dis-
tribute their consumption as evenly as possible over their lifetime. As older family
members no longer receive earnings from paid work and the public PAYG pension
is lower than the pensioner’s final wage income, households build up savings during
working life to avoid a dramatic reduction in consumption after retirement. Due
to population aging the public PAYG pension will be much more modest in the fu-
ture and will consequently reinforce the need to make private provision for old-age.
This effect is mapped in the model by corresponding forecasts of contribution and
replacement rates for the public pension system (see also the discussion of the state
sector below).12
In order to accommodate the long-term demographic development of the pop-
ulation structure, two characteristic stages in individual’s lives are distinguished:
working life and retirement. The proportion of the working age population and the
retirement entry age at a specific point in time are defined along sex and cohort
lines in the labor force projection. The number of people currently working or in
retirement varies according to the demographic projections on the basis of various
fertility rates.13 The model is therefore capable of mapping in detail the influence of
demographic changes on the labor supply, the demand for goods and consequently
on the production sector.
Children do not yet receive earnings from paid work, nor are they recipients of
state transfers on a scale comparable with public pensions. On the contrary, their
consumption, education and training are financed by their parents. Children are
therefore not modeled as independent decision makers. Parents do, however, take
account of the consumption of their children when making their own consumption
and savings decisions. The budget restrictions of all households are extended in
order to take account of the consumption of children. The statistical number of
children are assigned to households according to the age-specific fertility rates of
their female members. The consumption of each child is modeled as a mark-up
to the consumption of each adult family member. The consumption of children,
expressed in units of parental consumption, produces a scaling factor of 0.36. One
12Other motives for savings, such as a planned bequest or insurance against longevity risks or
unforeseeable events are not taken into account in our model.
13Other influencing factors are the labor force participation of women and overall rates of un-
employment. The figures are based on the projections of Birg and Bo¨rsch-Supan (1999).
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child’s consumption is thus equal to 36 per cent of the consumption of an adult.14
In monetary terms this is equivalent to around 309 euros a month.
This may appear to be a rather pecuniary view of children. Empirically, however,
quantifiable monetary parameters provide the only reliable variables to draw on. We
have therefore refrained from any attempt to model the utility of children or their
consumption.15
The production sector consists of one representative company per country. GNI
as well as the wage and interest rates are determined on the basis of the specified use
of production factors labor and capital as well as a specific technology. Initially it is
assumed that the productivity of the factors grows exogenously at a constant rate.
Alternatively, it is also examined - in stylized form - the influence of endogenous
growth. It is assumed that a society’s average human capital increases the younger
its working population is. Human capital in turn determines the productivity which
then endogenously specifies the overall growth in the model.16 According to this
hypothesis, productivity growth in an economy increases as the average age of the
working population falls.17
We restrict our focus to this stylized model of endogenous growth, even though
the structure of human capital is much more complicated in reality. It is more or
less impossible to take account of all the factors that influence economic growth in
such a model. Although endogenous growth can be modeled theoretically along the
“learning by doing” lines suggested by Romer (1986) and implemented by Fouge`re
and Me´rette (1999), for example, or according to the “learning and doing” approach
proposed by Lucas (1988), it is not possible, however, to calibrate these theoretical
models reliably with quantitative parameters.
The organization of pension and all other social security systems is the function of
the state sector. These tasks include collecting pension, unemployment, health and
long-term care insurance contributions as well as income tax, whereby income tax is
used in the model to finance state subsidies to the pension system and general state
consumption. No other government spending is modeled. The replacement rate
provided by the PAYG-funded public pension system is exogenous and is based on
data from the Federal Ministry of Labor. The contribution rate is derived from the
14These calculations are based on 1993 income and consumption survey (EVS) data on the
consumption of children and adults as presented for various types of households in Hertel (1998).
15In an otherwise very similar approach, Kotlikoff and Walliser (2001) take account of the con-
sumption of children in the utility of their parents whereby the weighting issue remains controversial
(refer also to Brooks (2002)). Barro and Becker (1988) model the “quality” of children in terms
of their human capital - however, this approach is also contentious and difficult to implement in a
concrete simulation model.
16Whether a larger and/or younger population has a positive or negative impact on the produc-
tivity of an economy is controversial. See, for example, Becker, Edward and Murphy (1999).
17Instead of making human capital dependent on the average age of the working population, the
number of children can also be used to determine a society’s future human capital. There is very
little qualitative difference in the results, however.
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budget equation of the public pension system and federal subsidies. The transition
to a partly-funded pension system is not explicitly modeled in the following but
results from the household savings behavior described above.18
In the model’s ideal capital market, international capital flows into countries
offering higher interest rates until interest rates differentials are equalized again. As
capital market imperfections do not exist, both the interest rate and the net wage
rate are identical in all the countries considered. The interest rate not only deter-
mines the amount of capital accumulated in the domestic market, it also determines
the amount of capital invested outside of that country and consequently the amount
of capital which flows between all the countries under consideration. This relation-
ship is used to solve the model by iterating the computations until all markets in
all countries are cleared.
2.3.2 Criticisms
Any model of reality inevitably entails a large degree of simplification. While fu-
ture demographic developments are mapped in detail and account is taken of the
linkages between national capital markets which are of great importance to Ger-
many, a number of aspects which are not of key importance in this study have been
excluded:19
(1) Variables such as the labor supply or family planning decisions are determined
exogenously from demographic and workforce projections. Potential feedback
effects between the decision of a woman or couple to have a child and the
labor supplied by that woman or the effects on these variables by the social
insurance systems are thus not taken into account.20
(2) The model takes no account of market frictions on the domestic labor market or
any capital market imperfections, such as credit restrictions. The assumption
of perfect capital markets is not very restrictive for the mapping of capital
flows within the EU, though.
(3) It is assumed that households act on the basis of foresight and that the fu-
ture holds no uncertainties. At the individual level such uncertainties would
include the risk implicit in longevity against which individuals would build
18See also Bo¨rsch-Supan, Heiss, Ludwig and Winter (2003a) on the introduction of a funded
pension system.
19See also the overview in Kotlikoff (1998).
20Sinn (1998), Barro and Becker (1988) as well as Cigno (1991) point to the negative effects
which social insurance systems can have on decisions to have children and the formation of human
capital. See also Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) for the relationship between technological progress
and population growth. See Tamuara (2000) for an overview of the theoretical literature on family
planning.
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up precautionary savings. At the aggregate level risk on financial markets is
ignored.
In our view these simplifications do not have a substantial influence on the key
findings as they only have a secondary and indirect impact on the relationship
between fertility rates and economic growth which is of actual interest in this study.21
2.4 The Impact of Demographic Change on the
German Economy
How would the German economy develop if the fertility rate were to rise to 1.8
children per woman? Or, what would be the consequences if fertility rates were
to continue to fall even lower? In order to answer these questions the analysis
concentrates in particular on the impact of demographic changes on the level of per
capita GNI and its growth. It is thereby initially assumed that technological progress
is independent of population structure. The findings of this initial model are then
compared with a scenario in which - as described in Section 2.3.1 - productivity is
linked to the population structure.
2.4.1 Exogenous Productivity Growth
As the demographic and workforce projections in Section 2.2 show, in the first 20-
year period following an increase in the fertility rate there are more children who
have not yet joined the working population and who need to be supported and
educated by society. This development is also reflected in economic growth. More
resources are required for children and this dampens capital accumulation to some
extent and in turn affects production. This means that an increase in the fertility
rate will initially slow down growth. Apart from this affect, there is a fall in all
per capita figures simply because GNI now needs to be distributed among a larger
number of people, i.e., shared with additional children.
These initial losses in growth are only overcome once the children are educated
and trained and have joined the working population at the age of 20 - at the earliest
from the year 2035 onwards. However, this is also precisely the time at which the
aging problem and the crisis in the public health and pension systems will peak.22
This means that not even a dramatic increase in fertility rates to 1.8 children per
woman would substantially alleviate the short-term aging problem.
After this transitional period the positive impact of increasing fertility rates
become obvious: Because more children now join the labor force, the working age
21Estimating the scale of these effects is current ongoing work.
22The consequences of the aging process for the social security system in Germany is a much
discussed issue. See Birg (2001), p. 170-194, and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2002).
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population grows faster than the rest of the population. The age burden now falls
on more shoulders. This is clearly demonstrated by the way the contribution rate23
to the pension system changes over time (Figure 2.4). The contribution rate is
identical for all scenarios until the aging problem reaches its zenith in the period
2035 to 2040. If the fertility rate increases the contribution rate will be 5 percentage
points lower in the year 2060 than it would be in the initial scenario of a constant
birth rate. A higher supply of labor and a lower contribution rate, both induced by
a rising fertility rate, will result in temporarily significantly higher per capita GNI
growth between 2035 and 2080 compared to the reference scenario (Figure 2.5).
This positive effect will lessen over the longer term, however. A larger employed
labor force in the years 2035 to 2060 leads to higher growth as the size of the
working age population grows faster relative to the population as a whole. What
is more, the older members of the population - the baby-boom generation - will
begin dying during this period. After 2075 the first wave of workers resulting from
a higher fertility rate will reach retirement age. This means that, in the scenario of
an increasing fertility rate, the number of pensioners will drop less rapidly (Figure
2.2 b) and the old-age dependency ratio will again increase slightly until it levels
out around the year 2100 (Figure 2.3). Under these conditions the opposite effect
becomes more important again whereby additional numbers of workers make a less
than proportional contribution to production.24 By the end of the present century,
and assuming constant technological progress, per capita rates of growth will more
or less converge again. The positive per capita growth effect of a higher fertility rate
will thus die away in the long run.
The impact of a higher fertility rate on levels of per capita GNI is similar (Figure
2.6). In fact it is difficult to even visually distinguish the different scenarios in Figure
2.6. However, a closer look reveals the same qualitative impact that has already been
observed for economic growth. In the case of an increasing fertility rate per capita
GNI is lower than in the comparative scenario at first. However, the initial negative
effect lasts longer as the initial losses in GNI growth first need to be catched up.
A weakly positive effect on the level of per capita GNI will only become apparent
from 2080 onwards.
2.4.2 Endogenous Productivity Growth as a Result of
Human Capital Accumulation
The rather sobering results generated under the assumption of exogenous growth
presented in Section 2.4.1 do not apply, however, if account is taken of the pos-
23The total contribution rate is the sum of the direct contribution rate and indirect subsidies to
the public pension system financed from general taxation; cf. for example Bo¨rsch-Supan, Heiss,
Ludwig and Winter (2003a).
24This argument goes back to Solow (1956), cf. Section 2.1 above and, for a more detailed
treatment, Cutler et al. (1990).
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Figure 2.4: Direct and indirect contribution rate to the public pension system
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Figure 2.5: GNI per capita growth - exogenous growth
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sibility that children born in the future may be better educated and trained and
consequently accelerate the pace of technical progress. In order to illustrate this
effect a variant of the simulation model is used in this section which allows for en-
dogenous growth. As described in Section 2.3.1, the stylized assumption is made
19
Figure 2.6: GNI per capita - exogenous growth
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that labor force productivity is higher if its average age is lower. At any rate this
hypothesis reflects a typical view. It is not at all clear whether it can be demon-
strated empirically. It would therefore be better to regard the following simulations
as an expression of the effects of improved education and training.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the results. If, in addition to a rising fertility rate,
improved human capital leads to growing labor force productivity, outcomes un-
der exogenous growth change in two fundamental ways. First, per capita economic
growth with endogenous productivity growth and rising fertility rates is significantly
above rates of economic growth and exogenous productivity growth (refer to Figure
2.7)). Second, this positive effect will also hold beyond the year 2085 as a higher
fertility rate will, in the long term, lead to a younger and - according to our as-
sumptions - more productive working population. In this case, one additional young
worker will, in comparison with an older member of the labor force, make a greater
than proportional contribution to production as the better educated and trained ad-
ditional worker can more than compensate for decreasing marginal returns. Whereas
in the case of exogenous growth young and old workers are rated identically and -
owing to decreasing marginal productivity - an additional worker makes a less than
proportional contribution to production (cf. Section 2.4.1).
A qualitatively and quantitatively significant positive result is also apparent with
regard to per capita GNI with endogenous productivity growth (Figure 2.8): If the
lower average age of the working population which results from a higher fertility
rate leads to a positive human capital effect, per capita GNI from around 2055 is
20
Figure 2.7: GNI per capita growth rate - exogenous & endogenous growth
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Figure 2.8: GNI per capita - exogenous & endogenous growth
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substantially higher than under conditions of exogenous growth and a rising fertility
rate. In this case it is also decisive that this effect persists beyond the year 2085.
What is more, the positive effect is not only larger and permanent, but also occurs
around five years earlier.
These results clearly demonstrate that the education and training of children and
young people will play a key role in managing the process of demographic change.
2.5 Conclusions
Could a higher fertility rate help to dampen the effects of aging? Economic theory
offers inconclusive guidance, even if the idea that “if we have too many old people,
we need more children to balance the effects out”, appears plausible enough. The
quantitative study discussed here also comes to more differentiated conclusions: A
long-term boost in per capita gross national income will only result from a higher
fertility rate if the additional children born are also better educated and trained.
This means that the formation of human capital and not a higher fertility rate itself
is decisive for long-term growth.
The three most important economic policy conclusions consequently relate to
the formation of human capital, the role of tax financed family transfers (“Familien-
lastenausgleich”) and the priority of further reforms of our social security systems:
(1) An aging Germany needs better trained and educated - and consequently
highly productive - children. Following international comparative studies -
such as studies of educational standards like the “TIMMS Study” or the “PISA
Study” in which Germany scored conspicuously poorly - there is a need for far-
reaching reforms in Germany’s vocational and continuing professional train-
ing sector. In a period of demographic change the engine of future growth
- training and education in the context of the family, school, university, and
continuing professional training - merits special attention and support.
(2) As the number of newborn children has very little influence on per capita GNI,
there are no particularly obvious reasons on economic grounds for encouraging
higher fertility rates. If higher fertility rates are desirable, the corresponding
rationale will have to be obtained from other scientific disciplines. The study
considered here does, however, generalize on the basis of the problems of cur-
rent tax financed family transfers. It would be beyond the scope of this paper
to discuss whether such transfers are adequate. However, this paper does sup-
port the conclusion that all that economists can really call for is compensation
for the burdens borne by families which simultaneously represent benefits for
others. The mere existence of more children does not in itself present a long-
term solution to the demographic-driven problems of the future.
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(3) A higher fertility rate does not represent an alternative to a reform of the
social security system aimed at solving the immediate aging problem which,
if no reform is forthcoming, results in a crisis in the public pension and health
systems in the period between 2020 and 2040. This also applies if the impact
of human capital is taken into account. The transition period after which
a higher fertility rate would result in a larger and better trained labor force
able to pay contributions to the pension and other social insurance systems
is far too long. Further reforms of our social security systems must have top
priority. Specifically, further pension reforms are needed which go well beyond
the steps taken by the “Riester reform” and which tackle the problems which
will arise after 2015. Furthermore, a reform of the health system, which even
faces more pressing problems, is needed.
Investments in human capital and reforms of social security systems are invest-
ments in the future which initially impose painful costs. However, it would be futile
to hope for a painless cure to the problems associated with demographic change. The
happy circumstance that we are living longer on average at the same time involves
the need to finance this longevity. The financing burden must be mainly borne by
the generation which will itself enjoy a longer life. The option of postponing urgent
social reforms and shifting the burden to later (and possibly larger) generations will,
as this paper has demonstrated, ultimately prove to be an economic nonstarter.
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Chapter 3
Institutional Determinants of
International Equity Portfolios -
A Country-Level Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Despite large potential gains, international equity investment is less diversified across
countries than predicted by the international version of the traditional capital asset
pricing model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).
According to the ICAPM, individuals should hold equities from countries around
the world in proportion to their market capitalizations. However, empirical facts
reveal that international portfolios are heavily biased towards domestic assets. This
phenomenon − known as the ‘home bias puzzle’ − is one of the most striking
empirical results in international economics. Table 3.1 shows that in 2001 U.S.
investors hold almost 90 percent of their portfolios in domestic equity compared to
a world market capitalization of U.S. equity of only 50 percent. For some countries
this bias is even more pronounced, for example 67.8 percent compared to 3.9 percent
for Germany and 85.9 percent compared to 1.25 percent for Spain. If one considers
the European Monetary Union (EMU) as one large financial unit, the home bias
phenomenon is also very noticeable: Investors hold 80.9 percent whereas market
capitalization of the euro area amounts to 15.2 percent.
This phenomenon has already attracted a large body of theoretical and empirical
research. Lewis (1995, 1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide extensive reviews
of the recent international economics and finance literature. However, the puzzle
is not yet fully resolved. This is partly due to the lack of data on cross-border
holdings, especially of large cross-country panel data and of data with a reasonably
long time series dimension. Therefore, most existing studies dealing with the home
bias phenomenon are limited to data on U.S. foreign equity holdings or on countries’
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Table 3.1: Home bias in equities in 2001
% of equity assets share of world
in domestic equities market capitalization
US 89.22 50.64
Japan 89.50 8.26
UK 74.73 8.13
Germany 67.81 3.93
France 79.80 4.31
Spain 85.94 1.25
EMU 80.93 15.19
Sources: Foreign equity investments from the IMF’s CPIS, market
capitalizations from WDI (2002) and FIBV, own calculations.
total foreign equity holdings not subdivided into country pairs. In contrast, this
paper employs a more comprehensive data set, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that allows to shed new
light on bilateral equity holdings between countries for 1997 and 2001 as well as on
their institutional determinants.1
An important assumption of the traditional version of the ICAPM is that there
are no barriers to international investment. Based on the ICAPM, the theoretically
predicted share of foreign assets at the country level is calculated in this paper and
compared to the actual share observed in the data. The difference between these two
values is then taken to investigate the relevance of different capital market frictions.
This empirical approach is based on Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) and
Edison and Warnock (2004).
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in two aspects. First,
it extends the analysis of the home bias in equities to a large cross section of 38
countries whereas Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) and Edison and Warnock
(2004) look at U.S. holdings of foreign equities alone.2 The home bias phenomenon
is described and characterized at the bilateral country level. An interesting finding
is thereby - as far as known to the author - for the first time revealed: a phe-
nomenon that I call bilateral ‘friendship bias’ for several European country pairs.
1As opposed to institutional explanations, individual investor behavior such as familiarity, prob-
ability judgments and social identity have also been considered in the literature to explain part
of this phenomenon. The distinction between institutional and behavioral explanations was first
suggested by French and Poterba (1991).
2Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) employ country-level data for 1994 and 1997; Edison
and Warnock (2004) use security-level data for U.S. firms for 1994 and 1997.
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Second, Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) and Edison and Warnock (2004) fo-
cus on information frictions as one important explanation of the home bias, which
they proxy by firms’ cross listings. In contrast, the present paper takes various
institutional frictions to investment into account such as information asymmetries,
financial market development and capital controls.3 Especially the impact of finan-
cial development is investigated more closely. It is proxied by the development of
the equity market and, alternatively, of the banking sector. Financial development
of both the home and the foreign country are considered and differences between
them examined. Moreover, the analysis accounts for closely-held shares that cannot
be freely traded (Dahlquist et al. 2003).
The results provide new insights into the relevance of capital market frictions for
foreign equity holdings using a large cross section of country pairs. The degree of eq-
uity market development of the country invested in plays a significant positive role,
whereas the development of the banking sector in the investor’s country is positively
linked to portfolio shares of foreign equity investment. Information advantages mea-
sured by geographical proximity as well as by the existence of a common legal origin
or, alternatively, of a common historical colonial relationship have great explanatory
power. The existence of capital controls has no significant impact on the share of
foreign equity investment, which, however, might be due to low data quality.
Section 3.2 describes the econometric specification and discusses the measures
of capital market frictions employed in the empirical analysis. Descriptive statistics
of portfolio compositions across countries and estimation results are presented in
Section 3.3 and concluded in Section 3.4. Based on the insights of the present
paper, Section 3.5 gives an outlook on how to implement capital market frictions
into an Overlapping Generations (OLG) simulation model.
3.2 Empirical Approach
The empirical approach is based on the idea of comparing the portfolio share of for-
eign equities predicted by the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM)
to the empirical share in a world with capital market frictions. The discrepancy
between these two measures is then explained by direct and indirect barriers to
international investment at the country level. After explaining the economic speci-
fication in more detail, the variables of interest and the data are described. Finally,
arising estimation issues are discussed.
3Frictions caused by non-tradable goods are not considered in this paper. Lewis (1999) tests
implications of models assuming complete markets and non-tradable goods. She shows that these
models are not able to explain the home bias. Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that when
non-traded human capital is taken into account, the international diversification puzzle is even
aggravated.
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3.2.1 Econometric Specification
In order to set up an empirical model, two different classes of theoretical capital
asset pricing models are considered: first, the traditional version of the ICAPM
without capital market frictions and, second, an ICAPM with barriers to interna-
tional investment.4
The first class of models goes back to Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin
(1966). The traditional version of the ICAPM is built on the assumption that in-
vestment and consumption opportunity sets do not differ across countries. Investors
are the same with respect to risk-aversion and information. These models assume
perfect markets. The fact that countries use different currencies has no significant
implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing. There are no taxes, no tariffs, no
information asymmetries, no restrictions on short-sales and no barriers to interna-
tional investment. One convenient property of this traditional version of the ICAPM
is that it has simple and clear implications for investors’ asset holdings: Investors
hold the world market portfolio share of risky assets irrespective of their country of
residence i. It follows that the portfolio share of country i invested into country j,
W ∗j , can be expressed as:
W ∗j,t =
MCAPj,t
MCAPworld,t
,∀i,
where MCAPj,t denotes market capitalization of country j in period t and
MCAPworld,t world market capitalization in period t. This market portfolio share
serves as the benchmark case of portfolio holdings to which the actual portfolio share
that can be observed in the data is compared.
The second class of models by Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Merton (1987) and
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) relaxes the assumption of perfect markets.5 These
models include frictions that are typically modeled as a deadweight cost or a tax
on expected returns in the foreign country. Those costs can be interpreted as costs
caused by capital controls, taxes, information costs or transaction costs. These
models only provide for testable implications of single model parameters, however,
and do not allow to deduct an estimation equation of portfolio shares and various
types of capital market frictions. Therefore, a reduced form approach is employed
in the subsequent empirical analysis that combines - against the background of the
above mentioned two classes of CAPM models with and without frictions - the
market portfolio share, W ∗j,t, investment costs, Ci,t, Cj,t and Cij,t, and observed
portfolio shares, W actij,t :
4See Stulz (1995) for a detailed review of the capital asset pricing literature and a systematic
discussion of different models.
5Deviations from the optimal portfolios in the case of the traditional ICAPM mentioned above
can also arise due to deviations from purchasing power parity such as in the model by Adler and
Dumas (1981). However, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) show empirically that large parts of the
home bias in equity puzzle cannot be explained by this model.
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W actij,t = α0,t + α1,tW
∗
j,t + C
′
i,tβ1,t + C
′
j,tβ2,t + C
′
ij,tβ3,t + Z
′
ij,tγt + ²ij,t.
The optimal share of investment in the ICAPM with perfect markets, W ∗j,t, enters
the right hand side.6 Ci,t, Cj,t and Cij,t are vectors of measures for capital market
frictions referring to the country of origin i, the country of destination j or the
country pair ij.7 These vectors consist of variables that take account of investment
costs due to indirect or direct barriers to investment. They are in the center of in-
terest and discussed in more detail in the following section. The vector Zij,t includes
additional covariates that proxy investment opportunities and diversification con-
siderations. They are also discussed in more detail in the next section. Moreover,
a constant, α0,t, and a nuisance term, ²ij,t, are included. ²ij,t captures all the fac-
tors affecting actual portfolio shares other than measured by the above mentioned
explanatory variables.
3.2.2 Variables of Interest
Information Frictions
Asymmetric information is regarded as a key factor of explaining the empirical ev-
idence on foreign asset holdings and international capital flows. Martin and Rey
(2004) construct a gravity model where transaction costs and costs caused by in-
formation asymmetries between two countries are proxied by geographical distance.
The model implies that gross bilateral asset flows will be greater the smaller the
distance. Di Giovanni (2005), Portes and Rey (2005) and Ghosh and Wolf (2000)
use this gravity model to explain cross-border capital flows between countries.8 In
Portes and Rey (2005), information frictions are also captured by using variables
measuring directly the degree of asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors
such as the volume of telephone traffic and the number of bank branch subsidiaries
as well as an index of insider trading. They find that for a large cross section of
countries the geographical component dominates in explaining the volume and di-
rection of international capital flows. Geographical distance does not only play an
important role for investment at the cross-country level but also within countries:
Using firm level data, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001) provide
evidence that U.S. investors have strong preferences for geographically proximate
investments.
6Thus, the effect of W ∗j,t on W
act
ij,t is left unrestricted. In a restricted version one could regress
capital market frictions on W actij,t −W ∗j,t.
7Country of origin denotes the investor’s country of residence, whereas the country of destination
is the country invested in, i.e., the issuers country of residence.
8Portes and Rey (2005) investigate international equity flows, Di Giovanni (2005) cross-border
M&A activity and Ghosh and Wolf (2000) FDI, bank lending, portfolio debt and portfolio equity.
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Information advantages do not only arise due to geographical proximity but also
due to similarity of institutions and legal structures. Legal rights of investors differ
very much across countries. A large part of this variation is accounted for by legal
origin. This applies especially to commercial laws for the financing of firms and for
investment but also to law enforcement (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Thus a common
legal origin indicates a lower level of information asymmetries. It is distinguished
between German, French and Scandinavian civil law families, the English common
law, and the Socialist law family.
The similarity of institutions can also be proxied by the fact that two countries
share a common colonial background. Colonialism explains the building of insti-
tutions for several, although not all, countries (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
2002). The institutions are often very similar to those of the former colonizers.
Thus, information advantages exist between former colonies and their colonizers.
The following variables are included to mirror information frictions:9 the log-
arithm of distance between country i and country j, logdistanceij, and a dummy
variable equal to one if a country pair has a common legal origin, samelegorij. Al-
ternatively, a dummy variable equal to one if two countries share a common colonial
background is used, colonyij.
10
Financial Market Development
In larger and more liquid markets prices are supposed to be more informative. One
reason is that larger markets encourage arbitrage through liquidity, the existence of
more and better substitutes to use as hedges for trading against mispriced securities
and reduced transaction costs (Beck, Demirgu¨k-Kunt and Levine (2001) andWurgler
(2000)).
A common proxy for financial development such as the size and depth of the
domestic capital market is the amount of private credit provided by the banking
sector relative to GDP which is included in the subsequent regression analysis for
the home and foreign country, logdcrediti,t and logdcreditj,t respectively.
11 The
banking sector plays an important role for private investment in many emerging
economies as well as in continental Europe and Japan. It represents the overall
development of the private banking sector - more specifically the development of its
financial institutions that conduct and channel international equity investments -
9Section 3.2.3 and Table 3.10 in Appendix A include descriptions of all employed variables,
their sources and exact calculations.
10In the trade literature, a dummy variable that denotes whether two countries have a common
language is often employed in order to proxy information advantages. Note that in this sample all
country pairs that have a common colonial background at the same time share a common language
and vice versa.
11See for example Chinn and Ito (2006) and Di Giovanni (2005). As a comparable measure
M2 to GDP is often used. However, this variable is only available for a much smaller number of
countries.
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and the amount of liquidity available in the economy.
In order to capture an additional angle of financial development, stock mar-
ket capitalization of country i and j relative to GDP is considered, logmcapi,t and
logmcapj,t. It directly addresses the influence of growing equity markets on in-
ternational investments which experienced a substantial growth in industrialized
economies as well as in new markets of transitional and emerging countries in the
1990s.
Finally, a variable is employed that measures the actual liquidity in the equity
market, i.e., it takes account of equity shares by large controlling shareholders that
can not be freely traded. Especially in countries with poor investor protection
many firms are controlled by large shareholders such that only a fraction of the
shares issued by firms can be freely traded in these countries and held by foreign
investors. La Porta et al. (1998) provide evidence that the size and breadth of
capital markets is largely influenced by investor protection and the quality of the
legal environment. Dahlquist et al. (2003) investigate the impact of equity shares
held by large shareholders on U.S. foreign investment. They show that a country’s
share in U.S. equity portfolios is negatively related to the share of equities held
by large shareholders in that country. In the subsequent regression analysis of
the present paper the float portfolio share calculated by Dahlquist et al. (2003),
W floatj,t , is used as a proxy for investor rights and the liquidity of the market. The
float portfolio share is the market capitalization of a country excluding closely-held
shares by controlling shareholders.
Direct Barriers
Direct barriers such as capital controls that have an immediate impact on net invest-
ment returns and, therefore, on the investment decision are also considered. Albeit
having been reduced to a great extent throughout the 1990s, capital controls are
still existent today. The crucial question is whether controls that are in place are
in fact effective.12 Although there have been attempts to determine measures of the
effectiveness of capital controls, these are only available for a very small number of
countries or years.13
Given the large cross-country data sample that is employed in the present paper,
a financial openness measure is used that was for the first time provided by Grilli
and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), restricti,t and restrictj,t. It does not
account for the effectiveness of capital controls but only states whether restrictions
on capital flows are in place or not.
12For a detailed description of different types of capital controls and their effectiveness see Edison
et al. (2002) and Neely (1999); for different country experiences see Ariyoshi et al. (2000).
13See, e.g., Edison et al. (2002) for a comprehensive overview of capital control measures.
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Additional Covariates
Two different variables are considered that mirror diversification and investment
opportunities. First, a correlation variable that is equal to the monthly return
correlation in the four years preceding year t is added, rcorrij,t. If diversification
motives matter for investors’ investment decisions, countries hold a higher portfolio
share of those foreign assets whose stock returns are only weakly correlated with
domestic stock returns.
Second, GDP growth for the country of destination is included, gdpgrowthj,t.
Again this variable is averaged across the four years preceding year t in order to
avoid business cycle effects.14 High GDP growth in the foreign country j mirrors
profitable investment opportunities that emerge in booming economies. This is
an implication of standard growth theory. Emerging countries in South-east Asia
in the 1990s that experienced booming economies and large capital inflows at the
same time constitute a well-known example of this relationship.
3.2.3 Data
So far, reliable bilateral holdings data has hardly been available except for the results
of some smaller surveys of residents’ portfolio holdings such as for the U.S. in 1994
and 1997. The present work is based on cross-country equity holdings obtained from
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). For the first time this data set includes comparable portfolio holdings
data from as many countries around the world as possible. The survey has been
undertaken in 1997 with 29 countries only. Since 2001 yearly waves are undertaken
including 64 countries. Data for 1997 and 2001 is used in this study. The availability
of several other variables limits the number of countries in the present sample to 38
in 2001. Table 3.2 lists all countries by regions.
The CPIS data refers to end of year numbers and includes, among other things,
information on gross bilateral foreign equity holdings, securities and, for some coun-
tries, separately reported liabilities. Foreign equity holdings entail cross-border in-
vestment from all sectors: monetary authorities, general government, banks and
other financial intermediaries, nonprofit organizations, and households.15 The great-
est difficulty consists in capturing cross-border investments by households. The IMF
provides the definitions and concepts,16 whereas the data is organized by domestic
statistical institutions as each country should take account of its own particular fi-
nancial structure and circumstances. There are some differences in reporting equity
14Alternatively, seven and ten year averages have been considered. However, results do not
change.
15Note that equity investment that establishes a direct investment relationship is excluded from
the CPIS. See the definition in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition (BPM5) and
the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide.
16These have to be in conformity with the BPM5.
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holdings between the 1997 and 2001 waves. In 1997 the distinction between unavail-
able and zero was not made. Therefore, the two years are treated separately in the
estimations.
The CPIS data is used in order to calculate actual portfolio shares of country
j’s assets held in country i. Note that country i refers to the residence of the
holder of the security and country j refers to the residence of the issuer of the
security. Appendix B explains in detail howW actij,t is calculated from the observations
of bilateral cross-country portfolio holdings.
Information on countries’ total market capitalizations is taken from the World
Development Indicators (WDI, 2002) and the International Federation of Stock Ex-
changes (FIBV).17 An alternative measure of market capitalizations, the liquidity
adjusted float portfolio share, can be found in Dahlquist et al. (2003). Data on
GDP growth is obtained from WDI (2002).
Table 3.2: Countries and regions
South America South-east Asia Northern Europe
Argentina Indonesia Denmark
Brazil Malaysia Finland
Chile Philippines Ireland
Colombia Singapore Norway
Venezuela Thailand Sweden
United Kingdom
North America Oceania Western Europe
Canada Australia Austria
United States New Zealand Belgium
France
West Asia Eastern Europe Germany
Israel Hungary Netherlands
Turkey Poland Switzerland
East Asia Southern Europe Northern Africa
Hong Kong Greece Egypt
Japan Italy
Korea, Rep. Of Portugal
Spain
17The availability of stock market measures limits the amount of countries in the present sample
to 38.
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In order to measure information frictions, the physical distance between coun-
tries’ capital cities and alternatively the fact of two countries sharing a common
border is used. Moreover, a dummy variable is added that is equal to one if two
countries have a common colonial background. All data are based on the CIA fact-
book18 and are obtained from Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995). A dummy variable,
based on La Porta et al. (1998), is included that is equal to one if both countries
belong to the same legal family. The amount of domestic credit provided by the
banking sector relative to GDP, obtained from WDI (2002), is used to proxy the
degree of financial market development.
Capital controls are taken account of by using an updated index by Grilli and
Milesi-Ferretti (1995) based on the IMF’s AREAER. The capital control data refers
to the home country as well as to the country of destination. Unfortunately, the data
does not allow a clear separation of restrictions on inflows or outflows. Thus, the
same indicator, restricti,t and restrictj,t respectively, is included for both countries.
In 1997 as well as in 2000/01 there have been several banking crises, for example
in Thailand, Malaysia and Turkey. This is taken into account by a dummy variable
that is equal to one if a banking crisis as documented in Caprio and Klingebiel
(2003) happened in the relevant or precedent year.
In order to calculate return correlations rcorrij,t, standard national stock market
indices by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) are used.19 The regional
classification of the countries is shown in Table 3.2. It is based on the UN geograph-
ical region division20 and used to construct region dummies.
For more detailed information on variable definitions and sources refer to Table
3.10 in Appendix A.
3.2.4 Estimation Issues
In several cases reported investments are zero. These corner solution outcomes are
likely due to an investor’s optimization in a world with investment barriers which
results in an optimal outcome of zero foreign equity holdings. Consequently, W actij,t is
zero. For all other observations the dependent variable is positive and continuous.
Therefore, a corner solution model is estimated. In the context of this study, partial
effects of W ∗j,t, Ci,t, Cj,t and Cij,t on E(W
act
ij,t |W ∗j,t, Ci,t, Cj,t, Cij,t) are of interest. Note
that these marginal effects refer to the full sample including zero and positive values.
They are obtained by estimating a Tobit model censored at zero and by calculating
average adjustment factors for the coefficients of the Tobit regression. All tables in
this paper report these marginal effects instead of estimated coefficients.21
18See www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
19For all available countries the gross index including dividend payments in U.S. dollars is used.
20See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49region.htm.
21See Wooldridge (2002), Chap. 16 pp. 521-524, for the derivation of the adjustment factor.
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The corner solution model can be applied to the CPIS data for 2001, but not
immediately to the 1997 wave, because - as mentioned in Section 3.2.3 - in 1997
zeros refer to both true zeros and missing values. In order to provide comparability
across regressions for each year and to validate a Tobit estimation approach for the
1997 data, missing values are imputed by using the information of the 2001 wave: A
Probit model fitting the probability of a missing or a zero entry given the explanatory
variables mentioned above is estimated for 2001. The estimation output is reported
in Table 3.3. The estimated coefficients are used to estimate the probability of a
zero or missing value for 1997. If the probability of a missing is larger than one half,
the reported zero is changed into a missing value.
Table 3.3: Probit estimates of missing values in 2001
W ∗j,t 0.02 rcorrij,t -0.186
(0.93) (0.64)
logdistanceij -0.067 gdpgrowthij -1.405
(0.66) (0.20)
samelegorij 0.681 bankcrisisi -0.523
(4.10)*** (3.26)***
logdcrediti,t -0.223 bankcrisisj -0.095
(2.40)** (0.56)
logdcreditj,t 0.043 constant 2.049
(0.42) (1.78)*
restricti,t -0.094 No. of obs. 433
(0.93) LL -239.46
restrictj,t -0.061 adj. R
2 0.08
(0.68)
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to one if there exists a
missing value and equal to zero if there is a zero value in 2001.
Absolute values of t statistics are reported in parentheses. All
regressions include region dummies for country i and j in order to
account for region-specific fixed effects.
3.3 International Equity Portfolios: Composition
and Determinants
In a first step, descriptive statistics of the composition of international equity port-
folios and the extent of the home bias at the aggregate country level are presented.
It serves to give a first comparison of bilateral portfolio shares in the data and op-
timal portfolio shares as predicted by the traditional version of the ICAPM under
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the assumption of perfect capital markets. In a second step, multivariate analysis
are undertaken as described in Section 3.2.1. The results provide insights into the
determinants of international equity portfolios.
3.3.1 Bilateral Friendship Bias versus Bilateral Home Bias
For all countries around the world with existing stock markets, a home bias in
equities with respect to total home versus foreign investment can be observed. Table
3.1 in Section 3.1 presents an overview of this home bias for some selected countries.
In contrast to a home bias referring to total home versus foreign investment,
one can also observe a home bias at the bilateral country pair level. A bilateral
home bias indicates that investors hold - compared to the traditional version of the
International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) - too little of their portfolio in
foreign equities of a given country. For the U.S. this bilateral home bias is existent
for all country pairs and has been amply discussed in the literature (e.g. Tesar and
Werner (1995), and Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004)). However, for certain
country pairs, especially within the EMU, one can observe a bilateral ‘friendship
bias’. It states that the actual equity portfolio share, W actij,t , is larger than the one
predicted by the ICAPM under the assumption of perfect capital markets, W ∗j,t.
Table 3.4 documents the predicted and the actual shares. Bold numbers refer to
country pairs with a bilateral friendship bias.
In most cases within the EMU this relationship is reciprocal, i.e., it is observed
for the country pair Austria-Germany and at the same time for the country pair
Germany-Austria. The number of country pairs with a friendship bias has increased
substantially from 1997 to 2001. Moreover, the friendship bias has been persistent
over the years: for almost all country pairs with a friendship bias in 1997 one can
also observe a friendship bias in 2001. The fact that most country pairs with a
friendship bias in the present data sample are part of the EMU might indicate that
this phenomenon is related to the large extent of enhanced financial integration
and development within the EMU. Also historical and cultural linkages might be
an explanation. The results of the multivariate analysis that are discussed in the
following section will shed light on the actual determinants of international portfolio
holdings.
3.3.2 Determinants of International Equity Portfolios
Main estimation results for the years 1997 and 2001 are summarized in Tables 3.5
and 3.6. In the first specification, market capitalization of country j,W ∗j,t, is the only
explanatory variable entering the regression. Subsequently, the introduced proxies
for capital market frictions are added one after the other.22
22Further robustness checks have been undertaken by excluding single countries from the sample
in order to test whether major financial centers such as the U.K., Ireland and the U.S. drive the
35
T
ab
le
3.
4:
E
q
u
it
y
p
or
tf
ol
io
sh
ar
es
in
ve
st
ed
w
it
h
in
th
e
E
M
U
(i
n
p
er
ce
n
t)
co
u
n
tr
y
j
p
re
d
ic
te
d
ac
tu
al
sh
ar
es
in
ve
st
ed
in
co
u
n
tr
y
j
b
y
in
ve
st
in
g
co
u
n
tr
y
i
(W
a
ct
ij
,t
)
sh
ar
es
(W
∗ j,t
)
A
u
st
ri
a
B
el
gi
u
m
F
in
la
n
d
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
Ir
el
an
d
It
al
y
N
et
h
er
l.
P
or
tu
ga
l
S
p
ai
n
20
01
A
u
st
ri
a
0.
09
0
.1
2
0.
00
0.
01
0
.0
9
0.
00
0.
06
0.
05
0
.0
9
*)
0.
00
B
el
gi
u
m
0.
06
0
.4
7
0.
03
0
.5
7
0
.1
7
0.
01
0
.3
2
0
.1
0
1
.1
8
1
.4
9
0
.1
6
F
in
la
n
d
0.
70
0
.7
9
1
.7
9
0.
47
1
.1
6
0.
01
0
.9
0
0.
48
0
.9
7
0.
19
0.
33
F
ra
n
ce
4.
31
2.
56
1
7
.3
3
1.
63
4.
01
0.
08
5
.3
8
2.
48
4
.4
4
0.
99
1.
86
G
er
m
an
y
3.
93
1
4
.2
2
4
.8
0
1.
04
2.
06
0.
07
5
.2
6
2.
00
3.
59
1.
00
1.
56
G
re
ec
e
0.
32
0.
11
0.
05
0.
01
0.
01
0.
01
0.
07
0.
02
0.
06
*)
0.
01
Ir
el
an
d
0.
28
1
.3
3
2
.7
1
0
.6
2
0
.6
5
0
.9
1
0.
03
2
.2
0
0
.3
4
0.
15
0.
24
It
al
y
1.
93
0.
48
2
.2
4
0.
32
0.
96
1.
10
0.
02
2
.5
6
1.
90
0.
74
1.
23
N
et
h
er
l.
1.
68
3
.0
4
9
.8
4
1.
22
2
.3
6
2
.7
1
0.
04
4
.1
5
2
.0
1
0.
56
0.
72
P
or
tu
ga
l
0.
17
0.
16
0.
21
0.
01
0.
05
0.
06
0.
00
0.
17
0.
10
0.
10
0.
22
S
p
ai
n
1.
72
0.
63
2
.7
1
0.
28
0.
99
1.
18
0.
02
1.
73
0.
63
1
.8
2
2
.2
6
19
97
A
u
st
ri
a
0.
15
0.
03
0.
02
0.
03
0.
06
0.
10
0.
14
0.
03
0.
00
B
el
gi
u
m
0.
59
0.
39
0.
10
0.
35
0.
05
0.
10
0.
30
0.
22
0.
05
F
in
la
n
d
0.
32
0.
06
0.
14
0.
07
0.
29
0.
04
0.
13
0.
00
0.
02
F
ra
n
ce
2.
90
0.
89
1.
74
0.
36
2.
04
1.
70
1.
66
0.
30
0.
81
G
er
m
an
y
3.
55
5
.8
2
1.
05
0.
33
1.
15
2.
60
1.
01
2.
61
0.
37
0.
77
G
re
ec
e
0.
15
0.
00
0.
08
0.
00
0.
04
0.
04
0
.3
9
0.
01
0.
00
0.
02
Ir
el
an
d
0.
21
0
.3
0
1
.1
7
0.
00
0
.2
3
0
.3
0
0.
03
0.
14
0.
02
It
al
y
1.
48
0.
45
0.
19
0.
08
0.
71
1.
00
0.
46
0.
09
0.
09
N
et
h
er
l.
2.
02
1.
68
3
.5
4
0.
36
1.
55
1.
91
0.
74
0.
33
0.
18
P
or
tu
ga
l
0.
17
0.
02
0.
03
0.
01
0.
07
0.
16
0.
04
0.
03
0.
05
S
p
ai
n
1.
25
0.
10
0.
52
0.
09
0.
50
0.
63
1.
15
0.
61
0.
59
N
ot
es
:
B
ol
d
nu
m
be
rs
re
fe
r
to
a
fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
bi
as
;
*)
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
<
0
th
at
ha
s
be
en
de
le
te
d
fr
om
th
e
sa
m
pl
e;
W
∗ j,t
de
no
te
s
co
un
tr
y
j’
s
sh
ar
e
in
w
or
ld
m
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n;
W
a
c
t
ij
,t
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
ob
se
rv
ed
eq
ui
ty
po
rt
fo
lio
sh
ar
e
in
ve
st
ed
in
co
un
tr
y
j
by
co
un
tr
y
i;
fo
r
19
97
th
er
e
is
no
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
of
G
er
m
an
or
G
re
ek
eq
ui
ty
ho
ld
in
gs
av
ai
la
bl
e;
O
w
n
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
ba
se
d
on
C
P
IS
by
th
e
IM
F
fo
r
20
01
,
W
D
I
(2
00
2)
an
d
F
IB
V
.
36
The marginal effect of W ∗j,t on actual portfolio shares is highly significant but
very low in size, namely equal to 0.05 in 1997 and 0.09 in 2001. The size does not
change in the subsequent regressions when additional variables enter. Noticeable,
for a large cross section of countries the market portfolio share, W ∗j,t, which - in the
traditional ICAPM under the assumption of perfect capital markets - just equals
the portfolio share invested in country j for each country i, does hardly explain the
actual share of foreign investment in country j, W actij,t .
Information Asymmetries
Differences in accounting standards, disclosure requirements and regulatory environ-
ments across countries lead to information asymmetries between local and foreign
investors. Foreign investors have to translate and interpret this information in light
of the relevant legal conventions and business culture which leads to additional costs.
Information frictions proxied by logdistanceij and samelegorij have highly signif-
icant and large coefficients. A one percent increase in geographical distance between
two countries leads on average to a decrease in the portfolio share of equity holdings
of about 0.16 percentage points in 1997 and 0.29 in 2001 (Tables 3.5 and 3.6, speci-
fication (2)). If both countries have the same legal origin, the share of foreign equity
holdings is on average about 0.24 higher in 1997 and even larger in 2001, namely
equal to 0.43. When colonyij is used instead of samelegorij (specification (3)), the
effect is even larger: If both countries have a common colonial background, the
marginal effect amounts to 0.40 in 1997 and in 2001 to 0.62.23 Overall, the results
emphasize the importance of information frictions as determinants of international
equity portfolios.
Financial Market Development
The second group of indirect capital market frictions refers to the degree of finan-
cial market development. Two alternative measures of financial development are
considered: the relative size of the banking sector and the relative size of the eq-
uity market. They proxy different angles of financial market development but are
positively correlated with each other. Moreover, the float portfolio share, W floatj,t , is
included instead of the market portfolio share, W ∗j,t, in order to exclude non-liquid
equity shares.
Financial development of the banking sector in the source country i as well as in
the country of destination j is proxied by the corresponding ratios of private credit
results. These additional regressions are not reported in the following, because results did not
change. However, they can be obtained from the author upon request.
23Likewise, logdistanceij can be interchanged with a dummy variable equal to one if two countries
are part of the same region or share a common border. The results can be obtained from the authers
upon request.
37
T
ab
le
3.
5:
M
ai
n
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s,
19
97
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
W
∗ j,t
0.
04
9
0.
04
9
0.
04
9
0.
04
7
0.
04
7
0.
04
7
0.
04
7
[1
4.
51
]*
**
[1
5.
25
]*
**
[1
5.
45
]*
**
[1
4.
66
]*
**
[1
4.
62
]*
**
[1
4.
64
]*
**
[1
4.
74
]*
**
lo
g
d
is
ta
n
ce
ij
-0
.1
56
-0
.1
53
-0
.1
63
-0
.1
64
-0
.1
65
-0
.1
63
-0
.1
75
[6
.2
6]
**
*
[6
.2
0]
**
*
[6
.5
6]
**
*
[6
.5
6]
**
*
[6
.6
3]
**
*
[6
.4
7]
**
*
[7
.0
2]
**
*
sa
m
el
eg
or
ij
0.
25
1
0.
23
5
0.
23
2
0.
23
7
0.
23
7
0.
22
3
[5
.5
9]
**
*
[5
.2
2]
**
*
[5
.1
3]
**
*
[5
.2
7]
**
*
[5
.2
7]
**
*
[5
.0
2]
**
*
co
lo
n
y i
j
0.
40
4
[6
.8
8]
**
*
lo
g
d
cr
ed
it
i,
t
0.
23
9
0.
24
0
0.
18
9
0.
19
4
0.
11
6
[3
.4
3]
**
*
[3
.4
3]
**
*
[2
.5
5]
**
[2
.6
0]
**
*
[1
.5
4]
lo
g
d
cr
ed
it
j,
t
0.
07
2
0.
07
6
0.
07
1
0.
08
1
0.
07
[1
.0
9]
[1
.1
5]
[1
.0
8]
[1
.1
8]
[1
.0
4]
lo
g
m
ca
p i
,t
0.
06
4
0.
06
4
0.
03
8
0.
03
0
0.
03
4
[1
.4
4]
[1
.4
3]
[0
.8
1]
[0
.6
0]
[0
.6
9]
lo
g
m
ca
p j
,t
0.
07
8
0.
07
7
0.
08
4
0.
07
4
0.
08
8
[2
.0
1]
**
[1
.9
7]
**
[2
.0
7]
**
[1
.6
4]
[1
.9
8]
**
W
f
lo
a
t
j,
t
0.
03
8
[1
4.
38
]*
**
re
st
ri
ct
i,
t
0.
10
6
0.
10
6
0.
09
1
[1
.8
7]
*
[1
.8
6]
*
[1
.6
2]
re
st
ri
ct
j,
t
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
19
-0
.0
19
[0
.5
0]
[0
.5
5]
[0
.5
5]
rc
or
r i
j,
t
0.
05
7
-0
.0
09
[0
.5
3]
[0
.0
8]
g
d
pg
ro
w
th
j,
t
0.
06
6
[5
.5
0]
**
*
N
o.
of
ob
s.
90
0
90
0
90
0
90
0
90
0
90
0
90
0
90
0
ad
jm
.
fa
ct
or
0.
51
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
ad
j.
R
2
0.
17
0.
2
0.
21
0.
21
0.
21
0.
22
0.
22
0.
23
N
ot
es
:
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
fo
r
al
l
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
W
a
c
t
ij
,t
;
T
ob
it
es
ti
m
at
io
n
of
a
co
rn
er
so
lu
ti
on
m
od
el
.
R
ep
or
te
d
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
m
ar
gi
na
l
eff
ec
ts
co
rr
ec
te
d
by
an
ad
ju
st
m
en
t
fa
ct
or
as
re
po
rt
ed
in
Se
ct
io
n
3.
2.
4.
A
bs
ol
ut
e
va
lu
es
of
t
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
R
eg
io
n
du
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
th
e
co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
an
d
th
e
co
un
tr
y
of
de
st
in
at
io
n,
du
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
es
in
th
e
co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
an
d
th
e
co
un
tr
y
of
de
st
in
at
io
n,
as
w
el
l
as
a
co
ns
ta
nt
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
bu
t
no
t
re
po
rt
ed
.
38
T
ab
le
3.
6:
M
ai
n
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s,
20
01
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
W
∗ j,t
0.
08
7
0.
08
7
0.
08
6
0.
08
5
0.
08
5
0.
08
5
0.
08
4
[1
3.
88
]*
**
[1
4.
29
]*
**
[1
4.
40
]*
**
[1
3.
45
]*
**
[1
3.
42
]*
**
[1
3.
42
]*
**
[1
3.
67
]*
**
lo
g
d
is
ta
n
ce
ij
-0
.2
85
-0
.2
71
-0
.2
92
-0
.2
92
-0
.2
92
-0
.2
77
-0
.2
88
[5
.4
5]
**
*
[5
.2
6]
**
*
[5
.6
1]
**
*
[5
.5
9]
**
*
[5
.6
1]
**
*
[4
.6
4]
**
*
[4
.9
8]
**
*
sa
m
el
eg
or
ij
0.
43
2
0.
43
5
0.
43
1
0.
43
6
0.
44
1
0.
39
1
[4
.3
6]
**
*
[4
.4
2]
**
*
[4
.3
7]
**
*
[4
.4
3]
**
*
[4
.4
6]
**
*
[4
.0
8]
**
*
co
lo
n
y i
j
0.
62
0
[4
.8
9]
**
*
lo
g
d
cr
ed
it
i,
t
0.
24
1
0.
24
0
0.
24
4
0.
24
8
0.
29
9
[1
.7
7]
*
[1
.7
6]
*
[1
.7
8]
*
[1
.8
1]
*
[2
.2
5]
**
lo
g
d
cr
ed
it
j,
t
-0
.0
14
0.
00
9
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
10
[0
.1
1]
[0
.0
8]
[0
.1
4]
[0
.1
0]
[0
.0
8]
lo
g
m
ca
p i
,t
-0
.1
49
-0
.1
49
-0
.1
49
-0
.1
56
-0
.2
12
[2
.4
0]
**
[2
.4
0]
**
[2
.3
9]
**
[2
.4
4]
**
[3
.3
8]
**
*
lo
g
m
ca
p j
,t
0.
16
6
0.
17
2
0.
16
5
0.
15
8
0.
15
8
[2
.6
4]
**
*
[2
.7
2]
**
*
[2
.6
2]
**
*
[2
.4
4]
**
[2
.5
2]
**
W
f
lo
a
t
j,
t
0.
06
9
[1
3.
24
]*
**
re
st
ri
ct
i,
t
0.
01
7
0.
02
0
-0
.0
02
[0
.1
9]
[0
.2
2]
[0
.0
2]
re
st
ri
ct
j,
t
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
08
[0
.1
4]
[0
.0
8]
[0
.1
0]
rc
or
r i
j,
t
0.
05
0
0.
04
6
[0
.4
9]
[0
.4
6]
g
d
pg
ro
w
th
j,
t
0.
14
5
[5
.6
2]
**
*
N
o.
of
ob
s.
89
9
89
9
89
9
89
9
89
9
89
9
89
9
89
9
ad
jm
.
fa
ct
or
0.
55
0.
55
0.
54
0.
55
0.
55
0.
55
0.
55
0.
54
ad
j.
R
2
0.
1
0.
11
0.
11
0.
12
0.
12
0.
12
0.
12
0.
12
N
ot
es
:
se
e
T
ab
le
3.
5.
39
provided by the financial sector relative to GDP, logdcrediti,t and logdcreditj,t. For
both years only the coefficient for country i is significant and has a positive sign24
(specification (4)). A one percent increase in private credit relative to GDP in the
home country i is associated with an increase in foreign portfolio shares of about
0.24 percentage points in 1997 and 2001. The positive effect indicates that more
and better banking institutions and more liquidity in the banking sector at home -
proxied by private credit relative to GDP in country i - are associated with more
investments in foreign markets.
Stock market capitalization in country i, logmcapi,t, has no effect in 1997 and
a negative effect in 2001.25 The latter is in line with the consideration that more
developed equity markets offer more diversification possibilities at home such that
investors are less inclined to invest abroad. The negative marginal effect in 2001
amounts to 0.15. In contrast, stock market capitalization in country j, logmcapj,t
has a positive and significant marginal effect on foreign portfolio shares which is
equal to 0.08 in 1997 and 0.17 in 2001. Based on these results, investors seem to be
more inclined to hold equity shares in such economies. The more developed equity
markets in the foreign country j, the more informative are prices and investment
opportunities.
All in all, the results suggest the following relationship between financial market
development and foreign portfolio shares: Both, the relative size of the banking
sector in the investor’s country and the relative size of the stock market in the
issuer’s country are positively linked to foreign portfolio shares.
The effect of the float compared to the market portfolio share is slightly smaller
in both years (specification (5)). In the full sample the float portfolio share does
not seem to capture any further liquidity effects and thus does not provide any
additional explanatory power compared to the market portfolio share, W ∗j,t.
Capital Controls
If capital controls on incoming capital are in place, the share of foreign equity
investment into that country should be lower. Again a negative effect is expected if
capital controls on outgoing capital are in place. Unfortunately, the AREAER data
does not allow to distinguish between incoming and outgoing capital controls. The
results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that capital controls have hardly any significant
impact. Exceptions are specifications (6) and (7) in 1997. The existence of controls
yields a weak positive effect that is significant at the 10 percent level only, meaning
24If stock market capitalization is excluded from specification (4), logdcreditj,t has a positive
and significant effect on actual portfolio shares. Due to the fact that logdcreditj,t and market
capitalization, logmcapj,t, are positively correlated, the effect is attributed to logmcapj,t rather
than logdcreditj,t once both variables enter the regression.
25Note that the negative sign is not influenced by the alternative financial market development
measure logdcrediti,t and still present in a regression without logdcrediti,t and logdcreditj,t.
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that the existence of controls in the country of origin, i, is associated with a higher
share of foreign equity. This result is mainly driven by Chile that experienced
high shares of foreign equity holdings and capital controls in 1997.26 Once Chile
is excluded from the sample, the coefficient on restricti,t turns negative in 1997.
27
Moreover, the effect vanishes in the full sample when GDP growth is added.
Investment Opportunities and Diversification
In addition, variables mirroring investors’ investment opportunities and diversifi-
cation, i.e., GDP growth and return correlations respectively, are included in the
regression analysis.
As specifications (7) and (8) (Tables 3.5 and 3.6) show, return correlations,
rcorrij,t, have no significant impact. A negative effect would be consistent with a
diversification motive. The tendency to find either a positive relationship or none at
all is in line with other empirical studies, e.g., Portes and Rey (2005) and Aviat and
Coeurdacier (2004). The finding might be driven by the common positive impact
that financial integration has on portfolio shares and return correlations at the same
time. According to this argument, return correlations measure the effect of increased
financial integration instead of measuring diversification opportunities. One possible
solution to this measurement problem would be to instrument current stock market
correlation. Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2005) show that when using stock return
correlation over the period of 1950-1975 as an instrument, a diversification motive
can be identified. As such data is not present for the country sample used in this
paper, this approach cannot be undertaken, however.
GDP growth is included for the country of destination. In booming economies
that experience high GDP growth rates more promising investment opportunities
are likely to be existent. In line with this consideration, GDP growth in country j
has a significantly positive impact in both years: A one percentage point increase in
GDP growth leads to an increase in foreign equity holdings of about 0.07 percentage
points in 1997 and 0.15 in 2001 (specification (8)).
Market and Float Portfolio Shares in Different Geographical Regions
The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that coefficients on the market and float
portfolio shares are very low. The float portfolio denotes the market portfolio share
corrected for non-tradable shares held by large shareholders. – Do these two findings
change when the impact ofW ∗j,t onW
act
ij,t is analyzed for different regions and countries
separately?
The size of the marginal effects of W ∗j,t and W
float
j,t differs significantly across
26See De Gregorio, Edwards and Valde`s (2000) on the Chilean experience of capital controls in
the 1990s.
27These results are not reported but can be obtained from the author upon request.
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Table 3.7: The market portfolio share for different regions
1997 2001
(9) (10) (9) (10)
W ∗j,t 0.131 0.108 0.205 0.180
[3.55]*** [9.37]*** [3.29]*** [7.21]***
(W ∗j,t) ∗ samerica 0.167 0.068
[0.63] [0.09]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ namerica -0.090 -0.127
[2.42]** [2.03]**
(W ∗j,t) ∗ easia -0.051 -0.050
[1.05] [0.49]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ seasia -0.147 -0.976
[0.33] [0.86]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ wasia -0.503 0.211
[0.19] [0.01]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ seurope 0.048 -0.325
[0.48] [0.23]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ neurope -0.014 -0.017
[0.37] [0.26]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ oceania 0.074 0.101
[0.53] [0.38]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ eeurope -0.505 1.801
[0.03] [0.24]
(W ∗j,t) ∗ U.S. -0.063 -0.096
[5.61]*** [4.01]***
(W ∗j,t) ∗ EMU 0.001 0.119
[0.01] [1.78]*
No. of obs. 900 900 899 899
adjm. factor 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.54
adj. R2 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.13
Notes: see Table 3.5. In addition, the following variables are included but not re-
ported: logdistanceij , samelegorij , logdcrediti,t, logdcreditj,t, logmcapi,t, logmcapj,t, restricti,t,
restrictj,t, rcorrij,t and gdpgrowthj,t.
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Table 3.8: The float portfolio share for different regions
1997 2001
(9) (10) (9) (10)
W floatj,t 0.168 0.101 0.284 0.171
[3.46]*** [9.38]*** [3.27]*** [7.27]***
W floatj,t ∗ samerica 0.462 -0.039
[0.80] [0.03]
W floatj,t ∗ namerica -0.134 -0.220
[2.76]*** [2.53]**
W floatj,t ∗ easia -0.077 -0.113
[1.22] [0.84]
W floatj,t ∗ seasia 0.042 -1.070
[0.06] [0.60]
W floatj,t ∗ wasia 4.284 1.677
[0.14] [0.13]
W floatj,t ∗ seurope 0.060 -0.449
[0.49] [0.41]
W floatj,t ∗ neurope -0.066 -0.122
[1.37] [1.40]
W floatj,t ∗ oceania 0.035 0.043
[0.26] [0.16]
W floatj,t ∗ eeurope 1.443 4.052
[0.14] [0.18]
W floatj,t ∗ U.S. -0.066 -0.104
[6.14]*** [4.52]***
W floatj,t ∗ EMU 0.019 0.190
[0.38] [2.22]**
No. of obs. 900 900 899 899
adjm. factor 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.54
adj. R2 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.13
W-test 0.56a 0.05b 0.84a 0.17b
p-value [0.46] [0.83] [0.36] [0.68]
Notes: see Table 3.7, a) refers to the Wald test with the null hypothesis: W ∗j = W
float
j,t ;
b) refers
to the Wald test with the null hypothesis: (W ∗j,t) ∗ EMU = (W floatj,t ) ∗ EMU .
43
regions. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present regressions including region dummies or coun-
try dummies interacted with the market and the float portfolio share respectively.
Compared to the reference region Western Europe, the marginal effect of the market
portfolio share is significantly smaller for North America (Table 3.7, specification
(9)). The same picture applies to the float portfolio (Table 3.8, specification (9)).
In contrast, there is no significant difference between Western Europe and all other
regions. Note that the marginal effect of W ∗j,t - which corresponds to the reference
region Western Europe - is larger compared to the full sample results in Tables 3.5
and 3.6: A one percentage point increase in the market portfolio share is associated
with an increase in the portfolio share of 0.13 percentage points in 1997 and 0.21 in
2001.
The coefficient on the float portfolio is now larger than the one on the market
portfolio share for Western Europe in 1997 and 2001 (specification (9), Table 3.8)
and the EMU in 2001 (specification (10), Table 3.8). But as the Wald tests report,
the null hypothesis of the coefficients on W ∗j,t and W
float
j,t being equal cannot be
rejected, neither for Western Europe nor for the EMU (Table 3.8).28 These results
indicate that the float portfolio does not add any explanatory power, neither to
the full sample nor to single regions.29 The two proxies for financial development
might already account for the liquidity effect measured by the float portfolio. In the
next paragraph this interpretation is further underlined with regression results in a
sample with EMU countries only.
The EMU
As the EMU forms a relatively well integrated financial region, regressions are run
separately for this group of countries in order to see whether the above mentioned
determinants have different effects on portfolio shares.
Within the EMU an increase ofW ∗j,t by one percentage point leads to an increase
of the portfolio share by 25 percentage points whereas a similar increase of W floatj,t
leads to a portfolio share that is 33 percentage points higher in 1997 (Table 3.9,
specifications (11) and (12)). For 2001 the average partial effects are 37 and 48
percentage points respectively. The results show a much larger effect on actual
portfolio shares compared to the full sample or other regions. However, W floatj,t is
not significantly larger than W ∗j,t (see Wald test in specification (12), Table 3.9).
If W floatj,t and the residual value of the market portfolio share, i.e., the difference
between the market and the float portfolio share, W diffj,t , enter the regression at
the same time, both are separately insignificant but jointly significant (specification
(13)). This changes once the proxy for equity market development in country j,
28The coefficient corresponding to EMU is the sum of the coefficients ofW ∗j,t and of (W
∗
j,t)∗EMU .
29This stands in contrast to Dahlquist et al. (2003) who show that the coefficient on W floatj,t
is larger than on W ∗j,t. However, they do not include any other proxies for financial market
development in their regressions.
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logmcapj,t, is left out of the regression (specification (14)). In this case, only the
float portfolio share is significant. This shows that for the EMU sub-sample the
float portfolio share indeed seems to capture some liquidity effects of total equity
shares traded at stock exchanges if these effects are not accounted for separately by
equity market development, namely logmcapj,t.
Information frictions are still existent as shown by the large size of the coeffi-
cients of logdistanceij and samelegorij. However, the coefficient of samelegorij is
not significant in 1997. Banking sector development, measured as private credit
provided by the financial sector, is not significant in any of the years whereas stock
market development matters in 2001, again with a negative effect for country i and a
positive effect for country j. This result might point at the fact that banking sector
developments within the EMU are fairly similar whereas differences in equity market
development are still existent such that it matters for foreign portfolio shares.30
Diversification considerations seem to be existent in the EMU sample for both
years: If returns are negatively correlated across countries, portfolio shares are
higher. GDP growth opportunities in the country of destination, j, matters.
Overall, results for the EMU countries show that information frictions are very
important. Results with respect to financial market development are mixed across
years. Clearly, banking sector development does not matter in this sample as varia-
tion across EMU countries is very small. Moreover, the diversification considerations
come out more clearly and the market portfolio share has a much larger impact com-
pared to the full sample results.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper employs the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in order
to investigate institutional determinants of international equity portfolios. While
a bilateral home bias in equities can be observed for most country pairs including
the U.S., the data reveal a bilateral ‘friendship bias’ for several other country pairs,
mostly countries within the same geographical region, in particular within the EMU.
The empirical approach of the estimation analysis is based on the difference be-
tween actual equity portfolio shares and the ones predicted by the ICAPM under
the assumption of perfect capital markets. This difference is used to investigate
the relevance of institutional capital market frictions, such as information asymme-
tries, financial market development, and capital controls for portfolio holdings at
the aggregate country level.
Financial market development is looked at from two different angles: equity mar-
ket development and development of the banking sector. The results reveal that the
30Baele et al. (2004) and Adam et al. (2002) find that the equity market is less integrated among
EMU countries than other market segments, which supports this interpretation.
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degree of equity market development in the foreign country plays a significant posi-
tive role for foreign portfolio shares. At the same time, the development of the home
banking sector is positively linked to foreign portfolio shares. For holding foreign
portfolio shares, it is advantageous to have well developed home financial institu-
tions that organize and channel these investments efficiently. Liquidity constraints
due to controlling shareholders are taken into account by using an alternative float
portfolio instead of the market portfolio share. However, the float portfolio share
has no additional explanatory power given all other covariates. The impact of fi-
nancial market development is substantial, but less important, i.e., less significant,
across specifications compared to the impact of information advantages. The latter
are proxied by geographical proximity and the existence of a common legal origin
or, alternatively, by the existence of a common colonial background. In contrast,
capital controls do not play any significant role in determining equity portfolios.
In addition, variables mirroring investors’ investment opportunities such as re-
turn correlations and GDP growth are included in the regression analysis. As in
other empirical studies, no relation between stock market return correlations and
foreign portfolio shares can be revealed. Only within the EMU a weakly significant
coefficient is found that is in line with portfolio diversification considerations. GDP
growth in the foreign country is positively associated with foreign portfolio shares,
which is in line with the observation that booming economies offer more promising
investment opportunities.
The findings in this paper motivate future research that incorporates capital mar-
ket frictions into models that simulate international investment and capital flows.
Models that take this direction and explain (part of) the home bias can be found e.g.
in Baxter and Jermann (1997), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Heathcote and Perri
(2004) or Coeurdacier (2005). However, these papers focus only on non-tradable
goods or costs associated with goods trade whereas the degree of financial market
development, information frictions or direct barriers to investment are not consid-
ered.
3.5 Outlook
As part of a broader research agenda of population aging, it is of interest to incor-
porate capital market frictions into an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model as
employed in Chapter 2 in order to project demographically induced capital flows
more realistically. So far, the model in Chapter 2 assumes perfect capital mobil-
ity. In the following, three different approaches of how to consider capital market
frictions in an OLG model framework are sketched. They combine the insights of
this paper with different modeling approaches. The first approach is a very direct
and straight forward way of implementing capital market frictions by introducing
exogenous mark-ups on returns to capital. In the second approach adjustment costs
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of investment are modeled that depend on financial market development. The third
approach introduces risk to the, so far, deterministic OLG model in Chapter 2.
Exogenous Mark-ups on Returns to Capital
In a first approach, an exogenous mark-up to the return on financial investment
is introduced. This mark-up can be modeled as a proportional tax, τi,t, on gross
returns to investment that is specific to each country i and year t. The dynamic
maximization problem of the representative firm in the production sector then looks
as follows:31
max
Ki,t,Li,t,Ii,t
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + ri,t(1− τi,t)
)t
[Yi,t − Ii,t − wi,tLi,t] (3.1)
subject to
Yi,t = F (Ki,t, Li,t) and (3.2)
Ii,t = Ki,t+1 −Ki,t(1− δi), (3.3)
where Ki,t, Li,t and Ii,t refer to the capital stock, the labor supply and investments
in country i in year t; ri,t and wi,t denote returns on financial investments and
wages. The tax, τi,t, is proportional to gross returns of financial investment, ri,t,
and enters the maximization problem through the discount factor, 1
1+ri,t(1−τi,t) , as
the representative firm considers net returns when discounting all future profits.
The maximization problem results in the following first order condition with
respect to capital:
rni,t = ri,t(1− τi,t) = (FKi,t − δi), (3.4)
where rni,t denotes net returns to financial investment and FKi,t refers to the marginal
product of capital. This first order condition describes the relationship between net
returns, mark-ups, gross returns and the marginal product of capital in a straight
forward way: Net returns on financial investment equal the marginal product of
physical investment less depreciation and less the proportional tax. Market clearing
on international capital markets and the assumption of perfect capital mobility
require that in equilibrium net returns are the same across all countries: rni,t = r
n
t .
The mark-up, τi,t, can be calculated exogenously on the basis of observable taxes
on capital as well as capital controls and plugged into the model. De Gregorio,
Edwards and Valde`s (2000) calculate such mark-ups for Chile. As pointed out in
the present paper it is difficult to find quantitative information on capital controls
31One could also state this maximization problem in a static way. However, as for the second
approach the dynamic maximization problem is needed, it is also used here. Note also that a
constant interest rate overall periods is assumed here.
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or on capital taxes including bilateral tax treaties for a large number of countries
that could be used for such an undertaking.
There are further capital market frictions that have not been directly addressed
in the present paper such as country or currency risks that can also be included in
such an approach. Country risks emerge due to political or economic risks and may
lead to country defaults. The dummy for banking crises in the present paper shows
that such risks affect international investment (see Table 3.3). Moreover, exchange
rate risks play a role in investors’ decisions. Such risks are not existent among
countries that form a currency union. The next chapter provides empirical evidence
on how German cross-border portfolio investment increases with countries that are
also part of the EMU. In addition to taxes, these risks can also be transformed into
risk premia mark-ups of expected returns to capital. Frankel (1992) and Favero,
Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997) show how interest rate differentials can be decomposed
into currency and default risk premia. These premia can then be included in the
mark-up τi,t.
Modeling Adjustment Costs of Investment
In a second approach that can be combined with the first one, proportional adjust-
ment costs to investment can be introduced that depend on the degree of financial
market development. Convex adjustment costs that are proportional to investment
can be added to the model.32 They change the firm’s maximization problem in the
following way:
max
Ki,t,Li,t,Ii,t
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + ri,t
)t
[Yi,t − Ii,t − C(Ii,t, Ki,t)− wi,tLi,t] (3.5)
subject to
Yi,t = F (Ki,t, Li,t) and (3.6)
Ii,t = Ki,t+1 −Ki,t(1− δi) and (3.7)
C(Ii,t, Ki,t) =
Ψi,t
2
I2i,t
Ki,t
, (3.8)
where Ψi,t is an adjustment cost function that is described in more detail below.
The maximization problem yields the following first order condition with respect to
capital:
32Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2007) model a fixed adjustment factor to investment based
on Hayashi (1982). The approach described in the following extends this idea in order to specify
these adjustment costs in more detail such that they vary across countries and time.
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ri,t =
FKi,t + (1− δi)∆qi,t + Ψi,t2 ( Ii,tKi,t )2
qi,t−1
− δi, (3.9)
with qi,t = 1 + Ψi,t
Ii,t
Ki,t
as the Lagrangian factor of the net investment equation 3.8.
It equals the total marginal costs of investment. The first order condition yields the
arbitrage condition for the rate of return on financial and physical investment, which
is now augmented by the introduction of adjustment costs on investment. The rate
of return on financial investment has to be equal to the marginal cost of one unit of
physical investment at price qi,t−1 in each country.33 If Ψi,t = 0, then equation 3.9
reduces to equation 3.4.
International investment depends positively on the degree of financial market
development.34 As discussed in Section 3.2.2, it can be proxied by the size of the
capital market. The adjustment cost function,Ψi,t, can therefore be described as a
function of the capital output ratio:
Ψi,t = α
Ki,t
Yi,t
, (3.10)
The parameter α has to be calibrated such that the current account to output
ratios in the data are matched. As costs should decrease with increased financial
development α is expected to be positive.
Implementing Risk
Instead of exogenously implementing currency and default risks as, for example,
suggested in the first approach risk can be generated by using a stochastic instead
of a deterministic growth model. Default risk depends on a country’s debt level. In
a stochastic model, this risk can be modeled as shocks to interest rates.35 These
shocks depend on the level of debt and lead to a risk premium on returns as described
in Turnovsky (1999):36
33The right hand side of equation 3.9 describes the marginal product of capital plus capital gains
on non-depreciated capital plus the reduction in marginal adjustment costs minus depreciation.
34Moreover, the present paper indicates that international investment depends positively on
information advantages that can be proxied by geographical proximity or the fact that two countries
have a common legal origin. However, these measures are both country pair specific and can
therefore not be implemented in a multi-country OLG setting where all determinants are specific
to the home country only. Country pair specific frictions can only be modeled as adjustment costs
to investment in a three-country model with three different production sectors. Alternatively, the
notion of a home bias can be introduced via individuals’ preferences that depend on information
advantages and familiarity. They can be proxied by geographical proximity or a common legal
origin between two countries.
35See for example Backus, Kydland and Kehoe (1994) who built a stochastic growth model.
As opposed to this approach, they implement shocks to aggregate productivity and government
purchases of goods and services.
36Refer to p. 42ff. Note that Turnovsky’s set-up refers to a deterministic model.
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ri,t(di,t) = r
∗
i,t + w(di,t); w
′ > 0 (3.11)
where di,t is a country’s debt level; w(di,t) is the country specific risk premium in
each period t that increases with the stock of debt issued by that country. The risk
premium makes foreign borrowing more costly and generates an upward-sloping
supply curve of debt. In addition to default risk, exchange rate risk comes into
play when goods or capital are traded internationally. This risk can be modeled as
shocks to interest rates and goods prices. These shocks and their persistence depend
on exchange rate determinants, i.e., economic fundamentals such as prices, interest
rates, debt and output.
These three approaches of implementing capital market frictions can be divided
into two different categories: Frictions can be further specified within the model
(second and third approach) or modeled as exogenous mark-ups to interest rates
as described in the first approach. The latter approach is more straight forward to
implement in an already existing model. Moreover, no additional parameters have
to be calibrated within the OLG model. However, this way of implementing frictions
is more vulnerable to the Lucas-critique. Taxes, capital controls as well as exchange
rate and country risks are very likely to change in the future, especially in light of the
globalization process and the tendency to form regions that are financially integrated
such as further enlargements of the EMU. Therefore, an endogenous determination
of capital market frictions within an OLG model is more consistent with long run
future projections of international capital flows.
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3.6 Appendix A
Table 3.10: Variable descriptions and data sources
Variable Description and Source
W actij,t actual portfolio share of country j’s assets in country i’s portfolio
Sources: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF;
International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV),
WDI (2002) and own calculations (see Appendix B)
W ∗j,t country j’s stock market capitalization relative to total world
market capitalization (“market portfolio share”) as described in
Section 3.2
Source: International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV),
WDI (2002)
W floatj,t corresponds to W
∗
j,t excluding shares by controlling shareholders
(“float portfolio share”)
Source: Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003)
for 1997, the ratio of W ∗j,t and W
float
j,t in 1997 is used to
impute the values for 2001
logdistanceij logarithm of physical distance between country i’s and j’s capitals
Source: Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995)
(www.nber.org/ wei/data/fsw1995/fsw1995.zip)
colonyij dummy equal to one if both countries share a common colonial
past, otherwise it is zero
Source: Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995)
(www.nber.org/ wei/data/fsw1995/fsw1995.zip), updated with
information by the original data source, CIA factbook
(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/)
samelegorij dummy equal to one if both countries share a common legal origin;
it is distinguished between German, French, Scandinavian civil law
families, the English common law and the Socialist law family
Source: La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney (1998).
logdcrediti,t, logarithm of domestic private credit provided by the banking sector
logdcreditj,t relative to GDP
Source: WDI (2002)
logmcapi,t, logarithm of stock market capitalization relative to GDP
logmcapj,t Sources: International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV),
WDI (2002)
Table continues on the next page.
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restricti,t, index of capital flow restrictions which takes the values zero, one, two
restrictj,t or three, depending on whether none, one, two or three of the
following restrictions are in place: (i) multiple exchange rates,
(ii) capital account restrictions, and/or (iii) current account
restrictions are in place; (iii) is only added if (ii) existsa
Source: based on an update of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995)b
gdpgrowthj,t yearly GDP growth in country j averaged across four years
preceding year t, i.e., referring to the averages in years 1993-1996
for 1997 and 1997-2000 for 2001
Source: WDI (2002)
rcorrij,t return correlations of country i’s and country j’s monthly stock
market indices in the four preceding years
Source: standard national stock market indices, www.msci.com
samerica dummy variable equal to one if country j is in South Americac
namerica dummy variable equal to one if country j is in North Americac
easia dummy variable equal to one if country j is in East Asiac
seasia dummy variable equal to one if country j is in South East Asiac
wasia dummy variable equal to one if country j is in West Asiac
seurope dummy variable equal to one if country j is in Southern Europec
neurope dummy variable equal to one if country j is in Northern Europec
oceania dummy variable equal to one if country j is in Oceaniac
eeurope dummy variable equal to one if country j is in Eastern Europec
U.S. dummy variable equal to one if country j is the U.S.
EMU dummy variable equal to one if country j is in the EMU
a) Restrictions on current account have been included because current account transactions can
be used to (partially) evade restrictions on capital transactions (if these are in place); b) I would
like to thank Axel Dreher for sharing his update. c) For the subdivision of countries into regions
see Table 3.2.
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3.7 Appendix B
The actual portfolio share, W actij,t , can be calculated as foreign equity holdings of
country i in country j, equaij, relative to country j’s total holdings of foreign as
well as domestic equities, equatotj,t =
∑N
i=1 equaji,t:
W actij,t =
equaij,t
equatotj,t
(3.12)
As equatotj,t is not directly available from the CPIS data,
37 country j’s total equity
holdings are calculated as follows:
equaj,t =MCAPj,t −
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
equlji,t +
N∑
i=1,i6=j
equaji,t (3.13)
where
∑N
i=1,i 6=j equlji,t denotes the sum of all equity liabilities of the rest of the world
held in country j and
∑N
i=1,i6=j equaji,t all foreign assets of country i held in the rest
of the world.
37The data includes only foreign equity securities and no domestic securities, equajj,t.
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Chapter 4
European Financial Integration
and German Cross-Border
Portfolio Transactions
4.1 Introduction
The formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been
the most important development affecting European financial markets in the last
two decades. Starting in 1990, twelve participating countries committed themselves
to remove all obstacles to financial integration.1 Finally, eleven countries gave up
their national currencies on January 1, 1999, Greece following in 2001, thereby
eliminating any exchange rate risk among themselves. In order to analyze this
process, three main questions are addressed in this paper: (1) How large is the effect
of European financial integration and the EMU on German cross-border portfolio
flows?2 More specifically: Are portfolio transactions between Germany and EMU
countries significantly larger over time compared to trade with Denmark, the UK
and Sweden that have not introduced the Euro? (2) What kind of reforms or
underlying country characteristics can explain (part of) this effect? (3) Are there
heterogeneous responses to increased European financial market integration with
respect to portfolio investment?
These research questions are of interest because learning more about the under-
lying factors and driving forces of financial integration helps to understand deter-
minants of international asset trade. In the last two decades, the volume of capital
flows has increased dramatically. In light of economic globalization, financial market
integration is very likely to further increase over time and across countries. Espe-
1Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands in 1990; Ireland,
Portugal and Spain in 1993, and Greece in 1998.
2Portfolio flows include equity, mutual funds, bonds and money market papers.
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cially the investigation of question (3) sheds light on changes in German asset trade
with European countries in the course of future enlargements of the EMU.
Several studies empirically investigate the impact of European financial integra-
tion on stock market returns using time-series methods (Baele (2005), Bartram,
Taylor and Wang (2005), Fratzscher (2002)). There is also a growing literature on
the effects of the EMU on the real economy, e.g., on goods trade (Rose and van
Wincoop (2001) and Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003)) and business cycles (e.g.,
Boewer and Guillemineau (2006)). In contrast, the present paper investigates the
role of European financial integration and the EMU on German cross-border port-
folio flows. The estimates are based on a gravity model of asset trade a` la Martin
and Rey (2004) using annual data on gross portfolio flows between Germany and
47 countries for the period of 1987 to 2002. As shown in the literature, the gravity
framework has performed very well in explaining volumes of bilateral cross-border
asset trade in earlier studies.3 So far, it has not yet been employed to analyze the
effects of European financial integration and the EMU.
Based on this approach and data, the present paper empirically describes the
differences of German portfolio flows to and from EMU countries compared to the
other trading partners. Gross flows mirror the volume of assets transacted on fi-
nancial markets. If frictions are present ceteris paribus less asset trading is taking
place. In this respect, gross flows may point at the degree of segmentation between
markets. However, this measure does not have any implications for diversification
across countries. The data set used refers to cross-border portfolio flows with Ger-
many only. Panel data on bilateral portfolio flows within a broader set of countries
is not yet publicly available. As Germany is economically the largest country within
the EMU and accounted for 19 percent of total portfolio investment within the EMU
in 2002,4 it is a promising starting point to analyze the effects of European financial
market integration.
Referring to the questions posed in the beginning, the following results are re-
vealed in the present paper: First, there is substantially more portfolio trade between
Germany and countries also participating in stage one and three of the EMU. In-
vestigations over time show that trade with the Euro area has become more and
more important. For 2002 cross-border portfolio flows between Germany and EMU
countries are significantly larger compared to flows between Germany and Denmark,
the UK, and Sweden which are part of the EU-15 but not of the Euro area.5 Sec-
ond, developments intertwined with the formation of the EMU such as changes in
exchange rate volatility, financial market development and increased real economic
integration among EMU countries have an impact on German portfolio flows. How-
3See, e.g., Buch (2005), Portes and Rey (2005), Portes, Rey and Oh (2001).
4This number is based on the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) issued by the
IMF.
5Note that the sample employed in the present paper ends in 2002. It includes observations for
the years 1987-2002.
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ever, these factors are not able to explain the effect of the EMU on German portfolio
transactions in the framework employed in this paper. Third, the EMU effect on
gross portfolio flows is larger for countries with more developed banking and equity
markets, and for countries with more correlated business cycles. Whether countries
are more market-based or more bank-based or whether countries are geographically
further away from Germany does ceteris paribus not lead to different country re-
sponses.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews important results of the
literature on financial market integration in Europe. In Section 4.3 the estimation
approach based on a gravity model of bilateral asset trade and the data are described.
Section 4.4 summarizes and discusses the empirical results which are concluded in
Section 4.5.
4.2 Financial Market Integration in Europe -
Related Literature
A number of recent papers give a broad overview of the degree of capital market
integration in Europe by using different price and quantity measures of financial
integration. Baele et al. (2004) present a comprehensive assessment of these mea-
sures and find a rising degree of equity market integration over time in Europe.
A comparison of the European equity market with other market segments reveals
that while the money market has almost fully converged after the introduction of
the single currency, important barriers to international investment still remain in
the equity market. The markets for government and corporate bonds as well as the
credit market lie in between these two extremes. Despite being characterized by dif-
ferent levels of integration, all sectors have shown a marked increase in integration,
underlining the hypothesis that monetary unions facilitate cross-border asset flows
(Baele et al. (2004), Adam et al. (2002)).
A more indirect measure of financial market integration looks at investment
savings correlations as pioneered by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). In a world of
perfect capital markets the two macroeconomic variables should be independent of
each other. Empirically, this is not the case - a phenomenon that is well know in the
literature as the so called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)
show that the correlation between domestic saving and investment has declined over
time, especially in the Euro area, suggesting higher integration in financial markets.
While the above mentioned studies give a broad and general overview of financial
integration in the Euro area, other papers more specifically look at certain market
segments. Pagano and von Thadden (2004) focus on the impact that the monetary
union has on the markets for Euro area sovereign and private bonds. They find that
primary and secondary bond markets have become increasingly integrated and that
bond yields have converged dramatically during the formation of the EMU. Still
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existing small yield differentials reflect differences in fundamental risk rather than
persistent market segmentation. In this respect, the sequence of policy actions in the
wake of the EMU removed most remaining obstacles in this market and, therefore,
facilitated a huge improvement of bond market integration.
Baele (2005), Bartram, Taylor and Wang (2005) and Fratzscher (2002) focus on
European equity markets. They investigate the degree of financial integration within
Europe by analyzing stock market returns across countries using high frequency data
and time-series methods. Baele (2005) investigates the effect of globalization and
regional integration on the intensity by which global and regional market shocks
are transmitted to local equity markets. He finds that the interdependence of 13
European equity markets with the US, and especially within European countries
increased over the 1980s and 1990s. According to his findings, equity market devel-
opment, trade integration and price stability enhance the extent of interdependence
within European equity markets. Bartram, Taylor and Wang (2005) conjecture that
the degree of dependence between equity markets of countries within the Euro area
increased in late 1997 or early 1998 after the Euro membership had been determined
and announced. Similarly, Fratzscher (2002) suggests that European equity markets
have become more integrated since 1996. He also shows that reduced exchange rate
uncertainty as well as monetary policy convergence of interest rates and inflation
rates have been the central driving forces behind the financial integration process in
Europe.
From a microeconomic perspective, Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli (2003) find that
households’ equity market participation has increased. They analyze the current
state of equity ownership in several European countries. However, considerable
country-specific differences remain, which they explain by different levels of partici-
pation costs in the Euro area. This finding suggests that there are still a number of
barriers existent that need to be overcome before full integration of European equity
markets will be realized.
As shown in the cited papers, financial market integration altogether increased
substantially in Europe over the last two decades. Different levels of integration
among financial market segments exist, though, in which still some institutional,
legal and fiscal barriers remain. Integration of European equity markets increased
especially in the late 1990s, but is still lower compared to other segments.
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4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 A Gravity Model of Bilateral Asset Trade - Empirical
Framework
Martin and Rey (2004) propose a theory of asset trade based on a general equilibrium
model from which a gravity equation emerges.6 The resulting gravity equation and
its intuition are similar to gravity equations in the literature on international trade in
differentiated goods. The model is characterized by three key assumptions: (i) assets
are imperfect substitutes, (ii) cross-border asset trade entails transaction and/or
information costs, (iii) the supply of assets is endogenous. The model is made up of
risk-averse agents that develop an optimal number of Arrow-Debreu projects. The
projects correspond to different assets, which are traded on the market. Prices are
determined by aggregate demand at home and in foreign countries. Agents set up
more risky projects if asset prices are higher. Consequently, a country’s market
capitalization evolves endogenously. The model’s main implication is that gross
flows of asset trade between two countries depend inversely on transaction and/or
information costs and proportionally on market sizes. The equation for transactions
between country i and country j, Tij, that is the sum of purchases and sales, takes,
in logarithms, the following form:
log(Tij) = a0 + a1log(MiMj) + a2log(τij). (4.1)
Mi and Mj are measures for the economic masses of country i and j. τij denotes
transaction and/or information costs that occur with asset trade. The model by
Martin and Rey (2004) implies that a1 > 0 and a2 < 0; a0 is a constant.
In empirical work, the model has proven to work very well.7 As noted in Martin
and Rey (2000) and Portes and Rey (2005), who are the first to use the present model
for empirical work, one major limitation of the model, however, is its static nature.
However, no dynamic theoretical models that are able to replicate the transaction
volumes observed in financial data are available so far.
When going to the data, economic masses of country i and j are generally mea-
sured by GDP per capita.8 In order to leave coefficients unrestricted, GDP and
6An empirical gravity model equation also emerges from a model by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
that introduces transaction costs solely in the goods market. Thereby it generates substantial
amounts of home bias. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) for an N-country extension of the
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) model.
7E.g. Buch (2005) applies a gravity model to bank lending data, Portes and Rey (2005) to
cross-border portfolio investment, Di Giovanni (2005) to M&A activity and Portes, Rey and Oh
(2001) to corporate, government bonds and equities.
8Alternatively, stock market capitalization relative to GDP is used to measure market size (e.g.
Portes and Rey (2005)). However, as the data employed in this paper does not only entail equity
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population size of country i and j enter the regression in separate terms. Transac-
tion or information costs, τij, are measured by two variables: geographical distance
between country i and j, distanceij, and the percentage of foreigners of nationality
i or j living in Germany, foreignerij,t.
9 As Portes and Rey (2005) have shown, geo-
graphical distance between two countries is a very good proxy for information costs.
The variable foreignerij,t depicts a proxy of familiarity and network effects between
countries. It is an inverse measure of τij and expected to have a positive influence
on transactions through lower information costs, i.e., β6 > 0. It complements the
distance proxy of information asymmetries in so far as that it varies not only across
country pairs but also over time. This is in line with French and Poterba (1991),
who stress the importance of cultural familiarity as an explanation for international
investment.
To summarize, the basic estimation equation becomes:
log(Tij,t) = β0 + β1log(gdpi,t) + β2log(gdpj,t) + β3log(popi,t)
+ β4log(popj,t) + β5log(distanceij,t) + β6log(foreignerij,t)
+
N∑
n=7
βnZ
n
ij,t + ²ij,t, (4.2)
where i denotes the source or transacting country, j the country invested in and t
time. The dependent variable, Tij,t, is defined as country i’s transactions of country
j’s portfolio investment. As derived from the theoretical model, the dependent vari-
able and all explaining variables mentioned above enter in logarithms.10 Additional
variables, Znij,t, are included that account for time and country-fixed effects: a full
set of time dummies, dummies for financial centers as well as a dummy variable de-
scribing whether a banking crisis is present in country i or country j in the relevant
or precedent year (crisisi,t and crisisj,t). β0 is a constant and ²ij,t is an error term,
which captures all factors that have not explicitly been accounted for. In order to
account for heteroscedasticity, the error term is assumed to be distributed N(0, σ2ij).
The basic specification of the gravity model described above is subsequently aug-
mented in the following regression analysis in order to analyze different hypotheses
concerning the course of European integration and its underlying driving forces.
The estimation strategy is as follows: First, effects of the formation of the EMU
are identified by adding dummy variables that stand for the starting point of the
EMU in 1990 and the final fixation of exchange rates in 1999. Moreover, German
but also bonds, a country’s GDP and population size are used as scaling variables. Anyhow, the
use of stock market capitalization leads to qualitatively similar results.
9This variable always refers to foreigners living in Germany. Data on the percentage of Germans
living in foreign countries is unfortunately very difficult to obtain.
10When taking the model to the data, reported zero transactions are replaced by very small
values, namely 500 US Dollar. Note that the smallest reported positive transaction volume amounts
to about 7 million US Dollar.
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asset trade with EMU countries is investigated over time in comparison to trade
with EU-15 countries that are not part of the Euro area, namely Denmark, the UK
and Sweden. Second, variables that proxy financial reforms or changes and real eco-
nomic integration are added in order to account for (part of) the EMU effect. Third,
heterogeneous responses to increased European financial market integration are in-
vestigated by adding interaction effects with variables that measure financial market
development and structure, information costs and business cycle synchronization.
In order to measure the impact of financial market integration - which is a con-
tinuous process over time - the time-series dimension is of interest. Therefore, not
only standard pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) estimates but also fixed effects
estimations are undertaken.11 In this respect, the static nature of the model is a
limiting assumption. Still, countries’ market sizes proxied by GDP and population
size are likely to explain asset transactions between countries also over time, given
that shocks, new information and structural changes within countries lead to contin-
ued shifts in overall portfolio composition. However, in order to test the robustness
of the estimation equation, additional regressions are undertaken: GDP growth in
country i and country j are used as additional scaling variables.12 The underlying
hypothesis is that not the size of the market in levels generates asset demand but
that changes in the size of the market lead to adjustments in international asset
portfolios. This consideration is in line with the traditional Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) which states
that portfolio shares should correspond to assets’ market shares.
4.3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study investigates German cross-border portfolio investment. The dependent
variable, Tij,t, includes the amount of foreign purchases and sales of German portfolio
assets - with i referring to the foreign transacting country and j to German assets -
as well as the amount of German sales and purchases of foreign portfolio investment
- in this case i refers to Germany and j to assets of the foreign country. The data
in use was provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Portfolio investments are part
of the balance of payments and include equity, mutual funds, bonds and notes as
well as money-market papers.13 The data is available for 47 countries from 1987
to 2002.14 The period covers the three stages of the formation of the EMU from
1990 to 1999. Further financial and macroeconomic variables are necessary for the
empirical analysis. Table 4.1 summarizes their definitions and sources. Summary
statistics for all variables are provided in Appendix B.
11See Cheng and Wall (2005) for a comparison of different panel estimation methods for the
estimation of bilateral goods trade.
12Results of these regressions and further robustness checks can be found in Appendix C).
13See Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports, www.bundesbank.de/volkswirtschaft/vo.php.
14For a list of countries see Table 4.9 in Appendix A.
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Table 4.1: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description
Tij,t The volume of portfolio transactions refers to sales and pur-
chases of assets from country j undertaken by Germans, or
sales and purchases of German assets undertaken by residents
from country i; Portfolio investment includes equity, mutual
funds, bonds and notes as well as money market papers.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
gdpi,t, GDP in current US $.
gdpj,t Source: WDI (2004)
distanceij Geographical distance between capitals of country i and j.
Source: Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995)
foreignerij,t Percentage of foreigners of country i or j living in Germany;
This variable only refers to foreigners living in Germany but
not to Germans living in the foreign country i or j.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
crisisi,t, Dummy variable equal to one if a banking crisis exists in the
crisisj,t relevant or precedent year in country i or j respectively.
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)
d1990ij,t Dummy variable equal to one since the first stage of the EMU
if both countries are part of stage one of the EMU.
It started in 1990 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Ireland, Spain and Portugal followed in 1993, Greece in 1998.
d1999ij,t Dummy variable equal to one since stage three of the EMU
if both countries are part of stage three of the EMU,
i.e., the fixation of the Euro exchange rate. It started in 1999
for all EMU countries except Greece that followed in 2001.
dEMUij Dummy variable equal to one during the whole sample period
if both countries are in 2001 part of the EMU.
dEUnonEMUij Dummy variable equal to one during the whole sample period
if one of the countries is part of the EU-15 but not part of the
EMU (i.e., Denmark, the UK, Sweden).
exratevolij,t Exchange rate volatility between country i and j is calculated
as the standard deviation of the mean monthly exchange
rate over its mean in year t. Source: IFS, own calculations
Table continues on the next page.
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mcapi,t, Value of listed shares for country i and j relative to GDP.
mcapj,t Sources: Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Levine (2001), WDI (2004)
crediti,t, Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP.
creditj,t Sources: Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Levine (2001), WDI (2004)
gdpcorrij,t GDP growth correlation in country i and j in the past 5 years,
calculated as rolling windows for each year t.
Source: WDI (2004)
marketi,t, Dummy variable equal to one if a country’s financial market is
marketj,t more market-based, and zero if it is more bank-based.
Source: Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Levine (2001)
Descriptive statistics of portfolio investments by direction of investment are pre-
sented in Table 4.2 for single years. Starting from the early 1990s, there is a very
strong increase in overall portfolio investment (purchases and sales) for both direc-
tions, i.e., German assets purchased and sold by foreign countries as well as foreign
assets purchased and sold by Germans. Moreover, percentage shares of portfolio
investment within OECD, EU-15 and EMU countries are reported. About 98 per-
cent of investments in either direction are undertaken with OECD countries. This
share stays constant throughout the entire sample period. This is contrasted by an
increase in the shares of investments with EU-15 and EMU countries.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
1987 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002
German sales and purchases of foreign portfolio assets
(in Bn. US$) 200.5 290.5 768.5 947.8 2,677.5 4,112.8 5,002.7
OECD (in %) 98.7 98.6 98.8 98.3 97.2 98.7 99.2
EU-15 (in %) 44.9 62.6 73.3 64.9 64.1 70.0 72.4
EMU (in %) 27.4 44.5 57.6 47.8 47.1 54.4 65.5
Foreign sales and purchases of German portfolio assets
(in Bn. US$) 385.9 549.4 2,200.7 2,979.7 4,441.4 4,269.9 5,042.2
OECD (in %) 97.8 98.1 98.7 97.5 98.1 99.3 99.5
EU-15 (in %) 74.4 77.0 89.1 86.7 84.1 87.5 90.4
EMU (in %) 21.1 17.1 19.4 22.7 28.0 29.9 30.2
Source: Own calculations based on Deutsche Bundesbank
Level and timing of this increase depend on the direction of investment: The
share of German investment (again purchases and sales) in EU-15 and EMU coun-
tries increases strongly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The EU-15 share rises
from 45 percent in 1987 to 72 percent in 2002. The EMU share grows even more
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strongly, namely from 27 percent to 66 percent. A slightly different pattern arises
for the other direction: Investment in German portfolio assets by EU-15 countries is
also rising mainly in the early 1990s but less significantly: from 74 percent in 1987
to 90 percent in 2002. Investments undertaken by EMU countries increase later, in
the mid-1990s, and both less dramatically, from 21 percent in 1987 to 30 percent in
2002.
Overall, the main difference between the two directions is due to a large share of
foreign investment in German portfolio assets by EU-15 countries whereas the share
of German sales and purchases of EMU and EU-15 portfolio assets is relatively low.
This is partly driven by a large share of German portfolio assets purchased and
sold by the UK due to its importance as a leading financial center. The empirical
analysis accounts for this fact by including financial center dummies15.
4.4 Empirical Results
First, the impact of European financial integration on German portfolio investment
is investigated in general. Second, potential underlying forces driving European in-
tegration are explicitly taken into account. It is very likely that countries’ responses
to European financial integration differ. This issue is addressed in the last part of
this section. Additional robustness checks can be found in Appendix C.
4.4.1 German Portfolio Investment and the EMU
The standard gravity regression equation described in Section 4.3.1 is used to identify
the effect of European financial integration on portfolio investment. The effect
is modeled by different dummy variables that mirror the formation of the EMU
or, more generally, EMU membership. The effect of EU-15 versus EMU financial
integration is disentangled and further robustness checks are undertaken.
The Formation of the EMU
To start with, results of the standard gravity model are compared with results in
the existing literature. The coefficients of the first column in Table 4.3 are based on
pooled OLS estimates with White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Speci-
fication (1) includes the scaling variables, the percentage of foreigners and distance.
Additional year dummies, dummies for financial centers, and dummies for financial
crises in the transacting country i or the country invested in, country j, are added
15Financial centers are Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, UK, Singapore and Switzerland. For
each of these countries separate dummies enter that refer to country i and j.
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in all specifications but not explicitly reported.16
The results are consistent with earlier estimates of gravity models in the liter-
ature.17 The distance coefficient is - as expected - negative and ranges in absolute
size between 0.34 and 0.43. Portes and Rey (2005) report a coefficient around mi-
nus 0.6 estimating bilateral portfolio flows between 14 countries from 1989 to 1996.
Buch (2005) considers assets and liabilities of commercial banks from five countries
(France, Germany, Italy, UK and the US) for 1983 and 1999 and estimates a dis-
tance coefficient between minus 0.3 and 1.25 depending on the respective estimation
sample.
The estimated coefficients of the remaining variables in specification (1) are in
line with the theoretical considerations mentioned in Section 4.3.1: The coefficients
of the scaling variables, gdpi,t, gdpj,t, popi,t and popj,t have the expected positive and
negative effects. The percentage of people of the respective foreign country living
in Germany, foreignerij,t, is associated with a positive effect on transactions. This
result suggests that familiarity between two countries plays a role.
In addition to the scaling variables and proxies for information costs, specifica-
tions (2) to (5) include dummy variables for stage one or three of the EMU. For
each specification, two estimates are reported: pooled OLS and country pair fixed
effects.18 Fixed effects capture omitted variables that are specific and constant in
cross sectional units. Most of these effects are not random but deterministically
associated with certain historical, political or geographical facts (Egger 2000). The
pooled OLS estimator captures both the effect over time and the cross sectional
effect of higher trade with EMU countries.
In the fixed effects model the coefficients on GDP and population size are not
always significant and, in case of population size, yield different signs compared to
the pooled OLS estimation. This may have different reasons: First, the inclusion
of country pair fixed effects and year dummies may already account for a large
part of the variation of these variables. Second, in the fixed effects estimation
GDP and population size rather seem to influence portfolio transactions in the same
direction whereas in the pooled OLS regression they do not. Third, as the sub-
sample estimates in Table 4.11, Appendix C, show, effects are not as homogeneous
across sub-samples as in the pooled OLS case and might therefore be even less
significant in the aggregate full sample.
In specification (2) to (5), Table 4.3, the dummies for stage one and three of the
EMU are highly significant. Based on these results, Germany experiences higher
16In order to take German reunification into account an additional dummy variable is consid-
ered. As the effect turns out to be insignificant, specifications without this additional dummy are
presented in the following.
17Note that the R2 amounts to 74 percent, which shows that the model performs very well in
explaining the variation in the data.
18Separate country pair fixed effects for each direction are considered, i.e., country pair ij is
distinguished from country pair ji.
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Table 4.3: Basic regression results I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
gdpi,t 2.209*** 2.161*** 0.581 2.192*** 0.437
[0.069] [0.069] [0.375] [0.069] [0.374]
gdpj,t 3.002*** 2.953*** 1.201* 2.985*** 1.028
[0.130] [0.131] [0.716] [0.130] [0.722]
popi,t -1.274*** -1.244*** -0.633 -1.261*** -0.377
[0.080] [0.078] [0.424] [0.079] [0.429]
popj,t -2.061*** -2.031*** 1.859** -2.049*** 2.157**
[0.142] [0.141] [0.941] [0.142] [0.952]
distanceij -0.429*** -0.343*** -0.407***
[0.046] [0.054] [0.047]
foreignerij,t 0.053*** 0.054*** -0.024 0.054*** -0.019
[0.006] [0.006] [0.057] [0.006] [0.058]
d1990ij,t 0.572*** 0.275*
[0.123] [0.145]
d1999ij,t 0.584*** 0.646***
[0.167] [0.130]
Obs. 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
R2 0.74 0.74 0.51 0.74 0.51
No. of pairs 94 94
Notes: robust standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: gross portfolio flows, Tij,t; *, **,
*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; specifications (1), (2) and (4) are
estimated using pooled OLS with White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, specifications
(3) and (5) are estimated using country-pair fixed effects, R2 refers to ’within’ values in this case;
a constant, year dummies as well as dummies for banking crises and for financial centers (Hong
Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Singapore and Switzerland) are included but not
reported.
portfolio investment volumes since 1990 with countries that are also part of the
first stage of the EMU. Specifications (2) and (3) suggest that ceteris paribus gross
flows with EMU countries are on average more than 57 percent larger in the pooled
OLS estimation and 28 percent higher in the fixed effects estimation. The third
stage of the EMU is ceteris paribus associated with portfolio investments that are
on average 58 percent higher in the pooled OLS and 65 percent higher in the fixed
effects estimation (specifications (4) and (5)).19
When both dummies enter simultaneously (specifications (6) and (7), Table 4.4),
the dummy for stage one is only significant in the pooled OLS estimation, whereas
the coefficient of stage three is only highly significant and large in the fixed effects
estimation. These results suggest that transactions increased over time especially
19For further robustness checks refer to Appendix C.
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Table 4.4: Basic regression results II
(6) (7) (8) (9)
gdpi,t 2.159*** 0.417 2.146*** 2.063***
[0.069] [0.374] [0.069] [0.070]
gdpj,t 2.951*** 1.01 2.940*** 2.859***
[0.131] [0.725] [0.128] [0.127]
popi,t -1.242*** -0.334 -1.234*** -1.154***
[0.078] [0.434] [0.079] [0.079]
popj,t -2.029*** 2.196** -2.023*** -1.943***
[0.141] [0.956] [0.140] [0.138]
distanceij -0.343*** -0.310*** -0.197***
[0.054] [0.058] [0.064]
foreignerij,t 0.054*** -0.01 0.053*** 0.059***
[0.006] [0.057] [0.006] [0.007]
d1990ij,t 0.498*** 0.155
[0.126] [0.146]
d1999ij,t 0.295* 0.609***
[0.167] [0.129]
dEMUij 0.615*** 0.988***
[0.121] [0.149]
dEUnonEMUij 1.228***
[0.158]
Obs. 1440 1440 1440 1440
R2 0.74 0.51 0.74 0.74
No. of pairs 94
F − test 5.25
p− value 0.02
Notes: see Table 4.3; specifications (6), (8) and (9) refer to pooled OLS with White-
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, (7) refers to country-pair fixed effects, R2 refers to
‘within’ values in this case.
after 1999 whereas for the first stage since 1990 only cross sectional differences can
be observed. As specification (8) shows, there exists also a positive level effect of
enhanced portfolio flows over the entire estimation period from 1987-2002: Ger-
man cross-border portfolio investment with EMU countries is on average 62 percent
higher compared to trade with countries not being part of the EMU.
EMU versus EU-15
The question arises whether the results are really driven by increased integration
in the wake of the EMU formation or rather by increased economic and financial
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integration within all EU-15 countries. Therefore, an additional dummy for EU-15
countries that are not part of the EMU, namely Denmark, the UK and Sweden, is
considered in the regression analysis, dEUnonEMUij.
When both the EMU dummy, dEMUij, and dEUnonEMUij enter simultane-
ously the regression equation, the coefficient of dEUnonEMUij is larger compared
to the EMU dummy (specification (9)). The hypothesis of both coefficients being
equal can be rejected at the 5 percent level, though not at the one percent level.20
On average across the whole time period under consideration, transactions between
Germany and Denmark, the UK and Sweden respectively tend to be larger compared
to trade with EMU countries.
Next, these effects are estimated separately for each year. Interaction terms
between the EMU dummy variable and year dummies as well as the dummy variable
for EU-15 countries that are not part of the EMU and year dummies enter the
regression. As stated in the Delors Report of 17 April 1989, the EMU was achieved
in three “discrete but evolutionary steps.” Therefore, one expects a smooth impact
of the EMU formation on financial indicators.
Figure 4.1: Estimated coefficients
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sults are documented in Table 4.1, Appendix C.
The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms plotted in Figure 4.1 are in
line with this notion.21 In the late 1980s, the estimated coefficients of the EMU-
20Refer to the documented F-test statistics in Table 4.4.
21Full regression results are documented in Table 4.15, Appendix C.
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countries are smaller compared to the coefficients referring to Denmark, the UK
and Sweden. Until 1998 the difference between the two coefficients decreases and
it finally reverses. As the standard error bands show, the coefficients are always
significantly different from zero, except for the EMU dummy in 1987 and 1988. F-
tests reveal that the estimated yearly coefficients are significantly different from one
another for the years up to 1992 and for the year 2002.22
The results suggest that German transactions with EMU countries are signifi-
cantly lower compared to trade with Denmark, the UK and Sweden until the early
1990s. However, since the beginning of the new millennium this relationship seems
to have reversed. The comparison between Euro area and non-Euro area countries
suggests, that this might be due to the final step of the EMU, the abolishment of
exchange rate risk. However, with one observations for 2002 only, this result is not
robust but only an indication. It is left to future research using updated data to
confirm or modify this indication.
4.4.2 Accounting for European Financial Integration
The dummy variables reflecting stage one and three of the EMU capture the effect of
increased financial integration. What exactly are its driving forces? In this section,
financial and real economic factors are investigated that might account for at least
part of the effect.
Financial Factors
The introduction of the Euro has resulted in the elimination of exchange rate risk
within the Euro area. The absence of exchange rate risk allows corporations to raise
funds across countries with fewer constraints and costs. This can in general have a
large effect on financial integration because exchange rate risk is an important source
of risk priced on capital markets (e.g. Dumas and Solnik (1995) and Hardouvelis
et al. (2006)). In addition, the launch of the common European currency is asso-
ciated with lower costs of cross-country transactions, improved liquidity and better
developed European capital markets (Fratzscher (2002) and Danthine, Giavazzi and
von Thadden (2001)).
In order to investigate whether financial factors such as the abolition of exchange
rate risk or financial market development and increased liquidity can explain part
of the effect captured so far by the dummy variables for stage one and three of the
EMU, measures for these factors are added to the regression analysis.
Exchange rate risk is measured as the standard deviation of the mean monthly
bilateral exchange rate over its mean in year t, exratevolij,t. In order to account
for enhanced financial development two commonly used measures are added to the
22F-tests are also documented in Table 4.15, Appendix C.
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regression: stock market capitalization relative to GDP for country i and j, mcapi,t
and mcapj,t, as well as private credit provided by the banking sector relative to
GDP for country i and j, crediti,t and creditj,t.
23 The two sets of variables refer
to different aspects of financial development. The relative volume of private credit
mirrors the development of the private banking sector and, therefore, reflects the
ability of financial institutions to carry out national as well as international capital
transactions. Stock market capitalization relative to GDP reflects the size and
development of a country’s equity market.
These additional variables are not always available for the full sample and time
period.24 Therefore, a benchmark regression is reported that is based on the same
observations but excludes the variables of interest. Then, the variables of inter-
est are added and the coefficients of the dummy variables, d1990ij,t and d1999ij,t
respectively, can be compared across regressions. In order to account for potential
endogeneity, lagged values of relative stock market capitalization and credit provided
by the banking sector are used.
Table 4.5 shows results of pooled OLS and of fixed effects estimations. The
table documents only the estimated coefficients of interest: the first part refers to
estimates of d1990ij,t and d1999ij,t respectively in a regression excluding exratevolij,t.
The second part refers to estimates inclusive this variable. In the pooled OLS case,
exchange rate volatility has a large negative influence, though only at the ten percent
significance level. The coefficients on the dummy variables decrease slightly, but not
significantly.25 Also in the fixed effects estimations exchange rate volatility does not
lead to significant changes of the coefficients of d1990ij,t and d1999ij,t. It has again
only a weakly significant negative coefficient.
Also, the inclusion of measures for financial development does not significantly
alter the size of the dummy variables neither in the pooled OLS nor in the fixed
effects estimations (Table 4.6). The variables themselves have the following effects in
the pooled OLS regressions: Banking sector development in the transacting country,
crediti,t, is positively associated with cross-border transactions. This result is in
line with the consideration that highly developed financial and banking institutions
help to conduct international transactions. Stock market development at home,
mcapi,t, has a negative and much smaller influence. The finding suggests that less
developed equity markets at home drive investors towards better developed foreign
markets that offer more diversification and better investment possibilities. The
positive coefficient on the stock market capitalization variable of the country invested
in, mcapj,t, supports this view. Countries with better developed equity markets tend
to attract more portfolio transactions. In contrast, the development of the banking
23As an alternative measure for private credit, M2 to GDP is often used, see e.g. Chinn and
Ito (2006) and Di Giovanni (2005). This variable is only available for a much smaller number of
countries and years and, therefore, not considered.
24For the availability of variables across years refer to Table 4.10 in Appendix B.
25Refer to the reported F-test statistics in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Accounting for European financial integration I
POLS F.E.
d1990ij,t 0.589*** 0.288*
[0.124] [0.147]
d1999ij,t 0.599*** 0.652***
[0.168] [0.130]
d1990ij,t 0.577*** 0.290**
[0.125] [0.147]
d1999ij,t 0.594*** 0.646***
[0.168] [0.130]
exratevolij,t -0.378* -0.419* -0.265* -0.243
[0.228] [0.232] [0.157] [0.158]
Obs. 1425 1425 1425 1425
F − test 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
p− value 0.92 0.98 0.99 0.97
Notes: see Table 4.3; distanceij , foreignerij,t, gdpi,t, gdpj,t, popi,t, popi,t are included but not
reported. The upper part of the table refers to a regression excluding the variable of interest, the
lower part to a regression inclusive the variable of interest. POLS denotes pooled OLS estimations
with White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, F.E. refers to country pair fixed effects esti-
mations. F-test refers to the F-test statistic of the hypothesis of equal coefficients on d1990ij,t and
d1999ij,t respectively.
sector in in the country invested in, creditj,t, has a negative effect. One reason
for the strong negative effect might be the fact that the credit variable is strongly
correlated with both stock market capitalization and GDP.26
In the fixed effects estimations only stock market capitalization in the country
invested in, mcapj,t, has a positive effect. This result suggests that over time larger
and more developed capital markets lead to increased transaction volumes of assets
located in these growing markets.
Real Economic Integration
The empirical literature on real economic and financial integration has established
the so called “quantity puzzle”: A positive association between financial integration
and GDP correlations is revealed in the data, whereas theory predicts a negative
26The two variablesmcapj,t and creditj,t are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of
0.75. This relation and also the estimation results point into a similar direction as findings in Berkel
(2004) (see Chapter 3). Also Di Giovanni (2005) finds that countries with better developed equity
markets attract more M&A activity whereas countries with better developed banking markets do
not.
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Table 4.6: Accounting for European financial integration II
POLS F.E.
d1990ij,t 0.601*** 0.346**
[0.130] [0.170]
d1999ij,t 0.745*** 0.739***
[0.212] [0.159]
d1990ij,t 0.595*** 0.417**
[0.153] [0.171]
d1999ij,t 0.782*** 0.784***
[0.200] [0.151]
crediti,t−1 0.853*** 0.938*** 0.00 0.066
[0.127] [0.119] [0.192] [0.191]
creditij,t−1 -0.583*** -0.499** 0.387 0.44
[0.217] [0.208] [0.452] [0.449]
mcapi,t−1 -0.191*** -0.232*** -0.025 -0.049
[0.072] [0.069] [0.078] [0.076]
mcapj,t−1 0.334** 0.294** 0.388** 0.367*
[0.145] [0.141] [0.190] [0.189]
Obs. 1159 1159 1159 1159
F − test 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.09
p− value 0.97 0.85 0.68 0.76
Notes: see Table 4.5.
relation if anything.27 There is growing evidence that real integration among EMU
members has been strengthened in terms of real business cycle synchronization and
trade.28 As both developments, real economic and financial integration, intertwine,
real economic integration might account for part of the financial integration mea-
sured by the dummy variables of stage one and three.
Using the same methodology as above, GDP growth correlation is included in
the regressions, gdpcorrij,t, as a proxy for real economic convergence (Table 4.7). In
order to account for the effect that GDP growth correlations has for EMU countries,
it also enters interacted with the EMU dummy, dEMUij.
The results of the pooled OLS regressions show that GDP growth correlations
with EMU countries have a significant positive effect on transactions whereas they
have no effect for the rest of the sample. In the fixed-effects case there is a weakly
27See Imbs (2004) and Imbs (2006) for a detailed discussion of the puzzle.
28Refer e.g. to Boewer and Guillemineau (2006) and Massmann and Mitchell (2004) with respect
to business cycle synchronization as well as Frankel and Rose (1997) and Micco, Stein and Ordonez
(2003) with respect to trade.
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Table 4.7: Accounting for European financial integration III
POLS F.E.
d1990ij,t 0.552*** 0.293*
[0.122] [0.145]
d1999ij,t 0.587** 0.663***
[0.167] [0.130]
d1990ij,t 0.421*** 0.270*
[0.140] [0.154]
d1999ij,t 0.428** 0.652***
[0.167] [0.128]
gdpcorrij,t -0.28 -0.239 0.317 0.362*
[0.173] [0.170] [0.194] [0.188]
gdpcorrij,t ∗ dEMUij 0.768*** 0.945*** 0.495* 0.352
[0.233] [0.233] [0.254] [0.242]
Obs. 1437 1437 1437 1437
F − test 0.87 0.91 0.02 0.01
p− value 0.35 0.34 0.88 0.93
Notes: see Table 4.5
significant positive effect that is not significantly larger for EMU countries. The
effect is smaller compared to the POLS estimation for EMU countries. This finding
suggests that the link between real and financial integration is larger across countries
than within countries over time. Moreover, the link within countries tends to be
a more general phenomenon. The inclusion of GDP growth correlations leads to
smaller coefficients of the stage one and stage three dummies. However, the F-
test indicates that coefficients do not significantly change in size. Real integration
proxied by GDP growth correlations in this empirical setting is not able to account
for financial integration measured by d1990ij,t and d1999ij,t.
29
Estimated coefficients on GDP growth correlations in Table 4.7 might be biased
due to endogeneity of GDP growth correlations, reflecting real economic integration,
and transaction volumes, mirroring financial integration. Accounting for endogene-
ity would lead to a lower impact of business cycle correlations on transactions,
thereby lowering also its ability to reduce the coefficients of the stage one and three
dummies. As there is no significant reduction in the size of coefficients anyway,
endogeneity does not affect the interpretation of the coefficients of interest on the
dummy variables, d1990ij,t and d1999ij,t.
Overall, none of the included variables in this section involve a decrease in the
dummy variable effects measuring stage one and three of the EMU. Most strikingly,
29Similar results are obtained when using 10 year rolling correlations of GDP growth.
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reduced exchange rate volatility does not even account for part of the effect.30 Ob-
viously, the effect of the formation of the EMU captures something more than is
measured by the above mentioned explicit factors in this framework. As discussed
in the conclusion this finding might be due to measurement or model specification
issues.
4.4.3 Do Countries Respond Differently to the EMU?
European financial market integration and the formation of the EMU are likely to
have a different impact in every country. One can easily think of differences that
depend on countries’ financial market development or structure and on how impor-
tant costs associated with cross-border portfolio investment are. Countries with low
transaction and information costs and relatively developed, efficient and large finan-
cial markets might see a large increase in gross flows induced by European financial
market integration. At the same time, it is also possible that an increase in cross-
border trading activity might be larger for countries starting with relatively high
transactions costs as well as less developed, efficient and smaller financial markets.
Ex ante, these effects are not clear. Countries can also be differentiated with respect
to the extent of real economic integration. Given the results in Section 4.4.2, one
expects countries with more synchronized business cycles, i.e., countries that are
more integrated in real terms, to be more financially integrated in the sense that
they experience larger transaction volumes.
In order to explore differences in the effect of European financial integration
on portfolio investment across countries, the basic regression is expanded by an
interaction term between the dummy variable for the first stage of the EMU and
the variable of interest:31
log(Tij,t) = β0 + β1log(gdpi,t) + β2log(gdpj,t) + β3log(popi,t)
+ β4log(popj,t) + β5log(distanceij,t) + β6log(foreignerij,t)
+ β7Xij,t + β8d1990ij,t + β9Xij,t ∗ d1990ij,t +
N∑
n=10
βnZ
n
ij,t + ²ij,t,
where Xij,t refers to the variable of interest. The estimated coefficient of the dummy
variable for the first stage of the EMU, β8, the effect of the interaction term, β9,
as well as the own effect of the variable of interest, β7, are reported in Table 4.8.
As heterogeneous responses of countries are of interest, only pooled OLS regressions
are undertaken. First, financial market structure and development are considered as
factors of interest that differentiate the EMU effect on transactions across countries.
30Also lagged values of exchange rate volatility and two or three year averages have been used.
Results do not change.
31Similar results can be obtained using interactions with dEMUij or d1999ij,t.
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Second, the role of information costs proxied by distance is explored. Finally, the link
between the volume of transactions and real economic integration is investigated.
Financial Market Structure and Development
An indicator variable that equals one if a country is more market-based and zero if
it is more bank-based, marketi,t and marketj,t, is included. It is used to investigate
whether economies with higher stock market or with higher banking activity respond
differently. In bank-based systems, banks play a leading role in mobilizing savings
and allocating capital whereas in market-based systems securities markets take the
role of getting society’s savings to firms, exerting corporate control and easing risk
management. Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Levine (2001) find that financial systems tend to
be more market-based in higher income countries where stock markets become more
active and efficient than banks. The literature does not reveal a clear support for
either the market-based or the bank-based system to perform better in attracting
capital and favoring growth (Levine 2002).
In order to proxy the development of financial markets again two different mea-
sures are used for country i and j: stock market capitalization relative to GDP
and the amount of credit provided by the banking sector relative to GDP, mcapi,t,
mcapj,t, crediti,t and creditj,t.
Results in Table 4.8 show that, first, countries invested in, i.e., countries j, that
are more market-based countries are associated with higher portfolio transactions
(specification (1)). This result is consistent with the finding in Section 4.4.2 that
relative stock market capitalization of country j has a positive impact on portfolio
transactions. However, the effect of higher transactions due to stage one of the EMU
is not linked to the classification of countries into more market-based and bank-based
financial markets as the interaction terms are insignificant. In this respect there is
no heterogeneity among countries.
Second, transacting countries with more developed financial markets, in terms
of more private credit provided by the banking sector relative to GDP, experience
higher transaction volumes during stage one of the EMU (specification (2)). The
same finding applies to financial development measured by stock market capitaliza-
tion relative to GDP (specification (3)).32
32If both interaction effects are investigated in one single regression, the same effects can be
observed. Note that the estimated coefficients on crediti,t and mcapj,t correspond very well to
the estimated coefficients estimated in a joint regression (Table 4.6). Now, mcapi,t and creditj,t
are insignificant and do not yield negative signs as before. This finding suggests that the negative
signs are likely to be driven by positive correlations among the two variables and with GDP.
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Table 4.8: Heterogenous country responses
(1) (2)
d1990ij,t 0.882*** d1990ij,t 0.654***
[0.149] [0.173]
marketi,t -0.237 crediti,t−1 0.831***
[0.146] [0.096]
marketj,t 0.969*** creditj,t−1 -0.171
[0.178] [0.209]
d1990ij,t * marketi,t -0.185 d1990ij,t * crediti,t−1 0.882***
[0.222] [0.238]
d1990ij,t * marketj,t -0.157 d1990ij,t * creditj,t−1 0.11
[0.234] [0.257]
(3)
d1990ij,t 1.197***
[0.246]
mcapi,t−1 0.042
[0.067]
mcapj,t−1 0.317***
[0.123]
d1990ij,t * mcapi,t−1 0.284**
[0.123]
d1990ij,t * mcapj,t−1 0.157
[0.120]
(4) (5)
d1990ij,t 0.032 d1990ij,t 0.347**
[0.640] [0.149]
distanceij -0.393*** gdpcorrij,t -0.204
[0.060] [0.166]
d1990ij,t * distanceij 0.085 d1990ij,t * gdpcorrij,t 0.630**
[0.088] [0.252]
Notes: Pooled OLS regressions with White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets;
dependent variable: gross portfolio flows, Tij,t; *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels; a constant, year dummies, dummies for financial centers, distanceij , foreignerij,t, gdpi,t,
gdpj,t, popi,t, popi,t, and dummies for banking crises are included but not reported.
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Distance
Information costs proxied by distance play a major role when explaining volumes
of portfolio investment in gravity models. Portes and Rey (2005) document that
geographical distance presents a good proxy for these costs. The question arises
of whether countries closer to Germany are associated with a larger increase in
transaction volumes in the wake of the formation of the EMU compared to countries
further away. The results in Table 4.8, specification (4) suggest that there is no
difference in the positive effect of the first stage of the EMU on transactions with
respect to distance.
Real Economic Integration
Results in Table 4.8, specification (5), show that countries participating in stage one
of the EMU and countries having higher GDP growth correlations ceteris paribus
experience larger portfolio investment compared to the rest of the sample. If larger
portfolio investment signifies increased financial integration, it can be concluded
that increased financial integration is associated with increased business cycle syn-
chronization for EMU countries. This finding is in line with the “quantity puzzle”
documented in the recent empirical literature on real integration.33 Imbs (2004)
shows that business cycles in financially integrated regions are significantly more
synchronized, even though financial integration may also result in more specialized
economies, and consequently less synchronized cycles.
4.5 Conclusion
Although there is a growing literature on the effects of the EMU on different seg-
ments of financial markets, no comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects on
portfolio asset trade using a gravity model approach has yet been undertaken. This
paper not only investigates the increase in gross portfolio flows induced by Euro-
pean financial market integration and the EMU but also potential underlying driving
forces and the heterogeneity of responses to European financial integration.
The estimations indicate that there is a substantial increase in gross portfolio
flows with Germany since the first and the third stage of the EMU. The latter marks
the fixation of exchange rates with the Euro. The estimations indicate that ceteris
paribus gross portfolio flows increased on average by about 60 percent for countries
taking part in the third stage. These are time series effects remaining after country
pair fixed effects have been taken into account. As has been shown, the positive
effect induced by the formation of the EMU evolves smoothly over time. Since the
33Again one has to be aware of the fact that real economic and financial integration are likely
to be interdependent in both directions. However, this section aims at characterizing country
responses and does not draw conclusions about causality.
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end 1990s it increases relative to a group of countries including Denmark, the UK,
and Sweden that are part of EU-15 but not of the Euro area. In 2002 it seems
to be significantly larger for EMU countries compared to Denmark, the UK, and
Sweden. Though it is left to future research using updated data to confirm whether
this finding is indeed robust.
The formation of the EMU is intertwined with changes in financial markets and
real economic integration. In a second step, this paper examines to what extent
these developments account for the estimated positive effect measured by dummy
variables. Lower exchange rate volatility, higher financial market development, and
increased business cycle correlations have significant effects on gross portfolio flows.
However, they are not able to account for the positive effect induced by the formation
of the EMU.
In the third part of the empirical analysis of the present paper, the coefficients of
the dummies for different stages of the EMU are forced to be equal across countries.
This paper also analyzes factors that lead to heterogeneous country responses. The
EMU effect on gross portfolio flows is larger for transacting countries with more
developed banking and equity markets and country pairs with more correlated busi-
ness cycles. The latter result is in line with other empirical studies investigating real
economic and financial integration (Boewer and Guillemineau (2006), Imbs (2006),
and Imbs (2004)). There are no differences in countries’ responses to the EMU
depending on geographical distance to Germany or on whether countries are more
market-based.
The gravity model is a useful approach to empirically reveal and describe the
differences of German portfolio flows with EMU countries compared to the other
trading partners. It does not explain the effects of a common currency union on
asset trade, though. The present empirical analysis can not sufficiently reveal, which
factors actually account for the EMU effect on portfolio flows measured by dummy
variables for different stages of the EMU. On the one hand, this finding can be due
to measurement problems. One would expected that at least exchange rate risk
explains part of the EMU effect. However, it is very difficult to effectively measure
expected exchange rate risk at an annual frequency. On the other hand, these in-
significant results might be comparable to the pessimistic “Nothing is Robust” in
the growth literature (Levine and Renelt 1992). Similar to the set up in this paper,
growth theories are not explicit about what variables belong in the regression. When
simply trying and adding variables, results may turn out to be inconclusive and
not robust. As Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests, using alternative and less restrictive
means of testing the relationship between variables by modeling whole distributions
of estimators may nevertheless yield strong and meaningful relationships between
variables.
As far as known by the author, no theoretical model yet exists in the literature
that structurally links the formation of currency unions and asset trade and that
provides testable empirical hypotheses. In line with the methodology stated in
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Deaton (2000),34 this lack of theory motivates the descriptive characterization of
the effects of the EMU in the present paper. Based on the results, it is desirable to
advance future theoretical and related empirical research that clarifies the channels
through which a common currency union, e.g., the EMU, affects asset trade, financial
and real economic integration.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Appendix A - Countries by Regions
Table 4.9: Countries by regions
Western Europe Southern Europe Eastern Asia
Belgium Greece Japan
France Italy Korea
Luxembourg Portugal China
The Netherlands Spain
Austria South-central Asia
Switzerland Northern Africa India
Egypt Pakistan
Northern Europe Morocco Sri Lanka
Denmark South Africa
Finland South-eastern Asia
Ireland Northern America Indonesia
Norway Canada The Philippines
Sweden USA Singapore
The UK Thailand
Central America
Eastern Europe Mexico Western Asia
Czech Republic Argentina Israel
Poland Brazil Jordan
Russian Federation Chile Turkey
Hungary Colombia
Peru Oceania
Venezuela Australia
New Zealand
34Rf. to p. 3ff.
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4.6.2 Appendix B - Summary Statistics
Table 4.10: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. EMU Non-EMU Years
T
a),b)
ij,t 1440 45.9 202.2 70.3 ** 38.1 1987-2002
gdp
a),b)
i,t 1440 1180 1160 1130 1196 1987-2001
pop
b)
i,t 1440 63.4 52.7 54.2 ** 66.3 1987-2001
foreignerij,t 1440 1.548 4.5 2.281 ** 1.311 1987-2002
distance
b)
ij 1440 5365 4795 950 ** 6794 -
mcap
b)
i,t 1410 0.414 0.4 0.443 ** 0.405 1987-2001
credit
b)
i,t 1319 0.793 0.3 0.876 ** 0.766 1987-2001
exratevolij,t 1426 0.062 0.2 0.023 ** 0.075 1987-2002
marketi,t 1039 0.184 0.4 0.108 ** 0.208 1989-2001
gdpcorrij,t 1437 0.121 0.4 0.497 ** -0.001 1987-2002
Note: a) in US$ bn, b) no logarithms; EMU refers to the mean in a sample with only EMU
countries; Non-EMU refers to the mean in a sample without EMU countries; ** denotes that the
mean in the EMU sample is significantly different at the 5 percent level from the mean in a sample
excluding EMU countries.
4.6.3 Appendix C - Further Robustness Checks
Further regressions have been undertaken to check the robustness of the results.
First, the regressions discussed so far are reproduced for two sub-samples in or-
der to check whether results are driven by one or the other: German investment
in foreign portfolio assets is separated from investment in German assets under-
taken by foreigners (see Table 4.11). Employing pooled OLS one finds that the
effect of European financial integration measured either by d1990ij,t or d1999ij,t is
larger for foreign purchases and sales of German assets compared to the full sample.
Qualitatively, the results are very similar for both sub-samples in the pooled OLS
regressions. In the fixed-effects estimations one main difference exists: There is no
significant effect of stage one of the EMU for German transactions of foreign assets,
whereas the effect for foreign transactions of German assets is highly significant and
large in size. Changes over time with respect to stage two of the EMU are now larger
for foreign transactions of German portfolio assets. Differences in size depending
on whether pooled OLS or fixed effects estimations are used remain as in the full
sample.
Second, the regressions described in Table 4.3 are redone for samples excluding
the US and financial centers respectively, because these countries account for a
large volume of transactions and might drive part of the results. The estimations
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are robust with respect to the two dummy effects. Size and significance levels of
the estimated coefficients of interest increase if financial centers are excluded (Table
4.12).
Third, as discussed in Section 4.3.1, GDP growth in country i and j are added
as additional scaling variables, gdpgrowthi,t and gdpgrowthj,t, (Table 4.13). How-
ever, as the results in specification (1) show, ceteris paribus these variables have
no significant explanatory power. Fourth, in order to address a potential endogene-
ity problem, lagged values for the scaling variables, gdpi,t, gdpj,t, popi,t, and popj,t,
are used instead of contemporaneous values. The estimated coefficients on these
variables hardly change (specification (2), Table 4.13).
Fifth, one might also ask, whether other country linkages that are not accounted
for by the empirical model drive the results. Standard variables employed in gravity
models that might capture such effects are added: a dummy equal to one if both
countries share a common border, adjacencyij,t, and a dummy equal to one if both
countries speak the same language, languageij,t. The coefficient on adjacencyij,t is
highly significant and results with respect to the other coefficients are unchanged,
except for the distance coefficient, which decreases in absolute size (specifications
(3) and (4), 4.13). languageij,t has no significant impact on portfolio transactions.
Sixth, as some cross-border portfolio flows are reported with zero values, esti-
mating a linear model might lead to biased coefficients. In total only less than 5
percent of all observations are reported zero flows, though. In order to investigate
the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients towards nonlinearities, a Tobit model
is estimated for comparison (Table 4.14). As specifications (1) and (2) show, the
estimated effects, especially on the various dummy variables measuring the financial
integration within EMU and EU-15 countries, do hardly change.
Seventh, variables such as transaction volumes, GDP, market capitalization and
bank credit might not be non-stationarity. If these variables are not stationary
and not co-integrated, inference is screwed. Panel unit root tests by Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003) and Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) have been undertaken.35 The tests
suggest that non-stationarity is not a problem. As the power of panel unit root tests
is often criticized, a time trend that may capture the persistence in time series of
transactions, GDP, market capitalization and bank credit, is entered (specifications
(3) to (6)). The time trend is significant in the fixed effects regressions (specification
(5) and (6)), however, this does hardly affect the other estimated coefficients.
Finally, single year regressions are run in order to reproduce Figure 4.1.36 In this
case, the estimated coefficients on the non-interacted variables are not restricted to
be constant over time. The estimated size and significance of the dummy variables
do not change, however.
35Test statistics are not reported, but can be obtained from the author upon request.
36These results are not reported in the Appendix, but can be obtained from the author upon
request.
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Table 4.13: Additional robustness checks II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
gdpi,t 2.009*** 2.137*** 2.164***
[0.068] [0.067] [0.068]
gdpj,t 3.148*** 2.931*** 2.959***
[0.145] [0.129] [0.128]
popi,t -1.239*** -1.240*** -1.253***
[0.077] [0.078] [0.079]
popj,t -2.039*** -2.029*** -2.042***
[0.149] [0.140] [0.140]
gdpgrowthi,t 0.026
[0.020]
gdpgrowthj,t -0.018
[0.032]
distanceij -0.444*** -0.428*** -0.162** -0.221***
[0.047] [0.046] [0.079] [0.072]
foreignerij,t 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.065*** 0.065***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
d1990ij,t 0.547***
[0.128]
d1999ij,t 0.610*** 0.562***
[0.152] [0.171]
gdpi,t−1 2.205***
[0.071]
gdpj,t−1 2.980***
[0.130]
popi,t−1 -1.280***
[0.082]
popj,t−1 -2.058***
[0.143]
languageij -0.159 -0.023
[0.147] [0.121]
adjacencyij 0.913*** 0.909***
[0.172] [0.171]
Obs. 1421 1356 1440 1440
R2 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74
Notes: see Table 4.11
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Table 4.14: Additional robustness checks III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gdpi,t 2.163*** 2.194*** 2.161*** 2.192*** 0.581 0.437
[0.081] [0.080] [0.069] [0.069] [0.375] [0.374]
gdpj,t 2.965*** 2.997*** 2.953*** 2.985*** 1.201* 1.028
[0.084] [0.083] [0.131] [0.130] [0.716] [0.722]
gdpi,t -1.245*** -1.262*** -1.244*** -1.261*** -0.633 -0.377
[0.100] [0.100] [0.078] [0.079] [0.424] [0.429]
gdpj,t -2.039*** -2.057*** -2.031*** -2.049*** 1.859** 2.157**
[0.102] [0.102] [0.141] [0.142] [0.941] [0.952]
distanceij -0.344*** -0.407*** -0.343*** -0.407***
[0.053] [0.048] [0.054] [0.047]
foreignerij,t 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** -0.024 -0.019
[0.011] [0.011] [0.006] [0.006] [0.057] [0.058]
d1990ij,t 0.568*** 0.572*** 0.275*
[0.161] [0.123] [0.145]
d1999ij,t 0.581** 0.584*** 0.646***
[0.247] [0.167] [0.130]
yearij,t -0.022 -0.024 0.134*** 0.144***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.038] [0.039]
Obs. 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
R2 0.25 0.25 0.74 0.74 0.51 0.51
No. of pairs 94 94
Notes: robust standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: gross portfolio flows, Tij ; *, **,
*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels; column (5) and (6) refer to Tobit estimations,
columns (3) and (4) refer to pooled OLS, and (5) and (6) to country-pair fixed effects estimations;
a constant, year dummies, and dummies for financial centers are included but not reported.
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Chapter 5
Retirement Age, Retirement
Entry Decisions and Pension
Reforms
5.1 Pension Reform in Germany: The Impact on
Retirement Decisions
5.1.1 Introduction1
The option of early retirement is a highly prized, but at the same time highly
costly, social achievement in Germany. With an increasingly aging population and
the precarious financial state of the public pension system, these costs are once
again the focus of discussion about pension reform, especially as the government
has committed itself to take adjustment measures should contributions exceed 20
percent of gross income in the year 2020 (22 percent in the year 2030) or pension
benefits fall below a certain minimum level. This minimum level is defined as 67
percent of net pensions by the “Riester reform” in 2001, and as 46 percent of tax-
adjusted gross pensions in the “Sustainability Law” of 2004. The latest forecasts
based on new population and labor force projections show that, barring further
reform, these two goals are incompatible and further reform is required.
Since the 2004 reform has kept the retirement age largely untouched, the reform
discussion is shifting once again to the pivotal retirement age, currently age 65. An
increase in the age of retirement will boost the number of contributors to the sys-
tem whilst simultaneously reducing the number of beneficiaries. This is particularly
attractive from a financial point of view in a system, which is not fully actuari-
ally neutral, since changing the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries will then also
1This is a joint paper with Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan that has been published in FinanzArchiv (2004),
5(1), pp. 71-90.
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improve the financial balance of the system. Bearing increasing life expectancy in
mind, raising the age of retirement would also appear to be a rather natural reform
option. What is more, there is no sign that an increase in the age of retirement is
likely to be prevented by deteriorating health. On the contrary, age-specific rates of
illness have dropped even faster than mortality rates (Cutler and Sheiner 1998).
The aim of this paper is to provide an econometric estimate of the long-term
impact of various reform options on retirement decisions in Germany, especially
on the distribution of actual retirement ages and its mean, the effective average
retirement age. “Long term” is defined as the state of play after all transitional
regulations and behavioral changes have taken effect. A model is presented which
relates the actual retirement decisions of older workers, as observed in the data
provided by the 1984-1997 German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), to the relevant
statutory pension rules. Based on the model estimates, future retirement decisions
under reformed pension rules are predicted. However, the full budget implications
of these changes in retirement behavior are not modeled. This is a complicated
exercise due to complex interactions of the pension budget with other parts of the
German social safety net, and is left to future research.2
The approach in the present paper takes as point of departure the econometric
analysis by Bo¨rsch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz and Mastrobuoni (2004b) which was
undertaken in the framework of an international project on the causes and impli-
cations of early retirement.3 In contrast to this international comparative analysis,
however, the present paper takes account of the institutional peculiarities apply-
ing in Germany and, specifically, addresses the 1992 and 1999 reforms as well as the
proposals discussed by the “Commission for Sustainability in Financing the German
Social Security System”, referred to in the following as the “Ru¨rup Kommission”.
Some of these proposals have been adopted as recommendations by the Commis-
sion, while other proposals did not find a majority in the Commission. The reform
options encompass an increase in the normal pension age by one or two years, ad-
justment factors of between 4.5 and 6 percent per year of earlier retirement, and the
introduction of actuarial individual pension accounts based on the Swedish model4
with their implied adjustment factors and no predefined “normal” retirement age.
While none of these proposals have been explicitly put into the pension reform law
of 2004, it includes a clause that will provide for a formal review of the system of
retirement ages by 2008.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 5.1.2 describes the institutional frame-
work determining retirement in Germany. Section 5.1.3 looks at the reform options
analyzed. Section 5.1.4 presents the data, model specifications, and the results of
estimates. Section 5.1.5 discusses the simulations which represent the core aspect
of the present work. Finally, the most important findings are summarized.
2See Bo¨rsch-Supan, Kohnz and Schnabel (2004a) for a first and preliminary analysis.
3Refer to Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004a and 2004b).
4Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) System, see Section 5.1.3.
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5.1.2 The German Public Pension System
The largest part of the German public pension system is the “public retirement
insurance” (“Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung”, GRV). It covers about 85 percent
of the German workforce. Most of these are private sector workers but the GRV
also includes those public sector workers who are not civil servants. Civil servants,
about 7 percent of the workforce, have their own pension system. The self-employed,
about 9 percent of the workforce, are mainly self-insured although some of them
also participate in the public retirement insurance system. For the average worker,
occupational pensions do not play a major role in the German system of old-age
provision, neither do individual retirement accounts yet, but their importance is
increasing since the last reform in 1999/2001.
The sample, taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1984-1997,
includes only cohorts that enter retirement until 1997. Therefore, in the retrospec-
tive econometric analysis, retirement entry decisions are modeled on the basis of the
1972 legislation. Because most parts of the 1992 reform have not been phased in by
1997, the 1972 legislation is relevant for the present sample and therefore described in
the following section. Where necessary, however, those institutional changes which
have been legislated in the 1992 and 1999 reforms are mentioned. The description is
limited to the possible pathways into retirement, which are particularly relevant for
the analysis, whereas a detailed description of retirement payments, which go into
the estimations as well, can be found in Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004b). A detailed de-
scription of the recent history of institutional changes is surveyed by Bo¨rsch-Supan
and Wilke (2003).
Private Sector Pensions
First, old-age pensions are considered. Until 1972, retirement was mandatory at
age 65. In 1972, several early retirement options were introduced, “early” defined
as before age 65, the “normal” retirement age. Since then the system of the GRV
pays old-age pensions for employees from age 60 on if certain conditions are met.
A main feature of the German old-age pensions is “flexible retirement” from age 63
for workers with a long service history. Moreover, retirement at age 60 is possible
for women, the unemployed, and workers who cannot be appropriately employed for
health or labor-market reasons. In addition, preretirement (i.e., retirement before
age 60) is possible using other parts of the public transfer system, mainly unemploy-
ment compensation. Labor force exit before age 60 is frequent: about 45 percent of
all men call themselves “retired” at age 59. Only about half of them retire because
of disability; the other 50 percent make use of one of the many official and unoffi-
cial preretirement schemes, e.g., unemployment compensation in combination with
severance pay.5
5For a comprehensive illustration of retirement entry rules see also Reimann (2003).
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Because of the numerous exceptions that enable retirement entry before age 65,
the reforms of 1992 and 1999 introduced an increase of retirement age limits to age
65. The system has been simplified, in that there will no longer be exceptions for
the unemployed, part-time employees and women. After a transitional period retire-
ment entry rules of these persons will be adjusted to those of long-time insured. If
adjustments (see below) are accepted, long-time insured can choose early retirement
from age 62 on. Similarly disabled people can obtain old-age pensions at age 63
and with adjustments even at age 60. The transitional rules of retirement entry are
displayed in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Statutory retirement age
60
61
62
63
64
65
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Jahr
longterm insured longterm insured (with adj.)
unempl./partial ret. unempl./partial ret. (with adj.)
disabled disabled (with adj.)
women
The 1992 reform introduced explicit adjustment factors for retirement before
age 65. Before 1992, adjustment of benefits to retirement age was only implicit via
contribution periods. There were no actuarial adjustments at all. The 1992 social
security reform will change this stepwise by the year 2004. Age 65 will then act as
the “pivotal age” for benefit computations.
Table 5.1 displays the retirement-age-specific adjustments for a worker who has
earnings that remain constant after age 60. The table relates the retirement income
for retirement at age 65 to that for retirement at earlier and later ages, and compares
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the implicit adjustments after 1972 with the total adjustments after the 1992 social
security reform is fully phased in. As references, actuarial adjustments computed
using a 3 percent discount rate are shown as well.6
According to the 1992 reform benefits will be reduced by 0.3 percent per month
(up to a maximum of 10.8 percent) for each year of earlier retirement. The 1992
reform also introduced rewards for later retirement in a systematic way. For each
year of retirement postponed past the minimum age indicated in Table 5.1, the
pension is increased by 0.5 percent per month or 6 percent p.a.
Table 5.1: Adjustment of public pensions by retirement age
Pension as a percentage of the pension that one
would obtain if one had retired at age 65
age pre− 1992a) post− 1992b) Actuarialfairc)
62 100 89.2 80.5
63 100 92.8 86.3
64 100 96.4 92.8
65 100 100 100
66 107.2 106 108.1
67 114.4 112 117.2
68 114.4 118 127.4
69 114.4 124 139.1
Notes: a) GRV 1972-1992. b) GRV after 1992 reform has fully
phased in. c) Evaluated at a 3 percent discount rate.
Source: Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999).
Besides old-age pensions the contributions to the German retirement insurance
also finance disability benefits to workers of all ages. These are converted into old-
age pensions latest at age 65.
The disability pathway has provided a frequently used option for entrance into
early retirement (besides the flexible retirement option) before the pivot age of 65.
A person who was not able to carry on a regular employment received full old-age
benefits, the so called disability pension (“Erwerbsunfa¨higkeitsrente”, EU). A person
who could work at most half the time a healthy person could received two-thirds
of the standard old-age benefits (“Berufsunfa¨higkeitsrente”, BU). In the 1970s and
early 1980s, the German authorities have interpreted both rules very broadly, in
particular the applicability of the first rule.
The previous rules governing total and partial disability pensions, as well as the
special old-age pension for those aged 60 or over and suffering from partial or total
6A higher discount rate yields steeper adjustments.
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disability, were abolished in 2001 under the 1999 Pension Reform Act. However,
generous hardship and other provisions designed to sustain confidence in the system
mean that the old rules will continue to be effective over a relatively long transitional
period (some rules until 2017). After this period, insured beneficiaries will still
be able to draw pension benefits for partial or full disability until the age of 65
but under different conditions.7 One main aspect is that the current labor-market
situation needs no longer be taken into account. Moreover, if a pension is claimed
for disability prior to the age of 63, adjustment costs similar to those which apply
to old-age pensions payable to the long-term insured are phased in until 2004. The
pension adjustment factor for each calendar month for which the pension is drawn
for a partial or full disability prior to age 63 is -0.3 percent, up to a maximum of
-10.8 percent (see Table 5.1).
Besides the above-mentioned retirement pathways, survivor pensions are paid
to wives if the insured husband dies. Survivor pensions are 60 percent of the hus-
band’s applicable pension for widows who are aged 45 and over or have children
in the household (“grosse Witwenrente”), otherwise they are 25 percent (“kleine
Witwenrente”). For couples married after the year 2001 a new law applies: Survivor
pensions are no longer 60 percent, but only 55 percent, of the husband’s disability
pension. In return, however, the number of children is now taken positively into
account when determining survivor benefits.
Survivor benefits are a large component of the public pension budget and of total
pension wealth. Certain earnings tests apply if the widow has her own income, e.g.,
her own pension. This is only relevant for a very small (below 10 percent) share of
widows. Only recently have male and female survivors been treated symmetrically.
Additionally, spouses can now choose whether to receive a survivor pension or a
newly introduced pension splitting.
The average retirement age in 1999 was 59.7 years for men and 60.7 years for
women. These numbers refer to West Germany. In the East, retirement age was 57.9
years for men and 58.2 years for women. The fraction of those who enter retirement
through a disability pension has declined and was 29 percent in 1998. Only about
20 percent of all entrants used the “normal” pathway of an old-age pension at age
65. The most popular retirement age is age 60.8
Public-Sector Pensions
Civil servants do not pay explicit contributions for their pensions as the other em-
ployees in the private and public sectors do.9 Instead, the “gross” wage for civil
7They are now referred to as partial or full “Erwerbsminderungsrente (EM)”.
8Cf. Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) for a distribution of pathways to retirement over time.
9Civil servants are also exempt from unemployment insurance contributions, since civil servants
have a life-time job guarantee. The government pays a certain fraction of health expenses of the
civil servant and his or her dependents (ranging from 50 to 80 percent). The rest has to be covered
92
servants is lower than that of other public sector employees with a comparable ed-
ucation. The generosity of gross pensions received by civil servants vis-a`-vis the
private sector workers is partially offset by the preferential tax treatment of private
sector pensions.
There are three pathways for civil servants: the standard, the early, and the
disability retirement option. The standard retirement age is 65. Before July 1, 1997
the early retirement age for civil servants was 62 and thus one year less than in the
social security system. In 1997 it was raised to 63. Adjustment factors for early
retirement were phased in linearly between the years 1998 and 2003, and are now 0.3
percentage points per month of early retirement, the same as in the private sector.10
The average retirement age for civil servants in the year 1999 was 58.9 years
and thus almost one year lower than in the private sector. Disability is the most
important pathway to retirement for civil servants: 47 percent of those who retired
in the year 1999 used disability retirement. Only about 9 percent of civil servants
retired at the regular retirement age of 65.11
5.1.3 Pension Reform Scenarios
As stated in the introduction, this generous system is financially unsustainable due
to the pressures exerted by the rapid aging of the German population.12 Various
incremental reform steps have been legislated and are currently being phased in,
other reform steps are under discussion. The aim of this paper is to estimate the
long-term impact of these reform measures on the retirement decisions of older
workers in Germany.
Six possible reform measures are considered. As a reference scenario, the pension
reforms already implemented in 1992 and 1999 are examined. Then, four reform pro-
posals involving higher actuarial adjustment factors and higher statutory retirement
age are considered. Finally, it is of interest to investigate how retirement probabil-
ities would respond to the introduction of an individual pension account system
based on the Swedish model. These six reform scenarios are defined in more detail
in the following.
The core aspects of the reference scenario encompass an increase of the early
retirement ages, the introduction of actuarial adjustment factors in the 1992 pension
by private insurance.
10Very specific rules apply to some civil servants. For example, the regular retirement age for
police officers is age 60; for soldiers it is even lower and depends on their rank.
11Refer to “Zweiter Versorgungsbericht der Bundesregierung”, Bundesdrucksache 14/7220,
19.10.2001.
12See Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000b) for a concise account of the demographic and economic problems
confronting the German public pension system. The term “unsustainable” is not well defined in the
literature, see Kommission fu¨r die Nachhaltigkeit der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssystem
(2003), Section 1.2. A system is defined as sustainable if the (possibly implicit) debt left to the
next generation by this system does not increase over time.
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reform described in Section 5.1.2, and the new rules, which took effect in 1999,
designed to accelerate the implementation of the 1992 reform. The transition path
is neglected. Instead, the long-term impact of the reforms after full implementation
is simulated. The rules for the reference scenario are stated in the following:
• The adjustment factors for early retirement introduced by the 1992 reform
amount to 3.6 percent (not exceeding a maximum of 10.8 percent) for each
year of early retirement. The adjustment factors introduced in 1992 only began
to be implemented on an incremental basis subsequent to the period covered
by the present sample and will only take full effect after 2017 (see Figure 5.1).
A long-term insured employee will then only be able to take retirement, with
a maximum deduction of 10.8 percent, at the age of 62. The value of 3.6
percent corresponds (under current mortality rates) to an implicit discount
rate of 0.5 percent, which corresponds to the expected interest rate of return
of the German pay-as-you-go system.13
• Adjustment factors will now also be introduced for each calendar month dur-
ing which an insured person claims a disability pension prior to the age of
63. These adjustment factors are the same as those for old-age pensions: 0.3
percent per month and a maximum of 10.8 percent.
• There will be reductions in widow/widower’s pensions from 60 percent to 55
percent of the spouse’s partial disability pension.14
• The child-raising pension and unemployment pensions are no longer available.
The only channels now open to all claimants are those of early retirement for
the long-term insured, the partially or severely disabled.
This reference scenario describes the retirement probabilities generated if the statu-
tory status quo remains unchanged and no new reform measures are passed. These
outcomes are then compared with those of five reform elements. To begin with, the
effects of higher actuarial adjustment factors on retirement decisions are examined.15
• Variant adjustment factor of 4.5 percent : Compared with the reference sce-
nario which provides for deductions of 3.6 percent p.a., this scenario is based
on deductions of 4.5 percent p.a., and a maximum of 13.5 percent. All other
rules are identical to those in the reference scenario. The value of 4.5 percent
corresponds to a discount rate of 1.75 percent.
13See Kommission fu¨r die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme
(2003), p. 86.
14As the incentives to retire are specified in case of married couples as a unit, the estimates take
account of the survivor’s pension rules but not of pension splitting.
15Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) describe the direct effects of these adjustment factors on
the total value of German pension benefits.
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• Variant adjustment factor of 6.0 percent : This scenario introduces deductions
of 6.0 percent p.a. (maximum 18 percent). All other factors remain unchanged.
The value of 6.0 percent corresponds to a discount rate of 3.5 percent.
There was no majority in the “Ru¨rup Kommission” for these proposed increases
in the actuarial adjustment factors. The actuarial adjustment is highly unpopular,
and the recent increase from 0 to 3.6 percent percent is still not fully phased in.
Therefore, little is known about the actual response to this recent reform step.
The right level of the adjustment factors depends on one’s point of view.16 The
value of 3.6 percent is approximately actuarially neutral in the sense that the present
discounted value of benefits is not affected by the actual retirement age if the present
discounted value is computed at the internal rate of return of the pension system.
However, workers are likely to use a different rate of interest when they are com-
puting the present discounted value in order to make retirement decisions. Also,
society will use a different rate of interest when evaluating social expenditures. This
difference then creates a wedge between actuarial neutrality and the absence of la-
bor supply disincentives, the latter being defined as the case in which the present
discounted value of benefits is independent of the retirement age, if the present dis-
counted value is computed using the personal discount rate of workers. The crucial
question is then, what is the personal discount rate of workers, and what is soci-
ety’s discount rate? If it is the market rate of interest, then it is usually larger
than the internal rate of return of the pension system, especially in times of aging
populations.17
The distinction is important: Pension systems may be actuarially neutral, but
they may still create substantial labor-supply disincentives. The root cause for this
discrepancy is the difference in the discount rates that are applied to the actuarial
adjustment. There are at least three candidates: (a) the internal rate of return,
which is n + g in a pay-as-you-go-system; (b) the market rate of interest r, which
is also the internal rate of return of a funded system; (c) and the rate of time
preference of the employees who make the retirement decision. The market rate of
interest r tends to be higher than n + g. While one may argue that the average
rate of time preference should be approximately equal to the market rate of interest,
the empirical evidence shows that the worker’s rate of time preference, guiding their
retirement behavior, is even larger than r.
In addition to different adjustment factors, the effect of a further increase in the
statutory retirement ages is examined. A rule of thumb used by the Federal Ministry
for Health and Social Security (BMGS) states that, in response to a change in the
retirement rules, one-third of workers retire at the new retirement age, one-third
continue to retire at the old one and accept the deductions that this implies, and
16See Ohsmann, Stolz and Thiede (2003).
17Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) describe the direct effects of these adjustment factors on
the total value of German pension benefits.
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one-third avoid the new rules by claiming benefits for disability. The next two
variants examine the validity of this rule of thumb. Note that these changes affect
not only the “normal” retirement age but the entire system of statutory retirement
entry ages.
• Variant age limit +1 : All the age limits reached after the transition period
shown in Figure 5.1 are increased by one year. As a result, the normal pension
age, for example, is raised from age 65 to 66; the earliest retirement age for
the long-term employed from age 62 to 63; etc. Only the contributory periods
for old-age pensions of partially and fully disabled persons remain unchanged
at age 60.
• Variant age limit +2 : All age limits are increased by 2 years. All other
factors remain unchanged. This is the proposal submitted by the “Ru¨rup
Kommission”.
Finally, as an alternative to these parametric reforms, the transition from the
current defined benefit system to a “notional defined contribution (NDC)” system is
modeled. As its proponents argue, it would be more sustainable, more flexible, and
more transparent while retaining the essential features of the current public pension
system.18 Notional defined contributions involve an “individual pension accounts
system” in which pension entitlements would be based on the actual amount of con-
tributions paid in to an otherwise unchanged (i.e., pay-as-you-go) pension system.
Paid contributions would be accumulated on individual pension accounts where they
would receive fictitious (“notional”) interest based on the rate of return provided
by the pay-as-you-go system. As a rule, the interest rate would correspond to the
growth rate of the total wage bill, responding to both demographic and employment
changes. Assets bearing fictitious interest of this type would be converted, on re-
tirement, into a lifelong pension annuity based on actuarial calculations. The level
of pension would depend on remaining life expectancy and would therefore respond
to demographic factors.
• Variant NDC system: In this case a system is considered which is again based
on the 1992 and 1999 legislative reforms. The most significant difference be-
tween this and the reference scenario is the change in the actuarial adjustment
factors which are implicitly based on the internal rate of interest in the NDC
system and remaining life expectancy. This system does not, therefore, have
fixed adjustment factors. They increase with age and decrease with increasing
life expectancy. The latter effect is almost exactly compensated by the de-
clining internal rate of return, so that the age-specific adjustment factors are
roughly constant over time. In 2015, 65 year old workers will receive about 7.7
18See Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003) and Clemens (2003) regarding the introduction of an NDC system
in Germany.
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percent higher pensions if they postpone their retirement by one year, while
workers, who shift their retirement from age 62 to 63, will receive 7.2 percent
higher benefits.
A similar system has been legislated in Sweden about ten years ago.19 A reform
package along these lines was also passed in Italy in 1995.
5.1.4 Econometric Estimation of the Incentive Effects to
Retire
The methodology follows the seminal work by Stock and Wise (1990). They intro-
duced the option value as a central incentive variable that captures the impact of
pension rules on retirement behavior.
Earlier analyses of the German pension system using this framework were carried
out by Bo¨rsch-Supan (1992), Schmidt (1995), Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996),
Siddiqui (1997), and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a and 2001). The present work is directly
linked to Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004b), which is part of an international project
about the causes and consequences of early retirement. Their work is improved
along the following lines: First, cumulative retirement entry probabilities are esti-
mated instead of hazard rates, which they employ. Cumulative retirement entry
probabilities turn out to generate more robust estimation results for Germany than
hazard rates. Second, a broader sample is employed that ascertains a represen-
tative estimation of retirement entry decisions of German workers and employees.
Finally, the special features and institutional conditions in Germany are taken into
account. The concrete reform options mentioned in Section 5.1.3 rather than the
synthetic hypothetical reform proposals in Gruber and Wise’s (2004a) international
comparisons are simulated.
In the following first the data and methodology is described, then the econometric
estimation procedure and, finally the base model estimates.
Data and Methodology
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel study of some
6,000 households and some 15,000 individuals.20 The panel started in 1984; 14
waves through 1997 are used.21 The GSOEP data provide a detailed account of in-
come and employment status. The sample is an unbalanced panel of all persons aged
19See Palmer (2000), Settergren (2001) and Wadensjo¨ (2003) for the workings of and initial
experiences with the Swedish system.
20Burkhauser (1991) provides an English-language description, code books and links to an in-
ternationally accessible GSOEP version. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a) discusses the merits and limits of
the GSOEP data for studies of retirement behavior.
21Ending in 1997 gives a clean estimate of the actual pension rules in place.
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55 through 70 in West Germany for which earnings data is available.22 This panel
includes 2,223 individuals with 14,401 observations. Average observation time is 6.5
years. The panel is left-censored as only persons are included who have worked at
least one year during the sample window in order to reconstruct an earnings history.23
Aggregate information on average earnings, system entries, and the actual distribu-
tion of retirement age by year is provided by the Association of German Retirement
Insurance Organizations (“Verband deutscher Versicherungstra¨ger”, VDR).
The variable to be explained is old-age labor force status. Because Germany has
very few part-time employees, only two states are modeled - fully in labor force and
fully retired. The definition of “retired” is problematic, because there exist different
alternatives. Retirement definitions commonly employed in the literature include
inter alia the retirement status self-reported by the respondent, the fact that there
are few work hours, and the receipt of retirement benefits. The first concept is used
in this context - self-reported status. It includes preretirement, mainly financed by
a mixture of unemployment compensation and severance pay.
The main explanatory variable is the option value established by Stock and Wise
(1990). This “incentive variable of the retirement decision” evaluates all current and
future payments of the different retirement pathways less possible required contri-
butions, and compares these present values with the utility of leisure when being
retired. It is explained in the following how to calculate these present values under
different retirement pathways.
Handling of Multiple Retirement Programs
At least theoretically, a worker at age 55 has the choice among three retirement
programs:
• old-age pensions starting with age 60,
• disability pensions, and
• preretirement schemes.
The set of choices is actually larger because some of these programs have several
branch programs (within old-age pensions: unemployment, long service life, etc.)
as was depicted in Figure 5.1. These choices are referred to in the following as
“pathways”. It is important to notice that all of these pathways pay the same
benefit, once a person is eligible.24
22East Germany is excluded because retirement patterns in the East are dominated by the
transition problems to a market economy. See Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996) for a comparison.
23See Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004b) for a detailed construction of the earnings history.
24In principle, preretirement programs can have any benefit level because they are negotiated
between workers and employers. In practice, however, the outcome of these negotiations is guided
by the public insurance benefits.
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In practice, there is no free choice, since most of these pathways are subject
to eligibility criteria. Among those, “strict eligibility rules” are distinguished from
“soft eligibility rules”. Strict rules are tied to objective variables such as age, gender
and previous contribution history whereas soft rules are subject to discretionary
decisions,25 notably the determination of a worker’s disability status.26
In the construction of social security wealth and the incentive variables below,
expected pension benefits need to be computed which depend on the choice of path-
way. In the computation of this expected value, observed frequencies are used as
weights. Let’s suppose, the observed frequency of disability status at age 59 is 33
percent, and the sample person is not eligible for any other pathway at that age.
Then expected benefits at age 59 for this person would be a third of the (common)
benefit level.27
Construction of Social Security Wealth
A key statistic in the computation of budget impacts is the change in the net present
value of all future benefits (which is the present value of all future benefits less contri-
bution payments) when retirement is postponed. In a slight misuse of terminology,
the net present value of all future benefits is called “social security wealth” (SSW).
Social security wealth is defined as the expected present discounted value of benefits
(YRET) minus applicable contributions that are levied on gross earnings (c·Y LAB).
Seen from the perspective of a worker who is S years old and plans to retire at age
R, social security wealth (SSW ) is
SSWS(R) =
∞∑
t=R
Y RETt(R) · at · δt−S −
R−1∑
t=S
ct · Y LABt · at · δt−S, (5.1)
with: SSW net present discounted value of retirement benefits,
S planning age,
R retirement age,
Y LABt gross labor income at age t,
Y RETt(R) net pension income at age t for retirement at age R,
ct contribution rate to pension system at age t,
at probability to survive at least until age t given survival until
age S,
δ discount factor = 1/(1 + r).
25See Schnabel (1999) for details.
26Under the 1972 legislation “disability” depends on health as well as labor-market characteris-
tics.
27Bo¨rsch-Supan (2001) provides an instrumental variables interpretation of this method and
explores the sensitivity with respect to a more sophisticated choice of instruments.
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A discount rate of 3 percent is chosen. Conditional survival probabilities are com-
puted from the standard life tables of the German Bureau of the Census (“Statistis-
ches Bundesamt”). SSW depends also on the joint survival probabilities of spouses
through survivor pensions.28 Independence of survival of spouses is assumed to
compute the joint probability.
Moreover, future contribution rates and pensions have to be predicted. In order
to obtain consistent policy simulations, they are simulated using the macroeconomic
pension model underlying Birg and Bo¨rsch-Supan (1999). This internal consistency
is important. Assume a policy proposal, which reduces the replacement rate by x
percent. This immediately lowers the contribution rates by the same x percent if the
system is pay-as-you-go and financed through contributions. The effect on SSW is
ambiguous and varies by cohort.
The Option Value of Delayed Retirement
Economic incentives to retire also include the value of leisure in retirement. It is
captured in the option value to postpone retirement (Stock and Wise 1990). This
value expresses for each retirement age the trade-off between retiring now (resulting
in a stream of retirement benefits that depends on this retirement age) and keeping
all options open for some later retirement date (with associated streams of first labor
then retirement incomes for all possible later retirement ages).
The option value function adds utility from consumption and leisure to the fi-
nancial incentives. Let Vt(R) denote the expected discounted future utility at age t
if the worker retires at age R, specified as follows:
VS(R) =
R−1∑
t=S
u(Y LABNETt ) · at · δt−S + α
∞∑
t=R
u(Y RETt(R)) · at · δt−S, (5.2)
with: Y LABNETt after-tax labor income at age t, t = S ... R− 1,
Y RETt(R) after-tax pension income at age t, t ≥ R,
α relative utility of leisure, to be estimated.
Utility from consumption is represented by an isoelastic utility function in after-tax
income, u(Y ) = Y γ. To capture utility from leisure, utility during retirement is
weighted by α > 1, where 1/α is the marginal disutility of work.
The option value for a specific age is defined as the difference between the max-
imum attainable consumption utility if the worker postpones retirement to some
later year minus the utility of consumption that the worker can afford if he or she
would retire now. Let R∗(S) denote the optimal retirement age if the worker post-
pones retirement past age S, i.e., argmax[VS(R)] for R > S. With this notation,
the option value is
28For the significance of this extension, see Coile (1999).
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G(S) = VS(R
∗(S))− VS(S). (5.3)
Since a worker is likely to retire as soon as the utility of the option to postpone
retirement becomes smaller than the utility of retiring now, retirement probabilities
should depend negatively on the option value.
The option value captures the economic incentives created by the pension sys-
tem and the labor market because the retirement income Y RETt(R) depends on
retirement age according to the adjustment factors in Table 5.1 and on previous
labor income according to the benefit computations.29
For every person in the sample the option value is computed using the applicable
pension regulations and the imputed earnings histories. The parameters chosen are
a discount rate δ of 3 percent and a curvature parameter γ of 1.0; the relative utility
parameter α has been estimated by a grid search algorithm and amounts to 2.8.30
Additional private pension income is ignored, because it represents only a very small
proportion of retirement income in Germany.
Other Explanatory Variables
Besides the option value and the social security wealth, the usual socio-demographic
variables such as age, gender and marital status are incorporated in the regression
analysis. The complexity of possible age effects is modeled by a set of age-specific
dummy variables. Moreover, wealth (variables for labor income, financial assets
and home ownership) and a self-assessed health measure are included. The legal
disability status is not used as a measure of health since this is endogenous to the
retirement decision. The desire for early retirement may prompt workers to seek
disability status, and frequently the employer helps in this process in order to al-
leviate restructuring. Until recently, disability status was sometimes granted for
labor-market reasons without a link to health.
Econometric Estimation Method
A decision model is estimated with labor status “retired” as dependent variable
that covers normal retirement as well as different forms of early retirement. The
explanatory variables are linked to the dependent variable by a binary probit model.
Using this simple functional form has two disadvantages from a theoretical point of
view.
First, a cross-sectional probit model does some injustice to the panel nature of
the present data and probably underestimates the true effect; see Bo¨rsch-Supan
29Benefits are computed on a lifetime contribution basis. They are the product of four elements:
(1) the employee’s relative wage position, averaged over the entire earnings history, (2) the number
of years of service, (3) several adjustment factors, and (4) the average pension level. For more
details see Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004b).
30For details of the grid search see Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2004b).
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(2001), who experiments with several specifications of panel probit models with
parameterized correlation patterns over time. He demonstrates that the effects of
the incentive variables are slightly strengthened. However, the results did not change
significantly.
Second, the probit functional form ignores the structure of the dynamic opti-
mization that underlies the worker’s decision when to retire.31 Inserting the option
value in this type of a regression model, however, can be interpreted as a flexible
discrete-time duration model explaining the timing of retirement entry. Previous
investigations have shown that this pragmatic approach generates robust estimates
of the average effects of the incentive variables on retirement, although it is likely to
fail predicting the individual variation as precisely as the true dynamic optimization
model.32
In order to correct for possible sample bias, the dependent variable (the observa-
tions of retired and non-retired persons) are weighted by aggregate sample frequen-
cies computed from the VDR statistics which include all retirement entries into the
public retirement insurance system.33 Therefore, after scaling the present sample
using age-specific weights the base model that is based on the 1972 legislation is
able to reproduce representative retirement probabilities.
The estimation approach is slightly different from the one applied by Gruber
and Wise (2004a and 2004b). The international comparisons in Gruber and Wise
use for the dependent variable the probability of entering retirement (the hazard
rate), which is the probability of being retired, given that the sample person has
worked during the year before. Therefore, they include repeated observations of the
same person only while this person is employed. In contrast, the present estimation
sample includes repeated observations of the same person while employed and while
retired, since retirement is not necessarily an absorbing state. Hence, the dependent
variable is the probability of being retired, given that the sample person has worked
until the beginning of the window period (age 53):
pt = Prob(retired in t | worked until 53),
which is the cumulative distribution function. Given the estimated probability of
being retired, the probability of retiring can be computed - if the sample person has
not been retired before - as the differences of the cumulative distribution function
at each age between 54 and 72:
31The full underlying dynamic programming model has been estimated by Rust and Phelan
(1997).
32See Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) for a comprehensive account of the relative predictive
properties of three competing approaches: the full dynamic optimization model, the FIML-option-
value-model, and the discrete-choice-cum-option-value approach employed in the present paper.
33“Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen”, various issues.
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qt = pt − pt−1 = Prob(retired in t | not retired in t− 1).
The probability of choosing a retirement age a is then qa and the expected retirement
age is
∑
qa · a.
Both estimation approaches are compared. For Germany the estimated and
simulated cumulative probabilities of retiring are more robust than those estimated
by a hazard model.34
Base Model Estimates
Table 5.2 shows full regression results. A positive coefficient indicates that the
explanatory variable increases the probability of being retired.35 In addition to
the option values, health and an array of socio-economic variables, a full set of
age dummies is included to capture non-parametrically all other unmeasured effects
on the retirement decision that are systematically related to age. Because of the
different employment histories of men and women, resulting in very different claims
on the retirement insurance and different incentives to retire, separate regressions
for males and females are undertaken.
The incentive variable (option value) and the set of age dummies are highly
significant for both males and females. For males the age dummies clearly elevate the
probabilities to retire after ages 60, 63 and 65, the earliest retirement ages under the
various pathways. Self-reported health is also highly significant: Healthier workers
retire substantially later than those who report poor health.
Married males do not have a different retirement behavior compared to single
males. However, if there is (still) a child in the household, retirement is more likely
to be deferred. The effect of an university degree on retirement age is very strong
and remains though an income measure is included as an additional control.
The wealth effect on retirement is clearly significant: Persons with higher wealth
(home ownership, financial securities) afford earlier retirement. The income effect
is not significant for males. Note that the higher opportunity costs of retirement
have already been accounted for in the option value variable and in the wealth
variables. Hence, the effect of higher labor income is over and above those variables
and therefore only significant for income squared at the 10 percent level.
34More “robust” in the following sense: The methodology in Gruber and Wise (2004a and 2004b)
produces quite a few individual negative retirement probabilities when they are computed from the
hazards, since no summation constraint is imposed on several observations of the same individual
in the panel data. This is not the case in the approach of the present paper, although the implicit
summation constraints when computing qt = pt − pt−1 are also ignored.
35The estimated coefficients represent the marginal effects of each variable on the implicit in-
direct utilities in the discrete-choice equations. Their absolute values have therefore no intuitive
interpretation. Hence, the reader should focus on their signs and their levels of significance, but
ignore their absolute values. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in Table 5.2 can be found
in the Appendix, Table 5.4.
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Table 5.2: Regression output
Males Females
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Optval -0.006 0.001*** -0.003 0.001***
SSW -0.002 0.001*** 0.001 0.001
SSW partner 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
Age=55 0.363 0.220 0.305 0.131**
Age=56 0.684 0.215*** 0.445 0.131***
Age=57 0.588 0.217*** 0.551 0.131***
Age=58 0.581 0.314** 0.579 0.135***
Age=59 0.570 0.249** 0.582 0.138***
Age=60 1.422 0.273*** 2.010 0.147***
Age=61 1.641 0.282*** 2.178 0.153***
Age=62 1.748 0.284*** 2.263 0.163***
Age=63 2.127 0.282*** 2.317 0.178***
Age=64 2.443 0.306*** 2.242 0.178***
Age=65 3.722 0.283*** 3.916 0.185***
Age=66 3.824 0.348*** 3.974 0.225***
Age=67 4.051 0.496*** 3.963 0.259***
Age=68 3.376 0.396*** 4.007 0.269***
Age=69 3.993 0.453*** 4.264 0.281***
Age=70 4.374 0.505*** 4.370 0.337***
Age=71 4.582 0.514*** 4.864 0.380***
Age=72 5.319 0.484*** 6.293 0.418***
Health status -0.133 0.0131*** -0.145 0.016***
Married -0.127 0.145 -0.966 0.112***
University degree -0.566 0.270** -1.011 0.223***
Skill -0.141 0.093 -0.120 0.060**
Home ownership 0.367 0.080*** -0.193 0.060***
No financial assets -0.168 0.149 -0.142 0.942
Financial securities 0.227 0.088** 0.142 0.068**
Period of insurance 0.035 0.025 0.046 0.009***
Period of insurance squ. -0.001 0.000* -0.001 0.000***
Labor income 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.005***
Labor income squared 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000***
Self-employed -0.458 0.170*** -0.786 0.128***
Civil service 0.621 0.156*** 0.977 0.289***
Kids -0.363 0.087*** -0.078 0.065
Constant 0.037 0.483 -0.162 0.224
No. of obs. 2321 4206
Notes: dependent variable: labor status “retired”; probit estimation; *, **, *** denote significant
at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level; Source: GSOEP, working sample 1984-1997.
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Two dummy variables are indicating the former labor-force status. These vari-
ables take the value one if the person is currently (or used to be) self-employed or a
civil servant. The model indicates that the self-employed tend to work longer, while
civil servants retire earlier, even after all other variables such as pension rules and
income levels have been taken into account.
For females the peaks of the age dummies are much more pronounced at age
60 and 65, in accordance with an accentuation of habitual effects over and above
the economic incentives created by different pension rules for women. In contrast
with males, the coefficient on social security wealth is not significant for females. A
probable explanation is the fact that women have a less continuous working life.
Most socio-economic variables have effects of size similar to that in the male
sample, but are more significant. This is especially the case for the effect of being
married: Married women retire later, probably because they have raised children
and therefore have an interrupted earnings record such that they are not eligible for
retirement at age 60. This effect dominates that of the fact that married women,
who are in general younger than their husbands, often try to retire at approximately
the same time as their husbands.36 There is no additional effect of having children
on the retirement decision of women. The fact of being married appears to absorb
the effect of having children in the household for the cohorts in the present sample.
5.1.5 Simulations of Reform Variants
Now the estimated coefficients are applied to several simulation experiments men-
tioned in Section 5.1.3. First the 1992 and 1999 reform is simulated as the reference
scenario such as if it was already fully implemented. Note that until 1997, the
end of the sample period, the rules of the 1992 pension reform had not been fully
phased in. On top of the reference scenario the implementation of different actuarial
adjustment factors and a change in the regular statutory retirement age of 65 by
one or two years is simulated. Finally the impact of installing a Notional Defined
Contribution (NDC) System is demonstrated.
The parameter values estimated in Section 5.1.4 are applied to each reform sce-
nario to calculate the retirement probabilities for the ages 54 to 72, based on the
assumption that an employee has previously worked up to the age of 53. The incen-
tive variables implicit in each reform scenario are calculated, i.e., a new option value
and a new social security wealth for each of the individuals in the present sample.
The age indicators in the scenarios involving an increase in retirement age are also
increased by one or two years in the forecast, as these capture the habitual effect of,
for example, the statutory pension age.
36Note that joint retirement decisions of married couples are not considered. In the case of
marriage the social security wealth variable of the married partner is included. However, the effect
is insignificant.
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The results are shown in Table 5.3 and Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.3 summarizes
the key data for the distribution of retirement ages, separately for men and women,
- viz., the average retirement age and the percentage of people retiring before ages
60, 62 or 65.
Table 5.3: The impact of different reform options on retirement age
Percentage of persons
Mean who retire before age
retirement age 60 62 65
MEN
1972 legislation 61.2 * 17.20 58.20 81.90
Pension reforms 1992 + 1999 63 4.70 42.40 51.70
... plus adjustment costs of 4,5% 63.7 3.20 31.30 37.40
... plus adjustment costs of 6% 64.9 2.10 18.60 20.00
... plus “pivotal age” +1 year 63.3 5.80 26.00 52.60
... plus “pivotal age” +2 years 63.7 7.20 11.30 53.40
NDC System 65.3 2.30 19.20 19.40
WOMEN
1972 legislation 61.7* 10.80 58.60 66.90
Pension reforms 1992 + 1999 62.4 6.30 52.40 54.80
... plus adjustment costs of 4,5% 62.7 5.30 48.60 50.10
... plus adjustment costs of 6% 63.2 4.10 42.00 42.90
... plus “pivotal age” +1 year 62.6 6.70 42.80 55.00
... plus “pivotal age” +2 years 62.3 6.90 9.40 55.10
NDC System 63.3 4.20 41.80 41.80
Note: *) These values correspond to the mean retirement age calculated from the VDR statistics
of 1995, based on old-age pensions and disability entries for all persons aged 54 to 72.
The overall distribution of new retirees is shown in diagrammatic form in Figures
5.2 and 5.3, again separately for men and women. The graphs on the left show the
distribution of retirement ages, i.e., the probability that a person will enter retire-
ment at a specific age. The graphs on the right show the accumulated retirement
probabilities, i.e., the probability with which a person of a specified age has retired,
for each age. The calculations include all people retiring between the ages of 54 and
72 who draw an old-age pension or disability benefits.
First the results for male workers are presented, then follows a discussion of
women’s responses to the introduction of actuarial adjustment factors and the
changes in initial retirement rules. Finally, the results with respect to the intro-
duction of a NDC system are described.
Based on the status quo established by the 1972 reform - i.e. the main provisions
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affecting the people in the present sample - the full implementation of the 1992 and
1999 reforms would lift the average male retirement age by almost two years, from
age 61.2 to 63. The impact on women, as shown below, is much weaker. An increase
in the average age of retirement is thus foreseeable in the future on the basis of
existing legislation alone and is already apparent in the latest figures issued by the
VDR (Reimann 2003).
An upward shift in the entire fabric of age limits by two years increases the
average effective retirement age for men by a further 9 months from age 63 to
63.7. Figure 5.2 (lower left) clearly illustrates how the two ages at which most
insured persons retire - 60 or 65 - increase by two years. However, some people
draw benefits for loss of earning capacity or put up with the actuarial deductions
attached to earlier retirement rather than going along with this shift in age limits.
The resulting increase in the effective age of retirement is somewhat greater than
suggested by the BMGS, the German ministry of social security. Its rule of thumb
states that in response to a change in the retirement rules, one-third of workers retire
at the new retirement age, one-third continue to retire at the old age of retirement
and accept the deductions this implies, and one-third avoid the new rules by claiming
benefits for disability. This rule of thumb would suggest an increase in the average
retirement age of less than 9 months.
The introduction of higher adjustment factors also has a very distinctive impact
on retirement decisions. Deductions of 4.5 percent p.a. increase the average re-
tirement age by nine months from age 63 to 63.7. Deductions of 6 percent have a
considerably stronger incentive effect and even lift the average retirement age up to
age 64.9. As shown in Figure 5.1, more people retire at age 65 and fewer at age 60
or 61.
Women respond less strongly than men to a shift in age limits. Under the 1972
pension legislation, the average age of retirement for women is 61.7 and will only rise
by 0.7 years to 62.4 when all the 1992 and 1999 pension reform rules are implemented
in full.
An increase in the entire fabric of age limits for women by one year produces
a postponement of 3 months, and the average age of retirement moves up from
62.4 to 62.6. An increase of two years is accompanied by a stronger drift towards
disability benefits. The average age of retirement in this scenario is only 62.3, and
thus remains to all intents and purposes unchanged.
This behavior is very clearly illustrated by Figure 5.3 (below left): In the basic
scenario, most women retire between the ages of 60 and 65. A shift in the age
limits by one (or two) years also postpones the bulk of retirements among women
by the same one-year (or two-year) period. However, not everybody retires later.
Some people claim disability benefits earlier (the second peak flattens out as the age
limits are progressively increased, while the first peak rises). This is the primary
effect for women.
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Figure 5.2: Predicted distribution of retirement ages, men
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Figure 5.3: Predicted distribution of retirement ages, women
a. distribution of retirement age
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The incentive effect of higher adjustment factors is also weaker for women: a
deduction of 4.5 percent p.a. increases the average age of retirement by 3 months
from 62.4 to 62.7. A deduction of 6 percent p.a. increases the average retirement
age by another 6 months to 63.2 years.
Finally, the simulations demonstrate that the introduction of the NDC system
would also have a major impact on the average age of retirement in comparison
with the 1992 and 1999 reforms (refer to Table 5.3). The average age of retirement
increases by more than two years for men (from 63 to 65.3) and, less dramatically,
by almost one year for women (from 62.4 to 63.3). Of the five reforms examined,
this variant generates the highest average retirement age and thus evidently has
the most powerful incentive effects. As demonstrated by Figures 5.2 and 5.3, the
distribution of new retirements is similar to that in the scenario involving higher
adjustment factors. This applies equally to men and women.
Although the NDC system in fact differs both in technical respects and in under-
lying transfer philosophy from the pay-as-you-go system, the earnings points rules
embodied in the German pay-as-you-go system resemble fairly closely the actuarial
principle of equivalence between contributions and benefits. The main difference be-
tween the two systems is that the NDC system includes explicit actuarial adjustment
factors that are considerably higher than in the reference scenario.
It is important to bear in mind that the estimates summarized in this paper are
based on the behavior of employees and employers from the mid-1980s to the 1990s.
The future behavior particularly of female workers may well change significantly,
viz., more closely resemble that of male workers, in the period 2005 to 2025 to
which the projections in this paper apply.
5.1.6 Summary and Conclusions
The accelerating process of population aging will have a momentous impact on the
financial sustainability of the German pay-as-you-go pension system. The increase in
the old-age dependency ratio means that the pensions of a growing number of people
at retirement age will have to be financed by a smaller workforce. Quite apart from
these demographic problems, there are also strong incentive effects favoring early
retirement built into the German pension system. These incentives increase the
old-age dependency ratio even more than would be dictated by demographic factors
alone.
In the present paper the influence of pension legislation on retirement decisions
in Germany is modeled and estimated. Retirement probability is summarized as a
function of an incentive variable, which encompasses pension legislation and other
control variables. The option value of postponing retirement by one year is em-
ployed as an incentive variable. This model is then used to simulate various reforms
to the retirement rules: the 1992 and 1999 reforms, as well as a range of reform
variants offered for discussion by the “Ru¨rup Kommission”, including an increase in
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standard retirement age limits, an increase in the actuarial adjustment factors, and
the implementation of a notional defined contribution (NDC) system modeled after
the Swedish pension system.
The calculations show that the introduction of an actuarial adjustment factor of
3.6 percent p.a. and other changes to the retirement rules already introduced by the
1992 and 1999 reforms will, over the next few years, increase the average effective
retirement age for men by almost two years and that for women by a considerably
shorter period of not quite 9 months.
A shift in the structure of age limits as a whole by a further two years would
postpone the effective retirement age of men by, on average, around 9 months, and
would have little or no effect on the retirement age of women. Alternatively, an
increase in the actuarial adjustment factor from 3.6 percent to 6 percent would
increase the average age of retirement of men by almost 2 years. This effect would
be considerably weaker for women; nevertheless, their average age of retirement
would increase by around one year.
These results illustrate that an increased actuarial adjustment factor and an
increase in the statutory retirement age based on higher remaining life expectancy
offer major potential for postponing the effective age of retirement. This is an
important finding. Since the pension system from which we depart distorts the
retirement decision - in that the present discounted value of pension benefits as seen
by a current worker decreases substantially with increasing age of retirement - an
increase in the effective retirement age will reduce the financial burden of the public
pension system.37 This is the case as long as the adjustment factors are based
on an interest rate below the economy-wide discount rate.38 From an economic
perspective, therefore, these policy options offer suitable measures which help to
put the German pay-as-you-go public pension system on a path on which it can
regain its financial sustainability.
37Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) provide empirical estimates and graphical representations
of the decline in the present value of benefits with increasing retirement age. It is important
to note that the budget effect is caused by the current actuarial non-neutrality of the German
pension system. It vanishes once the system has gained actuarial neutrality, see e.g. Breyer and
Kifmann (2002) for a theoretical analysis, and Gruber and Wise (2004b), in their introduction, for
an empirical international comparison of the size of these budget effects. The exact quantification
of the budget effects is a subject of current research. Bo¨rsch-Supan, Kohnz and Schnabel (2004a)
provide preliminary budget effect estimations based on a simplified model of the German social
security system.
38For a discussion of the involved discount and interest rates, see Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003).
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5.1.7 Appendix
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of variables used in Table 5.2
Males Females
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
labor status “retired” 0.400 0.011 0.312 0.007
Optval 184.62 3.606 141.36 9.925
SSW 301.39 3.135 129.89 1.820
SSW, sqrd. 52.37 2.302 218.50 2.889
Health status 8.223 0.063 9.197 0.032
Married 0.947 0.005 0.913 0.004
University degree 0.079 0.006 0.038 0.003
Skill 0.850 0.011 0.478 0.009
Home ownership 0.488 0.011 0.517 0.008
No financial assets 0.085 0.006 0.105 0.005
Financial securities 0.251 0.009 0.226 0.007
Period of insurance 39.92 0.145 21.02 0.201
Period of insurance squ. 1640.1 9.245 604.3 9.681
Income 55.64 0.490 29.64 1.062
Income squared 3637.5 73.06 5452.6 1756.9
Self-employed 0.072 0.005 0.086 0.004
Civil service 0.119 0.007 0.010 0.002
Kids 0.312 0.010 0.303 0.007
No. of obs. 2321 4206
Source: GSOEP, working sample, 1984-1997.
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5.2 Retirement Age and Preretirement in Ger-
man Administrative Data
5.2.1 Introduction
Early retirement and preretirement39 are costly achievements that aggravate the
already tight financial situation of the German pay-as-you-go pension system due to
population aging. Since 1992, pension and labor-market reforms have been adopted
and they greatly restrain publicly subsidized early retirement and preretirement
possibilities. Because of these reforms, the distribution of retirement age of older
workers is expected to be changing. These changes can be exploited to investigate
the impact of policy reforms on retirement entry behavior.
So far, there is hardly any research on the impact of pension reforms on preretire-
ment in Germany. The difficulty consists in observing preretirement in the data and
in providing for a sufficiently long time-series that allows to analyze policy reforms.
The only empirical analysis in this area has been undertaken by Wu¨bbeke (2005)
who uses a data set based on administrative information of labor-market histories
and retirement entries.40 She investigates the impact of firms’ employment and pub-
lic social security policy on employees’ changes from employment into retirement in
the period of 1975 to 1995.
Recently, the German Pension Insurance (“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”) has
started to release administrative data for research purposes. This administrative
data is a promising source for investigating the impact of labor and pension reforms
on individual retirement behavior, because it includes detailed information about
individuals’ employment status and pension insurance characteristics. So far, only
cross-sectional but no time-series data of individuals’ retirement entries and insur-
ance histories are available. The data set used in this study, i.e., the Scientific Use
File (SUF) Versichertenrentenzugang 2003, is a representative sample of publicly
insured persons who retired in 2003. This data is used to learn more about how
to describe preretirement which will be useful for future economic analysis of pol-
icy reforms based on German administrative data.41 The present paper discusses
39Preretirement refers to effective retirement before old-age public pension payments can be
received from age 60 onwards and includes the option of partial retirement (“Altersteilzeit”). Ne-
gotiations between employers and employees, and state subsidies enable preretirement. In contrast,
official retirement is defined as receiving public old-age pension payments and, thus, includes early
retirement from age 60 onwards. For a more detailed description of early retirement pathways see
Section 5.1.2.
40This data is not publicly available but results from an - until now - unique example of combining
data on labor-market histories issued by the Institute for Employment Research (“Institut fu¨r
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung”) of the Federal Employment Agency (“Bundesargentur fu¨r
Arbeit”) and data on retirement entries issued by the German Pension Insurance (“Deutsche
Rentenversicherung”)
41As discussed in Appendix B the data provided so far by the German Pension Insurance, i.e.,
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differences between individual determinants of retirement for those choosing pre-
retirement programs as opposed to official public pension plans. A reduced form
econometric approach is employed in order to explore this question.
Based on the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003, the present sample reveals
that 40 percent of all men and women preretire, that is they withdraw from the
labor market before official pathways into old-age retirement can be taken. On
average individuals stay 2.4 years in preretirement before taking one of the official
early retirement entries based on the unemployment or partial retirement (“Alters-
teilzeit”) pathway or retirement plans for women. Moreover, differences in effects of
individual determinants - such as rehabilitation services, income before retirement
and pension payments - on retirement age can be observed for preretired persons
compared to persons taking official retirement entries.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2.2 summarizes institutional facts and
recent changes of early retirement, partial retirement and preretirement in Germany.
In Section 5.2.3 the data, the sample, and the definition of preretirement are dis-
cussed. Characteristics of the retirement age are presented in Section 5.2.4 and,
finally, Section 5.2.5 concludes.
5.2.2 Early Retirement, Partial Retirement and Preretire-
ment in Germany
Early retirement, preretirement and partial retirement refer to regularly used official
and unofficial pathways into retirement before reaching the statutory age of 65. In
order to clarify these concepts and in order to motivate institutional changes with
respect to the public pension system and unemployment insurance since 1992, they
are described in the following.
Early retirement refers to retirement entry before age 65 by one of the official
pathways into old-age retirement, which results in an income stream paid by the
German public pension system. It has been introduced in Germany with the pen-
sion reform in 1972. With the age of 60 women, partial retirees,42 unemployed or
employees, who can not be appropriately employed due to health or labor-market
reasons, can enter retirement (“Fru¨hrente”). All other employees who have been
contributing to the public pension system for at least 35 years can retire at the age
of 63. These pathways into retirement are not related to any additional adjustment
costs. Consequently, strong incentives are set to retire before the age of 65 and
individuals react accordingly.
A recent survey reveals that two out of three employees would leave the labor
the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang, does not allow for policy analysis of retirement entry behavior
based on option value models.
42The term “partial retirees” refers to persons who enter a partial retirement plan (“Alter-
steilzeit”).
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force between age 55 and 60 if this was financially feasible (Pfeiffer and Simons
2004). Preretirement (“Vorruhestand”) meets these preferences and refers to labor
force exits that take place before early retirement is possible. This labor force
exit can be referred to as preretirement if a person receives income paid by the
unemployment insurance or other state subsidies that burden the tax and social
security systems and/or income that results from arrangements between employers
and employees.
One can distinguish between two different ways of entering preretirement. On the
one hand, unemployment compensation is an important way of financing preretire-
ment. If a firm wants to lay off older workers in a restructuring process, employees
can receive a negotiable combination of unemployment compensation and a supple-
ment or severance pay. At the age of sixty they enter early retirement via the public
pension system, i.e., by taking the unemployment pathway. In the case of prere-
tirement, the date of the labor force exit is very often determined by the maximum
duration of unemployment benefit payments. Until 2005 the duration of benefits
paid by the unemployment insurance (“Arbeitslosenversicherung”) lasted between
24 and 32 months.43 Even earlier labor force exits and corresponding retirement
entries can be induced by paying the employee the difference between the last salary
and unemployment assistance (“Arbeitslosenhilfe”), which, until 2005, lasted for one
additional year. Unemployment insurance benefits can amount to 67 percent of the
last salary and are especially attractive as the unemployment insurance additionally
pays the contributions to the public pension system.
On the other hand, partial retirement (“Altersteilzeit”) is another means of pre-
retirement. This scheme provides for part-time work between the age of 55 or above
and early retirement at age 60 or 63 depending on the above mentioned pathways.
Effectively, many employees continue to work full time at first and then leave their
job earlier (“Blockmodell”). Partial retirement is state-subsidized: The unemploy-
ment insurance pays an additional 20 percent of the usual part-time earnings if the
employer hires a young employee. This rule also encourages employers to substitute
older by younger employees and meets employees’ interest in retiring early.
Figure 5.4 shows the fraction of different pathways into retirement relative to
total retirement for the period of 1978 to 2003. It demonstrates that old-age pensions
due to unemployment have become an important pathway into retirement since the
early 1990s for men, whereas among women the unemployment pathway is not
frequently used. Due to low labor-market participation, women rather take the
pathway for women which allows to enter retirement at age 60.
Starting with the pension reforms of 1992 and 1999 and continuing with labor-
market reforms in 2003, several changes to these rules have been adopted. These
changes constrain generous early retirement and preretirement options. The reforms
of 1992 and 1999 introduced an increase of the retirement age limits to age 65 or
43The exact duration depended on the duration of compulsory insurance coverage and on the
age of the beneficiary.
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Figure 5.4: Pathways into retirement
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age 63 for long-term insured. These changes will be fully implemented after a long
transitional period in 2015.44 There will no longer be exceptions for the unemployed,
partially retired or women. In Figure 5.4 a small decrease in the early retirement
options of unemployment pensions for men and women old-age pensions can already
be observed since the late 1990s. Moreover, the government introduced adjustment
costs that reduce pension payments by 0.3 percent for each month of early retire-
ment before age 65. If employers do not want to accept the lower pension benefit,
they either need to work longer or have to extend the preretirement period, i.e.,
the period between labor force exit and retirement payments. From 2005 onwards,
unemployment benefits are shortened from a maximum of 32 to 18 months (“Hartz
IV”). Unemployment assistance will be paid only if the preconditions for welfare
payments are fulfilled (“Arbeitslosengeld II”). Thus, state-promoted preretirement
between labor force exit and pension benefit payments is now greatly reduced and
limited to 18 months. Transition rules of the pension reforms of 1992 and 1999
already apply to most cohorts retiring in 2003, whereas the new labor-market regu-
lations have not been effective before 2005.
All these reform steps indicate a change in paradigm from promoting early and
preretirement towards working longer. These reform steps are backed by the insight
that skills of older workers are needed, especially in the course of population aging,
and encouraged by governmental initiatives to bring older workers above age 50
back into work (“Initiative 50 plus”). Based on descriptive statistics of recent ad-
ministrative data of aggregate retirement entries, Reimann (2003) shows that these
changes have already had an effect as the retirement entry behavior slowly starts
to change. However, the pension reforms in 1992 and 1999 have long transitional
periods and are not yet fully phased in. It is of great interest to exploit this policy
change in future research in more detail and to investigate the responsiveness of re-
tirement entries, preretirement and old-age unemployment to institutional changes
for simulations of future pension and labor-market reform scenarios.
5.2.3 The Data and Sample
The data employed in this study is based on administrative data of the German
public pension insurance that are collected and provided by the German Pension In-
surance (“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”). As these data are made virtually anony-
mous, scientific use files entail only a representative sub-sample of all publicly in-
sured individuals or pensioners of the public pension system. This paper employs the
SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003 (SUFRTZN03XVST Berk) which is a sample
of about 100,000 individuals that started to receive public pensions in 2003. People
that are publicly insured but are not yet retired are not part of the sample.
44For a more detailed description of the 1992 and 1999 reforms and a graphical description of
statutory age limits during the transition period refer to Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) or Figure
5.1, Section 5.1.2.
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Administrative data are very valuable to analyze questions on retirement entry
behavior. They have the following advantages compared to German survey-based
data such as the GSOEP: First, samples are large representative draws of the whole
population of publicly insured persons. Second, there is no attrition. Third, there
are no problems with the interpretation of questions as it is often the case with sur-
vey responses. Fourth and most importantly, the sample provides information on
individuals’ insurance status before retirement and entails all the relevant informa-
tion to determine a person’s pension claims, e.g., information on earnings points45,
on various contribution periods and the type of pension that is received.
But administrative data are also associated with difficulties.46 One major issue
is the measurement of the effective retirement age, which is discussed in detail in
the remainder of the paper. Other issues are the measurement of income, wealth
and socio-economic variables.47 Information on these characteristics are available as
far as the public pension system retains them for the determination of individual
pension claims. Income refers to income subject to social security contributions only
and wealth is not recorded at all. Person’s health status can be inferred by using
a variable that describes whether medical rehabilitation services have been taken
in the last 5 years before retirement. Direct information is available, for example,
on education, family status, residence and details necessary for the calculation of
public pension payments.
For some variables more than pure cross-sectional information is provided, i.e.,
gross yearly income subject to social security contributions and the status of insur-
ance in the three years before retirement. The latter provides additional information
on individuals’ situation, i.e., whether they are self-employed or unemployed before
retirement.
For the subsequent analysis the sample is limited to individuals between age
54 and 72 that receive an old-age or disability pension for the first time in 2003.
Individuals with partial pensions are excluded from the sample as these persons
are likely to be still partially employed. Observations with pension payments that
are significantly determined by inter- or supranational legislation are not considered,
because these are determined by factors that are out of reach in this study. Problem-
atic for the analysis are also pensions paid on the basis of the “Fremdrentengesetz”
(FRG) which include mainly East-Germans that took refuge from Eastern to West-
ern Germany and resettlers (“Aussiedler” and “Spa¨taussiedler”). As suggested by
Mika (2005), these observations are excluded from the sample as their pension pay-
ments and corresponding information in the data are based on fictive contributions.
45In Germany the calculation of pension payments is based on earnings points. For each person
the number of earnings points depends mainly on the relative earnings position and the number
of contributions.
46These difficulties differ from problems with German survey data. It would therefore be inter-
esting to compare the GSOEP to the present administrative data in detail. This, however, lies
beyond the scope of the present paper.
47For a detailed description of the data see also Himmelreicher (2006) and Radl (2005).
118
The adjustment of pension payments in East Germany to West German levels has
almost been completed in 2003. Therefore, differences affecting the retirement entry
age should be minimal and observations from both East and West Germany are
included in the sample.
Retirement Age in German Administrative Data
Administrative data provide detailed and reliable information on individual pension
claims that are necessary for meaningful analyses of individual retirement entries
and labor force exits. The retirement age in administrative data is defined as the
age at which a pension is received from the German public pension insurance for the
first time. This retirement age is referred to in the following as the official retirement
age. Thus preretirement is not considered. There are three main motivations for
taking account of preretirement and for considering the effective instead of the offi-
cial retirement age in economic analyses of retirement entries: First, recent pension
and labor-market reforms, among other things, aim at limiting preretirement as it
aggravates the financial situation of the social security systems. It is of great inter-
est to investigate the impact of these reforms on preretirement using administrative
data. Second, it is important to take account of preretirement if overall financial
effects of retirement entries on social security systems are of interest instead of finan-
cial effects on the public pension system alone as preretirement typically burdens
the unemployment insurance. Third, survey-based data show that individuals refer
to themselves as retired when they have not yet officially retired but are preretired
(Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. 2004b). For a consistent estimation of individual retirement
entry decisions it is, thus, necessary to use the effective as opposed to the official
retirement entry age.
Preretirement cases can be identified in the data as information on individuals’
insurance status is available not only for the year before retirement, i.e., for 2002,
but also for 2001 and 2000. The insurance status specifies whether a person (i) had
an employment that was subject to social security contributions, whether a person
was (ii) marginally employed (“geringfu¨gig bescha¨ftigt”),48 (iii) eligible for a partial
pension plan (“Altersteilzeit”), (iv) voluntarily insured,49 (v) compulsorily insured
mainly due to unemployment or sickness,50 (vi) passively insured or (vii) in some
other insurance category.51 Table 5.5 summarizes the fraction of each insurance
category in the present sample. Half of the individuals have been passively insured
48A person is considered marginally employed if he or she does not earn more than 400 Euros
per month. Special rules with respect to social security insurance apply to these persons.
49These are mainly self-employed persons or housewives who have no income subject to social
security insurance but voluntarily take part in the German public pension system.
50For exact definitions refer to the German Social Security Code (“Sozialgesetzbuch”), SGB III
and § 3 Nr. 3 SGB VI.
51This category includes for example persons that were eligible to insurance credits (“Anrech-
nungszeiten”) or other compulsory insurances that are not part of (v).
119
or compulsorily insured due to unemployment or sickness. Passive insurance refers
to all persons that have not paid any social insurance contributions in the year before
retirement. 50 percent of these individuals have not paid any contributions for more
than 20 years. This group inter alia includes civil servants or self-employed that
have earned pension claims due to employment subject to social security insurance
at some point in time, typically very early in their career. A third group is made
up of individuals that gave up employment early which are mostly housewives.
Table 5.5: Insurance status before official retirement
insurance status percent*
employment s.t. social insurance contributions 20.64
marginally employed 4.14
compulsorily insured (unemployment, sickness) 23.92
partial retirement plan 12.46
voluntarily insured 3.31
passively insured 25.60
others 9.93
Source: Own calculations based on SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003
(SUFRTZN03XVST Berk).
*) Percentages relative to all individuals in the sample that officially
retired in 2003.
As summarized in Section 5.2.2 individuals are considered to be preretired if
they were unemployed, partially retired, marginally employed or passively insured.
In order to rule out cases that have been passively insured for a very long period,
(e.g. housewives, self-employed or civil servants) only those are included that have
paid contributions to the public pension insurance at least once during the last
10 years before official retirement in 2003. At the same time, persons that return
to an employment status subject to social security contributions or to voluntary
insurance are not included in this pool of preretired persons.52 This classification of
preretirement is taken from Pfeiffer and Simons (2004) who investigate preretirement
in Germany using various data sources. With this definition, 47 percent of men and
37 percent of women preretired in the present sample, i.e., effectively retired before
2003.53
52Also, persons that enter preretirement at age 63 or later are not considered as preretired.
These are only a few cases.
53Due to a censoring problem for the year 2000 it is not possible to determine whether individuals
who are effectively retired in 2000 entered retirement in 2000 or before. For the determination of
the effective retirement age this is, however, necessary. All individuals preretired before 2001 are
assumed to have entered preretirement in 2000. Compared to the alternative of excluding these
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The sample also includes disability pensions. Note that preretirement in this
study covers part of the disability cases. Persons retiring due to disability amount
to 10 percent in the present sample. Half of them receive a disability pension directly
after leaving the labor force, another 30 percent after a period of unemployment.
According to the above mentioned definition, the latter case may fall into the prere-
tirement category, whereas the first does not. Declaring part of the disability cases as
preretired is reasonable, because obtaining a disability pension due to labor-market
reasons is still possible for cohorts retiring in 2003. However, it has become much
more difficult over time.54
Figure 5.5 displays retirement entry probabilities in 2003 for men and women
aged 54 to 72 that take official pathways into retirement. Preretirement is not
accounted for in the data underlying this figure. The distributions for men and
women are characterized by two large spikes at age 60 and 65. There is also a third
spike for men at age 63. For women the spikes at age 60 and 65 are more pronounced
than for men. These differences can be explained by differences in employment
histories and different retirement pathways for men and women. 27 percent of all
women retire at age 60. This high value is due to a pension pathway that allows
women under certain conditions to enter retirement at age 60. This pathway still
exists in 2003, however, adjustment costs have to be taken into account. Another
41 percent of all women retire at age 65. Due to interrupted employment histories,
women often have not contributed a sufficiently long time period into the public
pension system such that they are not eligible to choose this or any other pathway
to retire before age 65.
The distribution of retirement age between age 54 and 72 is smoother for men:
20 percent retire at age 60, 18 percent at age 63 and 25 percent at age 65. From
age 60 onwards men can retire via the unemployment or partial retirement pathway.
From age 63, they are eligible for retirement if they are long-term insured. In 2003
adjustment costs apply to almost all cohorts that choose one of these retirement
pathways.
The average official retirement entry age55 for men and women as reported in the
present sample amounts to 62.3 and 62.5 years respectively. Once preretirement is
considered, the average effective retirement age is about one year lower: 61.3 years
for men and 61.6 years for women. In the present sample men and women preretire
on average at age 59.3 and 59.2 respectively and officially retire after 2.4 years.56
observations from the sample, this assumption is justified: The resulting average of duration in
preretirement in the present sample amounts to 2.4 years and is only slightly lower than the average
duration of preretirement in the GSOEP data which is 2.5 years (Pfeiffer and Simons 2004).
54Note the reduction in disability pensions since 1978 in Figure 5.4.
55“Official” refers to the fact that these individuals enter retirement through one of the official
pathways (old-age or disability pensions) and receive pension payments from the German Pension
Insurance. The numbers refer to average values in the present sample and, therefore, do not exactly
match statistics issued by the German Pension Insurance.
56These average values are only approximately correct. Note that the group of preretired persons
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of retirement entry age in 2003
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Source: Own calculations based on SUF Versichertenrentenzu-
gang 2003 (SUFRTZN03XVST Berk), German Pension Insurance
(“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”).
Other Variables
In order to characterize retirement entry age the data set provides several variables
for the subsequent regression analysis: income before retirement, pension payments,
socio-demographic characteristics such as highest educational degree, status of sick-
ness, marital status, and times of child-caring.
Income in administrative data refers to income subject to social security contri-
butions. It does not mirror a person’s complete income position. Therefore, income
of passively or voluntarily insured individuals is missing. These individuals mainly
obtain income from other sources, e.g., self-employed or civil servants who have had
an employment subject to social security contributions only at the beginning of their
career. Also housewives belong to this group. In case of housewives but also more
generally in the case of couples, especially with children, it would be desirable to
use a couple’s income. However, the data does not allow to match couples.
As the idea of the following econometric analysis is to provide a picture of the
in this sample refers to persons preretiring in 2000 to 2002 and officially retiring in 2003. In
order for this group to be representative for preretirement cases in 2003, one has to assume that
preretirement cases in 2000 to 2002 are representative for preretirement cases in 2003 that officially
retire in 2004 to 2006, i.e., one has to assume that no cohort and time effects exist for the years
2000 to 2006. As retirement entry rules are changing due to long transitional periods of the reforms
of 1992 and 1999, time effects can not fully be ruled out.
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characteristics of retirement entry age as provided by the administrative data at
hand, observations with missing income values are not dropped, but explicitly con-
trolled for. An income dummy is constructed that is equal to one if the income
value is missing, income mis. 26 percent of all men and 44 percent of all women
have reported missing incomes values. Almost 70 percent of these men and women
are passively insured.57
Another shortcoming of the income variable is the censoring of yearly income
values greater than 55,000 Euros. In order to circumvent the censoring problem at
the top end of the income distribution, dummies for income quintiles are constructed
for men and women with reported income values.58
Pension payments are directly obtained from the data. The corresponding vari-
able refers to public pensions only. As pension payments are censored at values
greater than 1800 Euros per month, again dummies for pension payment quintiles
are constructed.59
Information on education is classified by the highest individual educational de-
gree: secondary school (“Hauptschule” and “Mittlere Reife”), high school (“Abitur”),
technical college (“Fachhochschule”) or university. The categories secondary and
high school are subdivided into cases with and without vocational training (“Beruf-
sausbildung”). Dummy variables equal to one for the highest educational degree
are constructed and included in the regression analysis. Furthermore, there is one
category referring to unknown education levels and another category referring to
missing values. The latter category includes about one-third of all observations.
These are mostly individuals that entered retirement not directly after employment:
57 percent are passively insured and 20 percent are unemployed in the year before
retirement. Thus, no information on the educational degree was provided by a for-
mer employer.60 The category of missing educational degrees is clearly non-random
and related to the insurance status before retirement and is, therefore, separately
included in the regression. The distribution of observations with unknown educa-
tional degree across income classifications is also likely to be non-random and enters
as an additional dummy variable.61
The health status can be proxied by two different variables: An indicator variable
that denotes whether a person has claimed rehabilitation services during the last 5
57Because of missing income values one could alternatively consider to drop all passively insured
persons who have not contributed to the public pension system within the last 10 years and all
voluntarily insured persons. Another way to deal with the problem would be to impute income
and wealth by using the GSOEP.
58For exact quintile ranges see Table 5.9, Appendix A.
59For the exact range of quintiles see Table 5.9, Appendix A.
60For further background information on the education variable refer to Fitzenberger, Osikominu
and Vo¨lter (2005).
61In this group 33 percent of individuals are employed subject to social security contributions,
21 percent are unemployed and 25 percent are marginally employed, the rest splits up into all other
categories.
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years previous to retirement62 and a variable that comprises months of insurance
credits due to sickness or rehabilitation.
Information on a person’s marital status and on the number of months dedicated
to child-caring are provided. It is important to mention that this number refers
only to cases in which times of child-caring are credited and lead to higher pension
benefits. This variable, therefore, does not directly measure the number of children.
Finally, information on individuals insurance status is categorized. The follow-
ing dummy variables are included in the regression analysis: employment subject
to social insurance contributions; partial retirement; compulsory insurance due to
unemployment, sickness or rehabilitation; marginal employment; voluntary employ-
ment; passive insurance and others.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 in Appendix A provide definitions and summary statistics
of all variables that are of interest in the subsequent regression analysis.
5.2.4 Characteristics of the Official and Effective Retire-
ment Age
As all people in the sample officially retire in 2003 or effectively retire during the
short window between 2000 and 2003, the main sample variation results from the
differences in retirement age across individuals. The determinants of this varia-
tion are investigated using standard OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors. Estimations are undertaken separately for men and women as
retirement entry behavior and the corresponding retirement age are likely to be af-
fected by systematic differences in employment histories. In a first step, retirement
age is defined as a person’s age in 2003, which is the official retirement age. In a
second step, retirement entry age refers to a person’s age when effectively retiring.
Therefore, individuals who preretire are identified and their official retirement age
is adjusted to their effective retirement age.
The Official Retirement Age
Two different specifications are estimated: The first one includes variables for in-
come, pension, education, health status, marital status and child-caring (Table 5.6),
whereas the second specification additionally includes dummies for insurance cate-
gories as described in the previous section (Table 5.6). Variables referring to income
subject to social security contributions in the year before retirement and retire-
ment income paid by the public pension insurance in 2003 are defined as dummy
variables of income or pension income classes: A dummy for missing income val-
ues, income mis, as well as dummies for income and pension payment quintiles are
62Persons that receive a disability pension have often taken rehabilitation services before retiring.
However, this is no precondition for obtaining a disability pension in Germany.
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constructed: income 1st, ..., income 5th, pension 1st, ..., pension 5th. This classi-
fication does not allow to interpret the absolute effects but effects relative to the
reference category, which is the third quintile for both income and pension payments
respectively, income 3rd and pension 3rd.
Table 5.6: Characteristics of the official retirement age I
men women men women
income mis 1.728*** 1.039*** high school -0.547** 0.271
[0.087] [0.067] [0.269] [0.316]
income 1st -0.336*** 0.065 high school V T -0.538*** -0.029
[0.067] [0.051] [0.120] [0.145]
income 2nd -0.354*** -0.444*** sec sch -0.936*** -0.365***
[0.042] [0.032] [0.071] [0.099]
income 4th -0.081** -0.301*** sec sch V T -0.955*** -0.437***
[0.033] [0.044] [0.056] [0.095]
income 5th 0.365*** 0.472*** edu unknown -0.643*** -0.054
[0.076] [0.064] [0.069] [0.100]
pension 1st 1.598*** 2.814*** edu missing -1.350*** -0.179*
[0.050] [0.032] [0.063] [0.097]
pension 2nd 0.607*** 1.188*** reha -3.279*** -3.576***
[0.053] [0.030] [0.066] [0.070]
pension 4th -0.360*** 0.136*** sickness -0.034*** -0.020***
[0.029] [0.031] [0.004] [0.005]
pension 5th -0.219*** -0.677*** childcare 0.013*** 0.014***
[0.072] [0.034] [0.003] [0.001]
tech col -0.722*** -0.571*** married 0.178*** -0.288***
[0.083] [0.151] [0.031] [0.022]
No. of obs. 33917 38285
R2 0.3 0.51
Notes: The dependent variable is the retirement entry age in 2003, age; OLS estimations with
White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
The results show that men and women with missing income values, that are
mainly passively and voluntarily insured individuals, retire later compared to all
other income classes. On the one hand, this could be explained by the fact that
passively insured individuals are often not eligible to retirement pathways that allow
for retirement before age 65. On the other hand, voluntarily insured individuals are
often self-employed and typically retire at higher ages than employees.
Relative to the third income quintile, low incomes (first and second quintile) are
associated with lower retirement ages among men whereas very high incomes (fifth
quintile) are associated with higher retirement ages. Except for the first quintile
125
the effect for women looks similar. This category tends to retire later: Women with
very low incomes have typically very unstable employment histories and insurance
periods due to child-caring. Therefore, they often might not be eligible to early
retirement, i.e., retirement before age 65.
The lower pension payments, the higher are - relative to the third quintile -
retirement entry ages (refer to the coefficients on pension 1st and pension 2nd).
This result is in line with the following consideration: Many people who retire late,
i.e., with the age of 65, are not eligible to one of the pathways into early retirement.
These are mostly passively and voluntarily insured people that typically receive low
pension payments. This way into retirement applies to the typical housewife and
is, therefore, more common among women compared to men. In line with this
consideration, there is a much larger effect for women compared to men.
Income and pension payments are of course strongly correlated. Note, however,
that in the present data this correlation is actually weaker than one might expect at
first:63 For several cases income values are not reported (see previous section) or em-
ployment histories are rather instable before retirement such that income measured
in the year before retirement is no perfect proxy for individuals’ relative income
positions over the life cycle.
Compared to persons with lower educational degrees, men with a university de-
gree, uni, have a higher retirement age.64 This finding is in line with the general
notion that people with higher education are more attached to their jobs and, there-
fore, tend to work longer. Moreover, they are typically less physically strained and
are able to work longer. Men with a technical college degree, tech col, or secondary
schooling degree, sec sch or sec sch V T , have comparatively low retirement ages,
i.e., they retire on average between 8 to 11 month earlier. Men with high school
degrees, high sch and high sch V T , lie in between these two extremes. Results for
women are similar, though smaller in size and less significant. The fact that the
association between education and retirement age is much weaker for women could
again be explained by interrupted employment histories. Due to child bearing and
caring, many women have not followed a career that is suggested by their educational
degree.
Both health measures, reha and sickness, reveal that a higher degree of health
is associated with a higher retirement entry age for men and women which is a well
documented phenomenon.65 The number of months credited by the public pension
insurance due to sickness or rehabilitation has only a very small quantitative effect
on the retirement age.66 If men or women have claimed rehabilitation services due
to sickness, they retire on average more than three years earlier. The present data
63The actual correlation coefficient amounts to 0.71.
64The reference category are men or women with a university degree.
65Refer to e.g. Larsen and Gupta (2004) who provide for a large literature on this topic.
66An exact quantitative interpretation is not very reliable as the measure is censored at 48
months of credited insurance contributions due to sickness.
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show that these are mostly cases that take the disability pathway into retirement.
However, rehabilitation is no necessary precondition for receiving a disability pension
in Germany.
The number of months dedicated to child-caring as measured by the public pen-
sion insurance, childcare, on average leads to a higher retirement age for both men
and women, though the effect is low in size. This result is well in line with Hank
(2004) who investigates in great detail the relationship between women’s retirement
behavior and fertility biographies.
Married women retire on average three to four months earlier than singles or wid-
ows. This finding could be explained by the fact that wives are generally younger
than husbands and often try to retire at approximately the same age as their hus-
bands. For men the effect is mirror-inverted: Married men retire about two months
later on average. The result is in line with the consideration that in the generation
of interest married men are mostly responsible for the main family income source
and, thus, work longer in order to afford retirement for the couple and possibly
education for the children.
In a second specification, additional dummy variables for individuals with par-
tial retirement, part ret, compulsory insurance due to unemployment, sickness or
rehabilitation, comp ins, marginal employment, marg emp, voluntary insurance,
vol ins, passive insurance, pas ins, and other insurance status, others, before re-
tirement in 2003 are added (Table 5.7). The reference category is employment
subject to social social security contributions.
Men and women with partial retirement or compulsory insurance due to unem-
ployment have a lower retirement age. Both groups are able to retire early due to a
special retirement pathway for unemployment and partial retirement that still ap-
plies to cohorts in the present sample, though adjustment costs have already phased
in. The effect is smaller for women. This corresponds well with the possibility of
women to enter retirement under the same conditions and as early as unemployed
persons or as individuals subject to a partial retirement plan. Marginally employed,
voluntarily and passively insured persons on average retire much later. Most of the
individuals in these three categories are not eligible for retirement before age 65,
probably because of too short insurance and contribution periods. Effects for men
and women are qualitatively the same and just slightly differ in size.67
Naturally, correlations between individual characteristics and the retirement age
are largely driven by the institutional framework such as insurance categories or re-
habilitation services and to a smaller extent by socio-economic characteristics such
67Note that in this specification the estimated coefficients of the income and pension payment
dummies differ. The change is due to a correlation of income and insurance categories. Only in
the case of the missing income category, income mis, there is a substantial qualitative change in
the estimated coefficient. As this category is strongly correlated with the insurance categories of
passively and voluntarily insured persons, the positive effect is now captured by these dummies,
passive and vol ins.
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Table 5.7: Characteristics of the official retirement age II
men women men women
income mis -0.818*** -1.262*** sec sch V T -0.982*** -0.318***
[0.116] [0.076] [0.070] [0.098]
income 1st -0.366*** -0.465*** edu unknown -0.672*** -0.118
[0.066] [0.051] [0.069] [0.099]
income 2nd -0.194*** -0.305*** edu missing -1.341*** -0.251***
[0.043] [0.032] [0.065] [0.097]
income 4th -0.027 -0.273*** reha -3.262*** -3.340***
[0.033] [0.042] [0.067] [0.069]
income 5th 0.284*** 0.259*** sickness -0.034*** -0.017***
[0.075] [0.061] [0.004] [0.004]
pension 1st 0.871*** 2.049*** childcare 0.010*** 0.013***
[0.054] [0.036] [0.003] [0.001]
pension 2nd 0.141*** 0.821*** married 0.165*** -0.275***
[0.053] [0.030] [0.030] [0.021]
pension 4th -0.304*** 0.104*** part ret -0.683*** -0.294***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.035] [0.035]
pension 5th -0.243*** -0.862*** comp ins -0.683*** -0.308***
[0.074] [0.041] [0.038] [0.036]
tech col -0.688*** -0.465*** marg emp 0.951*** 1.848***
[0.081] [0.150] [0.119] [0.060]
high school -0.539*** 0.028 vol ins 2.520*** 2.360***
[0.119] [0.143] [0.110] [0.090]
high school V T -0.629** 0.267 pas ins 3.000*** 2.999***
[0.266] [0.328] [0.100] [0.070]
sec sch -0.978*** -0.362*** others 0.261*** 0.743***
[0.056] [0.094] [0.081] [0.057]
No. of obs. 33917 38285
R2 0.35 0.57
Notes: see Table 5.6.
as education, child-caring or marriage. The level of income subject to social security
contributions and pension payments are also but to a smaller extent important de-
terminants. The results in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 underline the importance of employing
incentive variables that bundle the institutional framework as well as individuals’
employment histories and future expected pension payments when determining in-
dividuals’ retirement entry ages, as e.g. undertaken in Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan
(2004) in Section 5.1.
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The Effective Retirement Age
Due to generous preretirement possibilities, about 40 percent of individuals in the
sample effectively retire before their official retirement date. These cases are identi-
fied and their effective retirement age is defined as described in Section 5.2.3. The
present section investigates whether individuals’ characteristics are significantly dif-
ferent with respect to retirement age for preretired individuals as opposed to in-
dividuals taking official pension plans. The regressions documented in Table 5.6
are repeated with interaction terms between a preretirement dummy, P , and each
explanatory variable (Table 5.8).68
Table 5.8: Characteristics of the effective retirement age
men women men women
income mis 0.32 0.054 income mis ∗ P 0.349 0.108
[0.197] [0.120] [0.273] [0.192]
income 1st -0.071 -0.058 income 1st ∗ P 0.073 -0.228
[0.143] [0.097] [0.201] [0.143]
income 2nd -0.210** -0.503*** income 2nd ∗ P -0.365*** 0.029
[0.083] [0.048] [0.106] [0.069]
income 4th -0.251*** -0.587*** income 4th ∗ P 1.342*** 1.423***
[0.053] [0.064] [0.064] [0.073]
income 5th 0.166 0.059 income 5th ∗ P -0.751*** -0.663***
[0.168] [0.122] [0.242] [0.182]
pension 1st 1.481*** 2.672*** pension 1st ∗ P 0.276* 0.239***
[0.056] [0.044] [0.150] [0.062]
pension 2nd 0.761*** 1.400*** pension 2nd ∗ P -0.664*** -0.632***
[0.065] [0.044] [0.115] [0.058]
pension 4th -0.560*** 0.081* pension 4th ∗ P 0.228*** 0.104*
[0.050] [0.048] [0.058] [0.059]
pension 5th -0.207*** -0.680*** pension 5th ∗ P -0.304 -0.085
[0.067] [0.043] [0.283] [0.060]
tech col -0.673*** -0.791*** tech col ∗ P 0.182 0.363
[0.118] [0.231] [0.155] [0.279]
high school -0.740* 0.631* high school ∗ P 0.098 -0.771
[0.403] [0.377] [0.500] [0.508]
high school V T -0.655*** 0.054 high school V T ∗ P 0.303 -0.465*
[0.167] [0.214] [0.222] [0.268]
Note: This table continues on the next page.
68The estimation of interacted effects for preretired persons is equivalent to a separate regression
for this group.
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sec sch -1.028*** -0.399*** sec sch ∗ P 0.112 -0.162
[0.095] [0.151] [0.130] [0.186]
sec sch V T -1.151*** -0.407*** sec sch V T ∗ P 0.466*** -0.159
[0.070] [0.145] [0.102] [0.179]
edu unknown -0.578*** 0.096 edu unknown ∗ P -0.269** -0.510***
[0.091] [0.152] [0.126] [0.187]
edu missing -0.848*** 0.293* edu missing ∗ P 0.028 -0.805***
[0.106] [0.150] [0.132] [0.183]
reha -4.245*** -4.000*** reha*P 2.533*** 1.936***
[0.089] [0.093] [0.124] [0.132]
sickness -0.043*** -0.022*** sickness*P 0.008 0.01
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008]
childcare 0.009** 0.012*** childcare*P 0.009 0
[0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
married 0.069 -0.368*** married*P 0.222*** 0.215***
[0.046] [0.028] [0.060] [0.041]
P -3.317*** -2.664*** No. of obs. 33557 37992
[0.388] [0.257] R2 0.54 0.67
Notes: The dependent variable is retirement entry age in 2000-2003 which is adjusted for pre-
retirement, agef ; P is a dummy equal to one if a person preretires as defined in Section 5.2.3;
OLS estimations with White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Overall, the effects for preretired individuals69 are qualitatively similar to the
reference category, i.e., individuals that take official pension plans. Main differences
exist with respect to the size of the effects on rehabilitation, income and pension pay-
ments: Most importantly, the negative association between claims of rehabilitation
services before retirement, reha, and retirement age is much smaller for preretired
men and women. If rehabilitation services are taken, the retirement age of persons
with regular pension plans is on average almost four years lower whereas preretired
men are only about one and a half years and preretired women two years younger
compared to persons not claiming any rehabilitation services. This observation can
be explained by the fact that the frequency of rehabilitation services in the present
data is much higher for persons between age 54 and 60 compared to older persons.
At the same time, rehabilitation is strongly correlated with disability pension entries
at ages below 60. Therefore, persons who take rehabilitation services seem less likely
to take the preretirement pathway but rather the disability pathway.
Differences in effects between preretired individuals and the rest of the sample
are large for individuals with middle and high incomes: The estimated effects differ
substantially for the fourth and fifth quintile, whereas there is no or only a small
difference with respect to the missing values dummy and the first and second income
69These effects are obtained by adding the interaction effect and the respective effect for the
reference group.
130
quintile.
There are also significant differences between preretired individuals and those
taking official pathways into retirement across all pension payments quintiles, except
for the fifth quintile. In spite of the quantitative differences, there is still a similar
qualitative pattern for both groups, though: Relative to the third quintile, lower
pension payments are associated with a higher retirement age and higher pension
payments are associated with a lower retirement age.
To summarize: Claiming rehabilitation services before retirement has a much
lower effect on retirement age for preretired individuals compared to the rest of the
sample. Also income in the year before retirement and pension payments in 2003
have different effects for preretired persons. However, there is no obvious and easy to
interpret pattern of differences in income and pension effects between the two groups.
Further minor differences can be observed with respect to marital status and edu-
cation.70 Overall, the estimated differences in effects with respect to rehabilitation
services, income and pensions as well as the large number of identified preretirement
cases underline the relevance of taking account of preretirement in administrative
data when individual retirement entry decisions and effects of retirement entries on
the overall social security system are of interest.
5.2.5 Conclusion and Outlook
The present paper employs administrative data of individuals’ retirement entries in
2003 (SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003 ) provided by the German Pension In-
surance. Retirement entry in administrative data is defined as receiving pension
payments for the first time. This does, however, not include the possibility of prere-
tirement. The issue of preretirement plays an important role in recent pension and
labor-market reforms.
Preretirement is defined as leaving the labor force and effectively retiring before
any official pathways into retirement can be taken. Until official retirement individu-
als receive financial support through arrangements between the state, employers and
employees that typically burden the social security system. These arrangements are
often very generous for the employee such that this option has been frequently used:
40 percent of all men and women in the sample preretire. They stay on average 2.4
years in preretirement before taking one of the regular retirement plans. Moreover,
the present paper investigates individual determinants of retirement entry age such
as income, pension payments, measures for education, health and family status. It
is investigated whether individuals’ characteristics are significantly different with
respect to retirement age for the group of preretired individuals and individuals tak-
ing regular pension plans. Noticeable differences arise with respect to rehabilitation
70There is a difference in estimated effects of edu unknown and edu missing which is per defi-
nition mainly driven by a larger number of passively insured persons in the preretired sub-sample.
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claims before retirement, income before retirement and pension payments.
These insights are based on analyzing German administrative data. Such data is
very advantageous with respect to detailed and reliable information on individuals
pension characteristics and the number of observations. Information is only provided
as far as it is relevant for the calculation of pensions. Consequently, income variables
are censored, information on wealth is non-existent and retirement entry is defined as
obtaining public pension payments. In order to provide useful information for future
studies based on German administrative data provided by the German Pension
Insurance, the paper discusses those issues.
In light of recent reform initiatives in Germany concerning the labor market
(unemployment insurance) or social security legislation (retirement entry rules and
adjustment costs) interesting future research questions arise: What is the impact
of these reforms on retirement entries, labor force exits and preretirement? How
will future pension and labor-market reforms change the distribution of retirement
entry age? Such research questions are typically analyzed in option value models
of individual retirement entry behavior, e.g., Bo¨rsch-Supan (1992), Schmidt (1995),
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996), Siddiqui (1997), Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000a), Berkel
and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004), Antolin and Scarpetta (1998). Administrative data that
is available so far, i.e., the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003, does not yet include
sufficient variation in individuals’ retirement entry decisions in order to investigate
these questions. Appendix B discusses why an option value approach is not feasible
with the data at hand and describes the necessary data characteristics for such
an undertaking. In particular, it is essential to have data that includes not only
observations of retirement entries but also of older workers still in the labor force
and not yet retired. It is of great interest to release such administrative data in order
to accomplish the estimation of structural models of retirement entry decisions and
labor force exits that can be used for policy analysis.
132
5.2.6 Appendix
Appendix A - The Data
Table 5.9: Variable definitions
Variable Description
age retirement entry age in 2003
agef retirement entry age in 2000-2003, preretirement is taken into
account as described in Section 5.2.3
income mis dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security .
contributions is missing in 2002
income 1st dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]0; 428] Euros per month in 2002
income 2nd dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]428; 1141] Euros per month in 2002
income 3rd dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]1141; 1957] Euros per month in 2002
income 4th dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]1957; 2870[ Euros per month in 2002
income 5th dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
is above 2870 Euros per month in 2002
pension 1st dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]0; 266] Euros per month in 2003
pension 2nd dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]266; 537] Euros per month in 2003
pension 3rd dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]537; 794] Euros per month in 2003
pension 4th dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]794; 1122[ Euros per month in 2003
pension 5th dummy equal to one if public pension payments are above
1122 Euros per month in 2003
reha dummy variable equal to one if rehabilitation services were
claimed during the last 5 years before retirement
sickness number of months with insurance credits due to sickness
or rehabilitation
childcare number of months with insurance credits for child-caring
married dummy variable equal to one if an individual is married
or widowed
sec sch dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from secondary school
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sec sch VT dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from secondary school plus vocational training
high sch dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from high school
high sch VT dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from high school plus vocational training
tech col dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from a technical college
uni dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from university
edu missing dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is a missing value
edu unknown dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is unknown
full emp dummy variable equal to one if the individual had an employ-
ment subject to social social security contributions in the year
before retirement
partial ret dummy variable equal to one if the individual was partly
retired in the year before retirement
comp ins dummy variable equal to one if the individual was compulsorily
insured due to unemployment, sickness or rehabilitation71 in
the year before retirement
marg emp dummy variable equal to one if the individual was marginally
employed in the year before retirement
vol ins dummy equal to one if a person was voluntarily insured in the
year before retirement
pas ins dummy equal to one if a person was passively insured in the
year before retirement
others dummy equal to one for all other individuals that are neither
passive, vol ins, marg emp, comp ins, part ret or full emp,
which includes the following employment categories: credited
insurance, other compulsory insurances, other status
and unknown status
71Refer to SGB III and § 3 Nr. 3 SGB VI.
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Appendix B - The Option Value Model and SUF Versichertenrentenzu-
gang 2003
The individual retirement decision is a sequential inter-temporal discrete choice
problem under uncertainty that depends on socioeconomic as well as present and
future institutional and legal determinants. This inter-temporal nature of the deci-
sion process is reflected in option value models such as by Stock and Wise (1990).72
The option value model assumes that individuals compare the present value of all
future discounted retirement income when retiring now to all present values of re-
tiring in all possible future points in time. An individual chooses to retire now if
the utility from retiring today is higher than utility from retiring at any later point
in time.
Due to its structural nature the estimation of an option value model allows pol-
icy analyses. More specifically, one can simulate the impacts of pension reforms on
individuals retirement entry decisions and, therefore, on the distribution of retire-
ment age in the population. This section discusses, why the option value model can
not be applied to the data of the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003.
In order to employ an option value model based on Stock and Wise (1990) as
estimated e.g. by Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) (see Section 5.1), panel data on
individuals retiring during the sample period is required. Ideally, the data should be
a representative draw from the German population of the elderly. Most importantly,
variation in the option value is needed that arises from different characteristics across
individuals retiring at different ages and still working, and from differences in pension
legislation across years and cohorts. The time series information on each individual
has to be sufficiently long in order to observe changes in the option value before
retiring.
The data structure of the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003 does not suffi-
ciently match these requirements. First, the data is cross-sectional as it refers to
retirement entries in 2003 only. The mechanism of the option value model can not
be revealed in such data as the decision of each single individual has to be followed
over time. A very short but insufficient time series can be extracted from the data,
though, as one has information on individuals’ labor-market and insurance status
in 2000 to 2002.
Second and most importantly, all individuals retire in 2003. The importance of
this point becomes clear if one describes the final measure of interest, the probability
of retiring at age a conditional on the option value at age b in the present sample,
Pr(RA = a|OVb), more formally by applying Bayes’ Rule:
72The model by Stock and Wise (1990) does not provide for a complete solution of the complex
inter-temporal optimization problem, but includes all relevant economic incentives. Models solving
the full inter-temporal optimization problem can be found e.g. in Rust (1996), Rust and Phelan
(1997). Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) discuss and compare three alternative approaches of
estimating an option value model. More general surveys about option value models can be found
in Arnds and Bonin (2002) and Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999).
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Pr(RA = a|OVb) = Pr(RA = a)Pr(OVb|RA = a)
Pr(OVb)
,
where Pr(RA = a) is the unconditional probability of retiring at age a, Pr(OVb)
is the unconditional probability of an option valueOV at age b, and Pr(OVb|RA = a)
is the probability of observing an option value OV at age b if an individual retires
with age a. In the present sample a refers to retirement age in 2003 and b takes
the values b = a, b = a − 1, b = a − 2 or b = a − 3. The unconditional probabil-
ity of retirement age a, Pr(RA = a), and the probability of an option value OVb
conditioned on retirement entry age a, Pr(OVb|RA = a), can be obtained from the
data sample at hand. If necessary both terms can be weighted by age such that the
representative age structure in the population is matched. However, information on
Pr(OVb) is only available for individuals retiring in 2003 and not for a represen-
tative draw from the whole population including also individuals retiring later. If
Pr(OVb) is significantly different for individuals inside and outside the sample, the
sample has too little variation and estimation results will be biased.73 Additional
variation would come from a longer time-series dimension including people that are
still working and covering a longer period of institutional changes. Potentially Ger-
man data of retirement entries between 1997 and 2015 are very useful as during
this period adjustment costs of early retirement are phased in and retirement age
limits are gradually increased. As no true time-series information is contained in
the data at hand, such variation is not sufficiently provided. Crucial information for
the model is not existent and econometric models with weighting procedures, such
as the “weighted” exogenous sampling Maximum-Likelihood estimator (WESLM)74,
can not help. As the option value is a complex construction, it can not be easily
obtained from other data sources.
Third, the sample is only representative with respect to the population of all
retirement entries in 2003 whereas it is not representative for the German population
of retired and non-retired individuals. There is a large portion of 60, 63 and 65 years
old individuals retiring, as these are popular retirement ages, but there are only few
people with age 59, 61 and 64. After constructing an artificial panel from 2000 to
2003 with all individuals retiring in 2003 the sample is not at all representative to
the German population. One can solve this problem by weighting observations by
age classes. However, weights take very extreme values.
73Estimations indeed reveal that there is not sufficient variation concerning the option value in
the data. In the model individuals have an incentive to retire if the option value of postponing
the retirement entry decision becomes negative. The option value falls the closer an individual
gets to its optimal moment of retirement. Therefore, individuals tend to have small option values
around the moment of retirement. In order to obtain variation, observations on individuals still
being further away from their entries into retirement are essential.
74Refer to Manski and McFadden (1981).
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Overall, no robust estimation method can be found to solve the most severe
problem of missing information on individuals not retiring during the sample period.
Additional data on older individuals not yet retired is needed. Ideally, a random
draw of insured persons of age 54 to 72 is needed that covers a period of about 15
years and that includes persons that retire within the sample period and others who
are still in the labor force or not yet retired.
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